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THE EFFECT OF PHYSICIAN OWNERSHIP ON QUALITY OF CARE FOR OUTPATIENT
PROCEDURES
By Xinliang Liu, Ph.D., M.B.B.S., M.S.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctoral of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012
Director: Gloria J. Bazzoli, Ph.D.
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Ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) play an important role in providing surgical and
diagnostic services in an outpatient setting. They can be owned by physicians who staff them.
Previous studies focused on patient “cherry picking” and over-utilization of services due to
physician ownership. Few studies examined the relationship between physician ownership and
quality of care. Using a retrospective cohort of patients who underwent colonoscopy, this study
examined the effect of physician ownership of ASCs on the occurrence of adverse events after
outpatient colonoscopy.
Agency theory is used to as a conceptual framework. Depending on the extent to which
consumers are able to assess quality of care differences across health care settings, physician

ownership can function as a mechanism to improve quality or as a deterrent to quality. Four
adverse event measures are used in this study: same day ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day
serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day other
gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, and 30-day non-gastrointestinal
events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Physician ownership status is determined based on
a court decision in California in 2007. Data sources include the State Ambulatory Surgery
Databases (SASD), State Inpatient Databases (SID), Emergency Department Databases (SEDD),
State Utilization Data Files, the Area Resource File (ARF), and HMO/PPO data from Health
Leaders.
After controlling for confounding factors, the study found that colonoscopy patients
treated at a physician-owned ASC had similar odds of experiencing same day ED visit or
hospitalization and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization as
those treated in a hospital-based outpatient facility. But the former had significantly higher odds
of experiencing 30-day serious gastrointestinal events and 30-day other gastrointestinal events
resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. The results are robust to changes in propensity score
adjustment approach and to the inclusion of a lagged quality indicator. They suggest that
physician ownership of ASCs was not associated with better quality of care for colonoscopy
patients. As more complex procedures are shifted from hospital-based outpatient facilities to
ASCs, expanded efforts to monitor and report quality of care will be worthwhile.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Specific Aims
Containing health care costs while improving quality of care have been priorities of
policy makers for many decades and is increasingly important given objectives of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2010). Shifting surgical
services to outpatient settings, especially ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) has the potential to
achieve cost reduction and quality improvement at the same time (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster,
2003). ASCs are health care facilities that specialize in providing surgical services that do not
require an overnight stay. Most ASCs are freestanding facilities independent from other facilities
while about 1% are owned and operated by hospitals (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
2003; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2011). ASCs play an important role in
providing surgical and diagnostic services in an outpatient setting. The number of Medicarecertified ASCs reached 5,260 in 2009, up from 336 in 1985 (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2002; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2010).
ASCs can be owned by physicians who staff them. Physician owners collect both
professional fees and a share of the facility’s profits. A multitude of concerns arise about the
potential conflicts of interest because physician owners are in a position to self-refer patients for
procedures. Issues regarding patient “cherry picking” and over-utilization of services due to
physician ownership of health care facilities are at the forefront of research and policy
discussions (Hollingsworth et al., 2009; Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Mitchell, 2010; Strope et al.,
1

2009; Strope, Sarma, Ye, Wei, & Hollenbeck, 2009; Winter, 2003). However, the potential
relationship between physician ownership and quality of care has not been examined in
substantial depth. Proponents argue that physician-owned health facilities, including ASCs,
provide better quality of care because physician ownership may enhance physician’s
accountability (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009; Office of Inspector General,
1999). By contrast, others contend that quality of care in physician owned facilities may be
compromised due to potential financial conflicts of interest (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; O’Neill &
Hartz, 2012). Yet, limited empirical study has been conducted to assess the potential influence of
physician ownership of health care facilities on quality of care and no research has specifically
examined this issue for physician-owned ASCs.
This study aims to address this knowledge gap by examining the effect of physician
ownership of ASCs on the occurrence of adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy.
Colonoscopy is widely used for the screening, diagnosis and treatment of colonic disorders. It
has been accepted as the most effective colorectal cancer screening method (Rex, Johnson,
Lieberman, Burt, & Sonnenberg, 2000). Examination of the quality of outpatient colonoscopy is
needed to monitor and improve its quality and safety. The task is especially important given that
colonoscopy has been migrating out of hospital-based outpatient facilities and into ASCs. The
market share of Medicare-covered colonoscopies provided in ASCs increased from 22% in 2000
to 41% while the market share of these procedures at hospital-based outpatient facilities fell from
73% to 54% during the same period (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009).
Through this study, we will gain a better understanding of the implications of physician
ownership of ASCs on quality of outpatient colonoscopy care as well as a clearer picture about
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factors that affect the occurrence of adverse events after this procedure in outpatient surgical
settings.
Study Overview and Research Questions
Physician ownership is common among ASCs. But the question of how physician
ownership affects the production of quality outpatient surgical care needs to be assessed. This
study addresses this question by examining how physician ownership affects the occurrence of
adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy. Specifically, this study compares the rates of
experiencing adverse events within 30 days of the procedure by patients who were treated at a
physician-owned ASCs and those treated by a hospital-based outpatient facility.
The following research questions guide the investigation:
•

Research question I: How does physician ownership affect the incidence of
adverse events following outpatient colonoscopy?

•

Research question II: Does the competitiveness of the health care market change
the effect of physician-ownership on quality of care?

•

Research question III: What patient-, facility-, and market-level factors are
associated with the incidence of adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy?

Conceptual Framework
This study focuses on the relationship between physician ownership and quality of care in
outpatient surgical settings. Agency theory is used to explain how physician ownership may
shape two agency relationships, the one between other owners of an ASC (principals) and
physicians (agents) who perform surgical procedures in the facility and the relationship between
patients (principals) and physicians (agents) and ultimately affect patient outcomes. Depending
on the extent to which consumers are able to assess quality of care differences across health care
3

settings, physician ownership can function as a mechanism to improve quality or as a deterrent to
quality. In addition to physician ownership, the study will also investigate the moderating effect
of the market competition on ASC ownership.
Patient characteristics, financial incentives and other organizational factors, and market
environment all affect physician choices of quality of output (Conrad & Christianson, 2004a). In
order to isolate the potential effect of physician ownership, the study also controls for
confounding factors. These include factors from patient-, facility-, and market levels.
The graphical depiction in Figure 1 presents the groups of factors that may influence the
ultimate quality of care in outpatient surgical settings.
Market Characteristics

Patient Outcomes

Patient Characteristics

Organizational Characteristics
• Physician ownership
• Physician ownership*
market competition
• Other facility-level
Figure 1. Brief Depiction of Multi-dimensional Factors that Affect Quality of Care for Outpatient
Procedures
Study Approach
This study will examine the provision of colonoscopy services in the State of California.
Several reasons lead to this choice of geographic location for the analysis. First, California has
the largest number of ASCs and nearly three million ambulatory surgeries were performed in
2007 in California. Because there is no ambulatory surgery database at the national level, a study
based on California is a good option given the large number of procedures in this state. Second, a
court decision in California made it possible to identify full or partial physician ownership of
4

ASCs in the state. Third, information related to organizational factors can be obtained from
national sources and also California state agencies.
The study examines a retrospective cohort of patients who underwent colonoscopy in
physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities between 2005 and 2007 in
California. Primary data for the analysis comes from the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ) Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, specifically the Agency's State
Ambulatory Surgery Database (SASD). This database contains Current Procedural Terminology
codes, which were used to identify patients receiving colonoscopy procedures. AHRQ also
provides a revisit data file that allows researchers to examine whether patients in the SASD
database had a subsequent emergency department visit or hospitalization. This study links
AHRQ's State Inpatient Databases (SID) and Emergency Department Databases (SEDD) to the
SASD for California. Adverse events that may be precipitated by the colonoscopy procedure
were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical
Modification (ICD-9 CM) diagnosis codes reported in previous studies (Levin et al., 2006;
Warren et al., 2009). The analytical database also includes information on (1) ASC and hospitalbased outpatient facility characteristics from the State Utilization Data Files of Specialty Clinics
and State Utilization Data Files of Hospitals; (2) community socioeconomic characteristics from
the Area Resource File (ARF); and (3) data on HMO/PPO market shares from Health Leaders.
Four adverse event measures are used in this study: same day ED visit or hospitalization,
30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day other
gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day non-gastrointestinal events
resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Physician ownership status is determined based on a
court decision in California in 2007, which changed the licensing requirements for ASCs wholly
5

or partially owned by physicians. The study controls for patient-, facility-, and market-level
factors using three-level generalized hierarchical linear models (GHLMs) to account for the
clustering of patients within outpatient surgical facilities and the clustering of those facilities
within health care markets.
Significance of the Study
The care provided by ASCs is seen by many to be a less costly alternative to the care
furnished by hospital-based outpatient facilities. While existing studies largely focus on the
relationship between physician ownership of health care facilities and potential over-utilization
of services due to self-referral as well as issues of patient selection, limited evidence exists on
the potential relationship between physician ownership and quality of care. In addition, the
quality of outpatient surgical care is relatively understudied in terms of patient outcome
measurement and the scope of factors that may affect it.
The study contributes to the body of existing research in several ways. First, it focuses on
the effect of physician ownership on the quality of care in outpatient surgical settings,
complementing prior studies of the impact of physician ownership on potential patient selection
and overuse of services. Second, the study uses a heterogeneous and large sample to identify
procedure-specific complications that result in ER visit or hospitalization after outpatient
colonoscopy. Samples used by previous studies were limited to just Medicare or Medicaid
patients or were restricted to a few hospitals (Ko & Dominitz, 2010). The largest sample size was
53,220 patients (Warren et al., 2009). Third, the study uses multilevel analysis techniques to
account for the hierarchical structure of the data.
Results of the study have potential implications for theory, health policy, and health care
management. First, this study serves as an example of applying agency theory to the examination
6

of physician ownership and patient outcomes of care. It also assesses relationships noted in the
outpatient surgical literature, such as the positive relationship between procedure volume and
quality (Chukmaitov et al., 2008). From a policy perspective, a better understanding of the
relationship between physician ownership and quality may help policy makers and payers
evaluate the value of care provided by physician-owned ASCs and develop informed disclosure
and payment policies. From a clinical or management perspective, the research findings could be
used to identify subgroups of surgical patients who are at greater rates of developing
complications after the procedure. Extra efforts may be needed to monitor high risk patients both
in the facility and at home for potential complications that require medical attention. Targeting
care for these vulnerable subgroups can be much more cost-effective than delivering
interventions to the general patient population. This is especially the case considering that the
rates of adverse events after outpatient surgery are low.
Summary of Remaining Chapters
The dissertation is organized into six chapters. This chapter provided a general
introduction and discussed the aims, conceptual framework, scope and approach, and the
significance of the study. Detailed information is given in subsequently chapters. Chapter 2
reviews the development of the ASC industry, relevant literature, and policies related to
physician ownership in ASCs. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework based on agency
theory. Chapter 4 covers research methods used in this study, including research design,
empirical models, specification issues involved, and approaches for dealing with these
specification issues. Chapter 5 presents study findings. Results of descriptive analysis,
multivariate models, and sensitivity analysis are discussed. Chapter 6 summarizes research
findings and discusses the implications and limitations of the study.
7

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Studies of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) have grown substantially in number in
recent years. This chapter reviews the literature related to physician ownership of ASCs and its
implications. The chapter is organized into five sections. The first section provides background
on ambulatory surgery centers. Specifically, it covers the growth of the ASC industry, common
surgical procedures provided by ASCs, and Medicare ASC payment policy. The second section
discusses the prevalence and measurement of physician ownership among ASCs. The third
section reviews the literature on the quality of outpatient surgery in general and that focused on
outpatient colonoscopy specifically. The fourth section summarizes the effects of physician
ownership on care in ASCs. The related literature can be grouped into studies examining patient
selection and those focusing on services use. The fifth section summarizes the limitations of the
literature and outlines how this study addresses the gap identified in the review.
Background on Ambulatory Surgery Centers
Over the last thirty years, there has been significant change in how surgical services are
delivered. With the advances in medical technology and the external pressure to reduce costs,
traditionally inpatient surgeries are increasingly performed in outpatient settings. In 1981,
outpatient surgeries accounted for only 19% of all surgeries (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, &
Xanthopoulos, 2009). The most recent data indicate that the proportion has increased to a range
between 60% and 70% (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2004).
8

In addition, complex surgical procedures traditionally rendered in hospital-based
outpatient facilities are migrating into ASCs and physician’s office. During the period from early
1980s to 2005, the share of outpatient surgeries performed by hospital-based outpatient facilities
has fallen from over 90% to 45%, while the shares performed in ASCs and physician’s offices
has increased from less than 5% each to 38% and 17%, respectively (American Hospital
Association, 2006). Data from Pennsylvania suggest the same trend. From 2000 through 2009,
ASC’s share of outpatient diagnostic and surgical procedures performed on all patients rose from
10% to 33% (Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, 2010).
The number of ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) has increased substantially since
the1980s. The first ASC was started by two surgeons back in early 1970s. In 1985, there were
336 Medicare-certified ASCs around the country. In 2010, the number had increased to 5,316
(Figure 2.). However, the growth of ASCs has slowed in recent years due to the economic
downturn, Medicare payment system change in 2008, higher payments rates for the same
outpatient surgical services in the hospital-based outpatient facility setting, and limited
opportunities to develop new ASCs as most physicians are already affiliated with extant ASCs
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2012).
ASCs tend to be concentrated geographically. As of 2007, five states, California, Florida,
Maryland, Texas, and Georgia, had more than 39 percent of all ASCs while Arkansas and Rhode
Island had fewer than 10 ASCs and Vermont had none (Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, 2009). California has the largest number of ASCs. The number of licensed ASCs in
California grew by 15% from 2003 to 2007 (Figure 2.). But the number has dropped since 2007
because of the Capen v Shewry decision in 2007, after which about 450 ASCs were delicensed.

9

Figure 2. Number of Medicare-certified Ambulatory Surgical Centers, 1985 – 2010
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2002. Data Compendium, 2002 Edition; Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission. March 2003/2009/2012. Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy;
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). Surgical Clinics 2003-2007 Trends,
Specialty Clinics Annual Utilization Data Files (2008-2010).

This decision provides the opportunity to distinguish physician-owned ASCs from nonphysician-owned ASCs and will be discussed in detail below.
Since 1982, Medicare has covered certain surgical procedures provided in ASCs under
Part B. CMS is responsible for determining whether a procedure can be performed safely in an
ASC and thus can be eligible for Medicare payment. The list of procedures payable by Medicare
in ASCs has expanded over time, especially in the 2008 revision to the ASC payment system.
Medicare covers about 3,500 surgical procedures according to a MedPAC report (Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, 2012). Cataract surgery and endoscopy procedures are among
10

the most common procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries in ASCs (Table 1.). In many
states, such as Florida, Nevada, Tennessee, and Washington, ASCs furnished more than half of
all colonoscopies as of 2007 (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). Even though
CMS implemented no positive updates to ASC payment rates between 2004 and 2008, the
volume of services provided by ASCs to Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries still
increased by 10.2% per year from 2003 through 2007, with a 10.5% increase in 2008 (Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, 2010b).
Table 1
Most common categories of procedures provided to Medicare beneficiaries in ASCs, 2007 and
2010
2007
Percent of Rank
volume
19.9%
1
7.9%
2
5.9%
3
5.5%
4
5.4%
5
4.8%
6
4.3%
7
3.1%
8
2.9%
9
1.9%
10
61.6%

Surgical service
Cataract surgery w/ IOL insert, 1 stage
Upper GI endoscopy, biopsy
Diagnostic colonoscopy
Colonoscopy and biopsy
After cataract laser surgery
Lesion removal colonoscopy, snare technique
Injection spine: lumbar, sacral (caudal)
Injection foramen epidural: lumbar, sacral
Injection paravertebral: lumbar, sacral add on*
Injection paravertebral: lumbar, sacral*
Total

2010
Percent of Rank
volume
17.6%
1
8.0%
2
4.2%
5
5.6%
3
4.0%
6
4.3%
4
3.5%
8
3.8%
7
1.9%
11
2.1%
9
55.0%

Note: IOL (intraocular lens), GI (gastrointestinal). *The description of these services changed in 2010 to include
imaging guidance.
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. March 2012. Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy

Medicare’s payment policy for ASCs underwent substantial revision in 2008, which
added uncertainties to the growth of ASCs (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2007;
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2010a). First, CMS loosened the criteria a surgical
procedure must meet to be eligible for Medicare payment. Any surgical procedures, except for
11

those that usually pose significant safety risk or may require an over-night stay, will be covered
under the new ASC payment system (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2010a). Second,
qualified procedures are grouped into several hundred ambulatory payment classification (APC)
groups and all services within an APC group have the same payment rate. The old ASC payment
system had only nine procedure groups. Third, CMS implemented separate ASC payments for
ancillary services, including certain radiology services, brachytherapy sources, many drugs, and
some implantable devices. Finally, CMS set the payment rates for most procedures based on the
relative weights in the hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS). Overall, except
for office-based procedures and device-intensive procedures, CMS on average pays ASCs about
60% of the hospital-based outpatient facility payment rate for providing the same services
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2012).The revisions in the ASC payment system
resulted in substantial changes in payments for a large number of procedures. To help ASCs
adapt to the new payment system, CMS decided to phrase in the new payment system over a 4year period, from 2008 through 2011.
To sum up, ASCs represent an innovative force in the health care delivery system. In the
past thirty year, ASCs experienced rapid growth. However, ASCs face a number of uncertainties
caused by the general economy and Medicare payment policy. The next section discusses a
specific feature of ASCs, namely, physician ownership.
Physician Ownership of Ambulatory Surgery Centers
Physicians are allowed to invest in the ASC where they perform procedures (Office of
Inspector General, 1999). However, it remains unclear that how many ASCs are owned partly or
wholly by physicians 1. Two studies have used trade association surveys to identify physician
1

In the literature, physicians are called owners once they gain equity interests, regardless of the size of ownership.
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ownership and estimate its prevalence among ASCs. One study reported that 83% of ASCs had
physician owners based on a survey conducted by the American Association of Ambulatory
Surgery Centers (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). Another study stated that the percentage
of ASCs with physician owners reached 91% in 2008, citing a survey conducted by the same
association (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). The percentage of physicianowned ASCs based on surveys conducted by the Ambulatory Surgery Center Association (the
successor of the American Association of Ambulatory Surgery Centers and the Federated
Ambulatory Surgery Association) may not be nationally representative because the Association
has about 650 member ASCs while there are more than 5, 300 ASCs around the nation
(Ambulatory Surgery Center Association, 2012; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
2012).
It is difficult to determine the physician ownership structure of an ASC, and it is even
tougher to identify physician owners since no public information is available (Gabel et al., 2008).
Researchers in previous studies tried to determine the physician ownership status of ASCs via
public records or by directly contacting individual facilities. Mitchell (2010) combined
information from public records maintained by a state agency and a private insurer and that from
facilities with incomplete records. She reported that Idaho had 42 ASCs in 2007, 39 of which
were owned entirely by referring physicians (Mitchell, 2010). Gabel et al (2008) used
information from hospital association, insurers, phone calls and web search to determine the
ownership of facilities. They found that 28 out of 43 ASCs in the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
metropolitan areas were owned by physicians (65%) (Gabel et al., 2008). Identifying physician
ownership status by contacting providers directly has several limitations. First, it is timeconsuming and resource-intensive, which has limited its application to broader geographic areas.
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Second, since the survey involves a sensitive matter (i.e., reporting physician investment in a
health care facility, which may be deemed as a conflict of interest), elicitation of accurate
responses is a major concern. Finally, it is difficult to follow up changes in ownership over time.
Two other studies used proxy measures to distinguish physician owners from physician
non-owners (Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Strope et al., 2009). The safe harbor rule issued by the
Office of Inspector General (1999) requires that owners of multispecialty ASCs must perform at
least one-third of their procedures in the facility in which they have invested. Strope et al. (2009)
claimed that the ASCs that provided outpatient urological procedures were multispecialty and
defined physician-owners as those who performed more than 30% of their cases within a single
ASC in each year. They attempted to validate this definition using the public records made
available by the Florida Department of State Division of Corporation. The validation was
conducted by first identifying a sample of ASCs with physicians listed as registered agents,
counting all physicians practicing in these facilities as owners, and comparing the total numbers
of physician owners with the number identified using the empirical definition (Strope et al.,
2009). Hollingsworth et al. (2010) applied the same method to identify physician owners in
ASCs that provided carpal tunnel release, cataract excision, colonoscopy, knee arthroscopy, and
myringotomy with tympanostomy tube placement (Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Strope et al.,
2009). It is unclear whether all these ASCs were multispecialty and thus subjected to the onethird of procedures rule.
Defining physician owners as those performing a large proportion of their procedures at
an ASC also has some flaws. First, only physician owners practicing in multispecialty ASCs are
required to perform at least one-third of procedures in the facilities they own. Second,
performing more than 30% of one’s procedures in an ASC is a necessary condition for being an
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owner, but not a sufficient condition. A physician may choose to perform a large proportion of
his or her cases in an ASC merely out of personal preference. In short, identifying physician
ownership status of ASCs remains to be challenging. A method that can reliably determine the
physician ownership of ASCs within a large geographic area is still missing.
To sum up, this section reviews the prevalence of physician ownership among ASCs as
reported in the literature and the empirical methods used by some studies to determine the
physician ownership status of ASCs. The next section reviews studies that examined the outcome
variables of interest-the quality of outpatient surgery and then more specifically the quality of
outpatient colonoscopy.
Quality of Outpatient Surgery
Enormous importance has been attached to health care quality, both in relation to
inpatient and outpatient care, since the release of the Institute of Medicine report “Crossing the
Quality Chasm” (Institute of Medicine, 2001). This section reviews the literature examining the
quality of outpatient surgeries in general and outpatient colonoscopy in particular. Specifically, it
covers the following topics: how quality of outpatient surgery is measured, empirical approaches
adopted by researchers, and factors found to affect the quality of outpatient surgery. After a
general discussion of analyses focusing on outpatient surgery, the section then reviews studies
specifically examining the quality of outpatient colonoscopy.
Quality measures of outpatient surgery.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) proposed one of the widely accepted definitions of
quality, which defines it as the “degree to which health services for individuals and populations
increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional
knowledge.” (Lohr, 1990) Although quality of outpatient surgery can also be captured by process
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of care indicators, postoperative morbidity, and patient satisfaction (Shnaider & Chung, 2006),
researchers often use patient outcome indicators, such as mortality and adverse events after the
outpatient surgical procedure to quantify the quality of care. These two types of quality measures
are described below with detail shown in Table 2.
Mortality measures.
Mortality or patient death that occurs during a patient stay in a facility or within a period
of follow-up is a traditional measure of quality and safety for surgery and anesthesia (Shnaider &
Chung, 2006). As Table 2 reports, few studies in the literature used in-facility mortality to
measure patient outcomes. One exception is the study conducted by Fleisher et al. (2004), which
reported that out of 564,267 outpatient surgical procedures, no deaths occurred the day of
surgery at a physician’s office, 4 deaths the day of surgery at an ASC (2.3 per 100,000 outpatient
procedures), and 9 deaths the day of surgery at an hospital outpatient department (2.5 per
100,000 procedures). Instead, researchers use mortality within 7 days (Chukmaitov et al., 2008;
Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, &
Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007) or 30 days
(Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher,
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Table 2
Measurements of Quality of Outpatient Surgery
Authors, Year, and
Journal
Fortier et al. 1998.
Candian Journal of
Anethesia
Fleisher, et al. 2004.
Archives of Surgery

Data Source /Study Period

Procedure(s) studied

Medical records from the
outpatient department of Toronto
Hospital, Western Division/32month period (date unknown)
5% random sample of Medicare
beneficiary claims data/1994-1999

Nine surgery groups including
ENT, dental, general surgery,
ophathalmology, orthopaedic,
etc.
cataract, femoral hernia,
umbilical hernia, laparoscopic
cholecystectomy, etc.
Ureteroscopy

Quality measures and
definitions
Unplanned immediate
hospitalization (documented
by nurses while patients were
still in the facility)
Death, hospitalizations, and
ED visits within 7 days

Medical records from the
outpatient department of the
University of Michigan/1998-2008

Strope et al. 2009.
The Journal of
Urology
Leffler et al. 2010.
Archive of Internal
Medicine

Florida SASD and SID from
AHRQ/ 2004

Urinary stone surgeries

Medical records from the
outpatient department of Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center,
Boston, Massachusetts/March 1 to
November 30, 2007
Hospital discharge data set,
ambulatory discharge data set, and
vital statistics data from
Florida/1997-2004
Hospital discharge data set,
ambulatory discharge data set, and
vital statistics data from
Florida/1997-2004

Esophagogastroduodenoscopy
(EGD) and colonoscopy

14-day Related ED visit
and/or hospitalization

Colonoscopy, cataract removal,
upper gastrointestinal
endoscopy, arthroscopy, and
repair of inguinal hernia
Colonoscopy, cataract removal,
and upper gastrointestinal
endoscopy

7-day and 30-day mortality
and 7-day and 30-day
unexpected hospitalizations

17

Tan, et al. 2011. The
Journal of Urology

Menachemi et al,
2007, American
Journal of Medical
Quality
Chukmaitov et al,
2008, Journal of
Ambulatory Care
Management

Unplanned immediate
hospitalization (defined as a
change in visit type to
inpatient or outpatient
observation)
Rates of immediate
hospitalization and death

7-day and 30-day mortality
and 7-day and 30-day
unexpected hospitalizations

Table 2 (continued)
Authors, Year, and
Journal
Chukmaitov et al,
2008, Health
Services Research
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Menachemi et al,
2008, The Joint
Commission Journal
on Quality and
Patient Safety
Chukmaitov et al,
2010, Medical Care
Research and
Review

Data Source /Study Period

Procedure(s) studied

Hospital discharge data set,
ambulatory discharge data set, and
vital statistics data from
Florida/1997-2004
Hospital discharge data set and
ambulatory discharge data set
from Florida/2004

Twelve most common
ambulatory surgical procedures
including colonoscopy
colonoscopy, cataract removal,
upper gastrointestinal
endoscopy, arthroscopy, and
biopsy of the prostate

7-day and 30-day
unexpected hospitalizations

Hospital discharge data set and
ambulatory discharge data/1997 to
2004 and ASC organizational
characteristics data/2007

outpatient arthroscopy and
colonoscopy procedures

30-day unexpected
hospitalizations

Note: N/A: not available; BMI: body mass index; AHRQ: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality

Quality measures and
definitions
7-day and 30-day mortality
and 7-day and 30-day
unexpected hospitalizations

Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Levin et al., 2006; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown,
Saunders, & Brooks, 2007) following an outpatient procedure.
There are some limitations with the mortality measure. First, although it may be
applicable to outpatient surgery, this measure often reflects the overall health status of the patient
undergoing the procedure, rather than the quality of care (Shnaider & Chung, 2006). Patient
death may also be associated with anesthesia, surgery, medical conditions, or even unrelated
factors, such as a car accident (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004). In empirical
research, it could be difficult to determine the cause of death. Exceptions are studies using vital
statistics data to identify mortality cases that were able to exclude deaths related to suicides and
homicides (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks,
2008; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007). Second, mortality is not a
sensitive quality indicator because it is only observed in a very small proportion of outpatient
surgical patients. Even when a 30-day follow-up is used, the morality rate in the outpatient
surgical setting is still no more than 0.5 per 1,000 procedures (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, &
Anderson, 2004). Because of these limitations, many studies did not include mortality in the
multivariate models and only used adverse events as outcome variables to reflect the quality of
outpatient surgery (Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Ko et al., 2010;
Warren et al., 2009).
Adverse event measures.
Adverse events in the literature of outpatient surgery are usually captured by emergency
department (ED) visits and/or hospitalizations following the outpatient surgical procedure
(Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008;
Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless,
19

Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Ko et al., 2010; Menachemi,
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, &
Hollenbeck, 2009; Tan et al., 2011; Warren et al., 2009). The period of follow-up varied across
studies. As shown in Table 2, two studies examined immediate unplanned hospital admission
after outpatient ureteroscopy (Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Tan et al., 2011). Fleisher et al. (2004)
examined hospitalizations and ED visits within 7 days of the outpatient procedure. Leffler et al.
(2010) evaluated 14-day related ED visit and/or hospitalization after endoscopy procedures. A
series of studies examined both 7-day and 30-day hospitalizations after common outpatient
surgical procedures (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2008; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi,
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). In a recent article, Chukmaitov et al. (2010)
focused on 30-day unplanned hospitalizations after arthroscopy and colonoscopy. Similar to
mortality measures, adverse events after outpatient surgery are also relatively rare (Chukmaitov
et al., 2008).
Adverse event measures have the same issues that plague mortality measures, namely,
how to exclude adverse events caused by extraneous factors that may be unrelated to the
outpatient surgical procedure. For example, hospital admissions may have been planned for some
surgical outpatients as part of their protocol. Fleisher et al. (2004) found that among elderly
Medicare patients, about one third of physician Medicare claims associated with inpatient
hospital admissions after outpatient surgery were related to the pre-existing medical conditions.
Additionally, Leffler et al. (2010) reported that only about 30% of 14-day ED visits and
hospitalizations were procedure-related. As a result, only a few studies (Fleisher, Pasternak,
Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, &
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Hollenbeck, 2009) included all-cause adverse events within a certain period of follow-up. Many
studies examined medical records or the diagnosis codes and diagnoses related group (DRG)
category listed in the discharge records to identify unexpected medical services use (Chukmaitov
et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers,
Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Leffler et al., 2010; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown,
Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Tan et
al., 2011). Some studies further narrowed down ER visits or hospitalizations to those caused by
specified complications related to the surgical procedure or sedation (Ko et al., 2010; Warren et
al., 2009).
An ED visit may or may not lead to a hospital admission. One study reported that a
higher proportion of outpatient surgical patients paid visits to the ED but did not get hospitalized
(Coley, Williams, DaPos, Chen, & Smith, 2002). In the literature, Fleisher et al. (2004) examined
different adverse events separately. The study constructed independent models for 7-day ED visit
and 7-day hospitalization. Alternatively, Leffler et al., (2010) combined ED visits with
hospitalization into hospital use.
Data sources used in the literature for constructing mortality and adverse event measures
include administrative data sets, medical charts, and death certificates. As Table 2 presents,
researchers often combined multiple data sources in their studies. For example, in the study of
Fleisher et al. (2004), mortality was assessed from the Medicare enrollment files, emergency
department visits were captured by any new physician claim with emergency department as the
place of service, and hospitalization by any Medicare Part B physician claims with the place of
service coded as “inpatient.” A series of studies led by Menachemi and by Chukmaitov used a
hospital discharge data set, an ambulatory discharge data set, and vital statistics data from
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Florida to study mortality and hospitalization after common outpatient surgeries (Chukmaitov et
al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Menachemi,
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2008).
Using administrative data costs less than medical chart review. Consequently, the sample
size of studies based on administrative data is typically large. By contrast, studies using medical
chart review are often limited to one or a few facilities. For example, Tan et al. (2011) used
medical records from the University of Michigan and found that there were only 70 immediate
unplanned hospitalizations after outpatient ureteroscopy over a 11-year period (Tan et al., 2011).
Similarly, Leffler et al. (2010) found that there were only 134 related ED visits and 76
hospitalizations within 14 days after 6,383 outpatient esophagogastroduodenoscopies and 11,632
outpatient colonoscopies.
This subsection reviewed two types of quality measures- mortality and adverse eventsused by prior studies of outpatient surgery. It also discussed the pros and cons of each type of
measures and typical sources of data used to obtain these measures. Next, empirical methods
used in these studies will be reviewed.
Empirical approaches used in the literature.
The vast majority of the literature related to the empirical assessment of quality of
outpatient surgery used a retrospective observational study design to assess practice patterns and
compare patient outcomes (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders,
& Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov,
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks,
2008). Only one study had a prospective study design (Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998). To address
22

the issue that mortality and adverse events are relatively rare after outpatient surgery, many
studies had a pooled cross-sectional design to combine observations over a period of multiple
years (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008;
Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008).
Two studies adopted different analytical strategies. Tan et al. (2011) matched each patient
with unplanned hospital admission (cases) to three patients without admission (controls) based
on surgeon, gender and date of surgery, with all controls having surgery within the month of the
corresponding case. Chukmaitov et al. (2010) conducted a longitudinal study at the facility-year
level. The unit of analysis in this study was facility-year. The total number of patients who were
hospitalized after receiving outpatient procedures was used as the outcome variable and
independent variables were also at the facility level.
As shown in Table 3, most previous studies used various risk adjustment strategies when
studying the outcomes of outpatient surgery since the severity of patients undergoing outpatient
surgical procedures can vary greatly (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown,
Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi,
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2008). One common approach to account for patient risk factors is to calculate Charlson
et al. (1987) Index and its modified version (Deyo, Cherkin, & Ciol, 1992). This approach is also
adopted by studies of outpatient surgery (David & Neuman, 2011; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert,
& Anderson, 2004). Strope et al. (2009) used Elixhauser et al. (1998) Comorbidity Index to
measure the comorbidity of patients. Increasingly more studies adopted the Diagnosis Cost
Groups-Hierarchical Condition Categories (DCG-HCC) methodology (Pope et al., 2004) to do
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Table 3
Empirical studies of the quality of outpatient surgery
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Authors,
Year, and
Journal
Fortier et al.
1998.
Candian
Journal of
Anethesia

Unit of
Analysis/
Study sample
Patient
level/15,179
consecutive
outpatient
surgical
patients

Quality
measures

Independent
variables

Unplanned
immediate
hospitalization

Preoperative,
intraoperative,
and postoperative
factors

Risk
Statistical
adjustment Technique
method
N/A
Descriptive
analysis and
logistic
regression

Fleisher, et
al. 2004.
Archives of
Surgery

Patient level/
Elderly
beneficiaries
undergoing
16 outpatient
procedures

Death,
hospitalizations,
and ED visits
within 7 days

Location of care,
age group, sex,
race, prior
hospital
admissions, and
comorbidity

The
modified
Charlson
Index by
Deyo et al.
(1992)

Tan, et al.
2011. The
Journal of
Urology

Patient
level/1,798
consecutive
outpatient
ureteroscopy

Unplanned
immediate
hospitalization

Clinical factors
that are
potentially
associated with
unplanned
hospitalization

N/A

Major Findings

Male, ASA status II and
III, long duration of
surgery, surgery finishing
after 3 pm, postoperative
bleeding, excessive pain,
nausea and vomiting, and
excessive drowsiness or
dizziness are risk factors
Descriptive More advanced age, prior
analysis and hospital admission, being
logistic
treated at a physician's
regression
office or outpatient
hospital, and invasiveness
of surgery were linked to
increased risk of inpatient
admission or death
Conditional Any previous admission
logistic
related to stone disease,
regression
history of psychiatric
illness and bilateral
procedure are associated
with increased risk for
immediate unplanned
admission while a
diagnosis of distal ureteral
stones is a protective
factor.
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Table 3 (continued)
Authors,
Unit of
Year, and
Analysis/
Journal
Study sample
Strope et al. Setting
2009. The
(hospitalJournal of
based
Urology
outpatient
facility or
ASC)
level/Patients
who
underwent
surgery for
stone disease
Leffler et al. Patient level/
2010.
patients of
Archive of
outpatient
Internal
EGD and
Medicine
colonoscopy

Menachemi
et al, 2007,
American
Journal of
Medical
Quality

Patient
level/3, 174,
436 patients
receiving 5
common
outpatient
surgical
procedures

Quality
measures

Independent
variables

Rates of
immediate
hospitalization
and death

Location of care

14-day Related
ED visit and/or
hospitalization

7-day and 30day mortality
and 7-day and
30-day
unexpected
hospitalizations

Risk
Statistical
adjustment Technique
method
N/A
Descriptive
analysis

Major Findings

The ratios of short-term
hospital transfer at a
hospital-based outpatient
facility and those at an
ASC were 0.4/100,000
procedures and
2.5/100,000 procedures.
Overall, stone surgery
appears to be safely
delivered outside of the
hospital setting.
N/A
N/A
Descriptive About 30% of the
analysis
hospitalizations and ED
visits 14 days after the
procedure were procedurerelated. Fourteen-day
related hospital visits
occurred in about 1% of
outpatient endoscopy.
Race/ethnicity
African Americans were at
DCG/HCC Logistic
and gender, Age
regression
a significantly increased
group, payer
models with risk for either mortality or
type, facility
a pooled
unexpected hospitalization
type, and severity
crossin 4 of the 5 procedures
of illness.
sectional
examined. Female gender
design
was associated with lower
level of unexpected
hospital admission or
mortality.

Table 3 (continued)
Authors,
Unit of
Year, and
Analysis/
Journal
Study sample
Chukmaitov Patient
et al, 2008,
level/patients
Journal of
receiving
Ambulatory colonoscopy,
Care
cataract
Management removal, and
upper GI
endoscopy

Quality
measures

Independent
variables

7-day and 30day mortality
and 7-day and
30-day
unexpected
hospitalizations

Physician and
facility volume,
gender, age, race,
insurance type,
severity, and
location of care
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Chukmaitov
et al, 2008,
Health
Services
Research

Patient
level/patients
receiving 12
common
outpatient
surgeries

7-day and 30day mortality
and 7-day and
30-day
unexpected
hospitalizations

Menachemi
et al, 2008,
The Joint
Commission
Journal on
Quality and
Patient
Safety

Patient
level/patients
receiving 5
common
outpatient
surgeries

7-day and 30day unexpected
hospitalizations

Risk
Statistical
adjustment Technique
method
DCG/HCC Logistic
regression
models with
a pooled
crosssectional
design

Major Findings

Patients treated by highvolume physicians or
facilities had lower odds
ratios for hospitalizations
and mortality. Physician
volume had a bigger
impact on unexpected
hospitalization compared
with facility volume.
Location of care, DCG/HCC Logistic
The relative performance
gender, age, race,
regression
of ASCs and hospitalinsurance type,
models with based outpatient facilities
severity, and time
a pooled
depended on the procedure
trend
crossexamined. Risk-adjustment
sectional
for comorbidities may
design
affect the result.
Accreditation
DCG/HCC Multivariate Patients treated by Joint
status, gender,
logistic
Commission–accredited
age, race,
regression
facilities were still
insurance type,
models
significantly less likely to
severity, and
be hospitalized after
facility volume
colonoscopy. No
differences in unexpected
hospitalization rates were
detected in the other
procedures examined.

Table 3 (continued)
Authors,
Unit of
Year, and
Analysis/
Journal
Study sample
Chukmaitov Facility-year
et al, 2010,
level/facilityMedical
years
Care
providing
Research
arthroscopies
and Review and
colonoscopies

Quality
measures

Independent
variables

30-day
unexpected
hospitalizations

Specialization,
ownership type,
facility volume,
payer-mix, % of
minority patients,
mean severity
measure, and
time effects

Risk
Statistical
adjustment Technique
method
DCG/HCC Poisson
regression
models with
a panel
design and
both fixedeffects and
randomeffects

Major Findings
The rate of specialization
in ASCs was associated
better patient outcomes
(though at a diminishing
rate). In addition, facility
volume was weakly
associated with improved
patient outcomes.
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Note: N/A: not available; BMI: body mass index; AHRQ: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality; GI: gastrointestinal; EGD:
esophagogastroduodenoscopy; DCG/HCC: Diagnostic cost groups/hierarchical condition categories risk-adjustment methodology

risk adjustment (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks,
2008; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov,
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). This method has been validated as a proper measure of risk
adjustment in the outpatient setting, but the cost of the software (DxCG, ) constitutes a barrier to
widespread adoption (Chukmaitov, Harless, Menachemi, Saunders, & Brooks, 2009).
Besides controlling for patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, some studies also accounted
for previous medical use history (Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Tan et al.,
2011). For example, Fleisher et al. (2004) included the number of prior admissions to an
inpatient hospital within 6 months prior to the quarter as a proxy for the propensity to use
medical services. Using data abstracted from medical records, Tan et al. (2011) controlled for
receipt of preoperative prophylactic antibiotics, preoperative imaging, and stone burden (size,
location, and number) when studying the quality of ureteroscopy.
Previous studies noted that the accuracy and completeness of the coding of some
variables might be problematic. Chukmaitov et al. (2008b) reported that healthcare professionals
other than physicians were listed as operating physicians in some discharge records, which were
likely to result from coding errors. In another study, Chukmaitov et al. (2008a) found that fewer
secondary diagnoses were reported among ASCs compared with hospital-based outpatient
facilities and some ASCs did not report secondary diagnoses at all during the study period. To
address this concern, many studies eliminated providers with very low volume to minimize
potential coding errors (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004;
Tan et al., 2011). For example, Tan et al (2011) excluded patients without renal or ureteral
calculi as the primary indication from the sample of ureteroscopy patients. Chukmaitov et al.

28

(2008a) conducted sensitivity analyses to assess the effect of under-reporting of secondary
diagnoses on risk adjustment.
As seen in quality of care research in inpatient settings (Gowrisankaran & Town, 1999),
some independent variables may be endogenous. For example, high procedural volume may lead
to high quality of care because it can improve the clinical skills and coordination efficiencies of
medical teams in a facility. But it is also possible that a facility’s high quality level attracts more
patients that results in high procedural volume. Chukmaitov et al. (2010) argued that in the
presence of potential reverse causation between independent variables and patient outcome
variables, it is only possible to examine the association rather than causal relationship between
the two groups of variables. They suggested that prospective study designs may resolve this
reverse causality issue in the outpatient surgical setting.
To account for the fact that patient outcomes can vary widely across different outpatient
surgeries, most studies stratified the sample by types of surgical procedures instead of mixing all
outpatient surgical procedures (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown,
Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Leffler et al., 2010;
Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts,
& Hollenbeck, 2009). These researchers focused on a narrow scope of procedures by selecting
specific Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes. On one hand, stratification of the study
population improves the homogeneity of the sample and the internal validity. But on the other
hand, it may be difficult to generalize research findings based on patients of one outpatient
surgery to other patient populations.
In many studies, the outcome variables were binary (Chukmaitov et al., 2008;
Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, &
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Anderson, 2004; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998; Leffler et al., 2010; Menachemi, Chukmaitov,
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008;
Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & Hollenbeck, 2009; Tan et al., 2011). As Table 3 presents,
descriptive analysis and logistic regressions were major analytical approaches used in these
patient level analyses (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Fortier, Chung, & Su, 1998;
Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown,
Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). Two studies used only descriptive analysis method (Leffler et al.,
2010; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & Hollenbeck, 2009). One study used conditional
logistic regression analysis, corresponding to the case-control study design (Tan et al., 2011).
Chukmaitov et al. (2010) used the total number of patients who were hospitalized unexpectedly
after receiving an outpatient procedure in a facility as the outcome variable. They used Poisson
regression models with a panel design in the study. Both fixed effects and random effects models
were estimated.
The data used by many prior studies had hierarchical structures (Chukmaitov et al., 2008;
Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless,
Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Fleisher, Pasternak, Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi,
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2008; Strope, Wolf Jr., Faerber, Roberts, & Hollenbeck, 2009). If a group of patients
were nested within hospital-based outpatient facilities or ASCs, patient outcomes might be
correlated among patients treated by a single facility. Therefore, in the quality analysis of
providers, both the variability between providers and that between patients nested within the
providers should be considered. Chukmaitov et al. (2010) recognized that estimation of facility30

level factors may be spuriously significant in nested models with patient level quality measures.
To address this issue, they aggregated patient information to the facility level, as suggested by
the literature (Bach, 2009). Another approach to address this issue is hierarchical linear modeling
(Normand, Glickman, & Gatsonis, 1997). The advantage of the hierarchical modeling approach
is that it accounts for the hierarchical or nested structure of the data by including random effects
at each level of the hierarchy. This approach results in a more conservative estimation of the
factors at higher levels.
Factors associated with quality of outpatient surgery.
Table 3 includes several empirical studies that examine the impact of patient
characteristics, clinical factors, and characteristics of the facility where patients received
outpatient surgery on patient outcomes. Patient-specific factors were found to be important
predictors of mortality and adverse events following outpatient surgery (Fleisher, Pasternak,
Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007). For
example, Fleisher et al. (2004) used multivariate logistic regression models and found that
compared with a white patient aged 65-69 years, advanced age (above 85), and being African
American or Hispanic were associated with a significantly higher rate of 7-day ED visit or
hospitalization. After controlling for age group, payer type, facility type, and severity of illness,
Menachemi et al. (2007) found that African Americans were at a significantly increased rate for
either mortality or unexpected hospitalization in 4 of the 5 procedures examined. They also
found that patients aged above 84 were at greater risk for at least 1 negative outcome in all 5
procedures examined. Finally, they found that female gender was associated with lower level of
unexpected hospital admission or mortality.
Clinical characteristics such as previous inpatient hospital admission, invasiveness of the
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procedure, and number of procedures performed in the encounter may also affect patient
outcomes. Tan et al. (2011) found that the odds ratio of immediate hospitalization for patients of
bilateral ureteroscopy were 2.88 compared with patients receiving the unilateral procedure. The
invasiveness of the procedure was found to be linked to higher risks after outpatient surgery.
Fleisher et al. (2004) reported 156 deaths within 7 days after the outpatient surgery in a sample
of 546,267 elderly Medicare patients undergoing 16 outpatient surgical procedures. But no
deaths happened to patients who underwent simple mastectomy, femoral hernia, or rotator cuff
repair.
Various facility-level factors such as location of care, accreditation, volume, and
specialization have also been examined in previous studies. The location of care (namely,
physician’s office, ASC, and hospital-based outpatient facility) may affect the quality of
outpatient surgery in that different type of facilities vary greatly in term of patient population,
level of volume and specialization, technologies, staffing, and access to emergency care
(Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). Fleisher et al. (2004) compared
the quality of multiple outpatient surgical procedures in physician’s office, ASCs, and hospitalbased outpatient facilities using 5% Medicare beneficiary claims data and found that patients
treated at ASCs have relatively better outcomes than those treated at physician’s offices and
hospital-based outpatient facilities. Specifically, in the 7-day ED visit model including multiple
procedures, the study found that patients treated at ASCs had worse outcomes than those in
physician’s offices but better outcomes than those in hospital-based outpatient facilities. In the 7day hospitalization model, patients treated at ASCs had best outcomes across all three settings.
When each procedure was evaluated individually, patients treated at ASCs were associated with
less negative outcomes such as hospitalization and mortality compared with those treated at
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physician’s offices in 7 of 8 procedures of sufficient sample size while controlling for patient
severity. Chukmaitov et al. (2008a) examined the quality of 12 common outpatient procedures
performed in ASC and hospital-based outpatient facility settings. They reported that for 10 of the
12 procedures studied, there was no quality difference between ASCs and hospital-based
outpatient facilities. For the unplanned hospitalization measure, hospital-based outpatient
facilities performed better than ASCs in 9 out of 12 procedures when using all available
diagnoses in risk adjustment. They concluded that neither ASCs nor hospital-based outpatient
facilities was consistently associated with better quality of care. They also noted that the results
of comparison of quality between the two types of facilities were sensitive to risk adjustment
method used. The current study primarily builds on these latter two studies by further controlling
for the physician ownership status of ASCs.
One study examined the relationship between accreditation status of ASCs and the
quality of outpatient surgery. Menachemi et al. (2008) found that for outpatient colonoscopy,
patients treated by Joint Commission–accredited facilities were significantly less likely to be
hospitalized after controlling for patient characteristics and facility volume. But such effect was
not observed in four other procedures examined.
Chukmaitov et al. (2008) examined whether an association exists between physician and
facility volumes and patient outcomes in the outpatient settings. Two types of volume variables
were used: a tertile variable created by ranking providers into low-, medium-, or high-volume
categories and a continuous variable of the natural logarithm of providers’ case load. They found
a consistent, dose-responsive pattern that linked higher volumes to improved patient outcomes
for the 3 types of procedures they studied. Moreover, when both physician and facility volumes
were included, the physician volume variable demonstrated stronger effects than the facility
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volume variable in terms of magnitude and levels of significance in the hospitalization models
and in the mortality models, facility volume had stronger effects.
Chukmaitov et al. (2010) further examined the relationship between several
organizational characteristics and quality of arthroscopy and colonoscopy procedures provided
by ASCs. Different from most previous studies, this study developed hypotheses regarding the
potential effects of specialization, ownership type, and volume on quality of outpatient surgery,
based on multiple organizational behavior and organizational theory perspectives and health
services research literature. They found a positive association between the rate of specialization
in ASCs and patient quality outcomes (though at a diminishing rate). Additionally, they found
that facility volume was weakly associated with improved patient outcomes.
To summarize, patient characteristics, clinical factors, facility characteristics all can
potentially affect patient outcomes in outpatient surgical settings. These factors explored by prior
studies should be included in future studies. The current literature is limited to factors at patient
level and facility level. Competition between hospital-based outpatient facilities and ASCs
reported by previous studies (Bian & Morrisey, 2007; Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2011;
Courtemanche & Plotzke, 2010) could have implications for quality. Therefore, it is necessary to
further investigate whether health care market features such as the level of competition are
associated with quality of outpatient surgery in future studies.
Quality of outpatient colonoscopy.
The previous subsection reviewed the literature on the quality of outpatient surgery in
general. The literature related to the quality of outpatient colonoscopy deserves a separate review
because procedure-specific quality measures, better defined study samples, and procedurerelated control variables were used in these studies. Because this study is interested in examining
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all related complications after colonoscopy, this review includes studies that examined multiple
quality measures in large patient populations. Studies that centered solely on colonic perforation
are not included in the review. Similar to the last subsection, this subsection discusses the quality
measures, data sources, and empirical methods used in prior studies of quality of outpatient
colonoscopy. Finally, factors that were found to be associated with quality of care are reviewed.
Colonoscopy is recommended for polyps and cancer screening in average risk person,
aged between 50 and 75 (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2008). Medicare started to cover
colonoscopy for colorectal cancer screening in 1998 (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
2011). It is estimated that over 14 million colonoscopies are performed annually in the United
States (Seeff et al., 2004). With the aging of the population, the demand for colonoscopy will
continue to increase. Therefore, it is important to investigate what factors affect patient outcomes
after the procedure.
Ideally, quality indicators of colonoscopy should include measures in preprocedure,
intraprocedure, and postprocedure periods as proposed by the American Society for
Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) and the American College of Gastroenterology (ACG) (Rex
et al., 2006). But in the literature, a majority of studies still concentrated on mortality and
adverse events after colonoscopy. Most colonoscopies are performed with the patient under
moderate sedation (“conscious sedation”) (Standards of Practice Committee et al., 2008). Similar
to other types of outpatient surgeries, mortality after outpatient colonoscopy is also rare. Ko et al.
(2010) identified 3 deaths following colonoscopy among 21, 375 patients. Additionally, Levin et
al. (2006) identified 1 death related to colonoscopy while Rabeneck et al. (2008) identified 3
related deaths and 2 possibly related deaths out of 67,632 outpatient colonoscopy patients. As a
result, many studies did not examine mortality measures in the multivariate regression models
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because the number of death were too small to support statistical analysis and the cause of death
could not be determined (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009).
Unlike studies that spanned multiple procedures as discussed in the prior subsection,
colonoscopy studies that examined subsequent ED visits and/or hospitalizations that were
potential quality issues focused on specific complications related to colonoscopy (Table 4).
Many studies calculated the rates for certain complications by counting the number of ED visits
and/or hospitalizations for such complications per 1000 colonoscopy (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et
al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009). However, previous studies defined and reported colonoscopy
related complications in various ways. Levin et al. (2006) defined any complication related to
colonoscopy that led to hospitalization as a “serious complication.” They reported incidence
rates of lower gastrointestinal bleeding, colonic perforation, postpolypectomy syndrome,
diverticulitis and other serious illness, including complications related to procedural sedation
such as aspiration pneumonia, complications of procedures, complications secondary to
anesthesia, et cetera. Warren et al. (2009) designated 3 adverse events (perforation,
gastrointestinal bleeding, or the administration of blood transfusions) as serious gastrointestinal
events. They included two other groups of adverse events, other gastrointestinal events (such as
paralytic ileus, nausea, and vomiting) as well as cardiovascular events (such as myocardial
infarction, arrhythmias, and congestive heart failure). Ko et al. (2010) operationalized serious
events as perforation, postpolypectomy syndrome, gastrointestinal bleeding requiring
hospitalization and/or transfusion, and diverticulitis. Besides these adverse events, they also
examined cardiovascular events, neurological events, and other potentially related complications.
As can be seen in Table 5, medical record and administrative data were major sources of
data in prior studies. One exception is the study conducted by Ko et al. (2010), which combined
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Table 4
Quality measures used in previous outpatient colonoscopy studies
Authors, Year,
and Journal
Warren et al,
2009, Annals of
Internal
Medicine

Data Source /Study
Period
5% Medicare claims data
in SEER cancer registry
areas/
July 1, 2001 to October
31, 2005

37

Ko et al, 2010,
CORI, two waves of
Clinical
phone interviews, and
Gastroenterology National Death Index/NA
and Hepatology

Levin et al.
2006. Annals of
Internal
Medicine

Electronic medical
records from KPNC/
January 1994 and July
2002

Rabeneck et al,
CIHI Discharge Abstract
2008,
Database/April 1, 2002,
Gastroenterology to March 31, 2003

Quality measures and definitions
30-day ED visit or hospitalization for serious gastrointestinal events
(perforation, gastrointestinal bleeding, or the administration of blood
transfusions);
30-day ED visit or hospitalization for other gastrointestinal events (paralytic
ileus, nausea, vomiting and dehydration, abdominal pain);
and 30-day ED visit or hospitalization for cardiovascular events (myocardial
infarction or angina; arrhythmias; congestive heart failure; cardiac or
respiratory arrest; or syncope, hypotension, or shock)
30-day hospitalization for complications directly related to colonoscopy
(perforation, postpolypectomy syndrome, gastrointestinal bleeding requiring
hospitalization and/or transfusion, and diverticulitis);
30-day hospitalization for complications potentially related to colonoscopy
(angina, myocardial infarction, stroke, transient ischemic attack, and other
potentially related complications such as abdominal pain or sedation-related
events); 30-day hospitalization for complications directly and potentially
related to colonoscopy;death within 30 days
30-day hospitalization for perforation only;
30-day hospitalization for perforation, bleeding requiring transfusion, and
diverticulitis requiring surgery;
30-day hospitalization for any serious complications (including complications
listed above and other conditions (colitis, aspiration pneumonia, pneumonia,
abdominal pain, complications of procedure, complications secondary to
anesthesia, myocardial infarction, and stroke);
death within 30 days
30-day hospitalization for bleeding or perforation;
death within 30 days

Table 4 (continued)
Authors, Year,
and Journal
Viiala et al,
2003, Internal
Medicine
Journal

Data Source /Study
Period
Medical records from 3
Australian hospitals,
death certificates, and
hospital records/5
September 1989-31
December 1999

Quality measures and definitions
30-day hospitalization for bleeding, perforation, and other complications
(abdominal pain, nausea/vomiting, excess sedation, angina, atrial fibrillation,
hypotension, transient ischemic attack, reversible ischemic neurologic deficit,
and aspiration); death within 30 days

Abbreviation: SEER: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results; KPNC: Kaiser Permanente of Northern California; CORI, Clinical Outcomes Research
Initiative National Endoscopic Database; CIHI: Canadian Institute for Health Information.
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Table 5
Summary of studies of the quality of outpatient colonoscopy
Authors, Year,
and Journal
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Quality measures and
definitions

Independent
variables

Warren et al,
2009, Annals of
Internal
Medicine

Unit of
Analysis/
Study sample
Patient
level/53, 220
Medicare
beneficiaries
aged 66
through 95
years

30-day ED visit or
hospitalization for
serious gastrointestinal
events, other
gastrointestinal events,
and cardiovascular
events

patient age, race,
sex, state/county,
urban/rural, ZIP
code level
indicators, and
comorbid
conditions

Ko et al, 2010,
Clinical
Gastroenterology
and Hepatology

Patient
level/21, 375
patients aged
40 and over

30-day hospitalization
for 4 serious events
and other potentially
related events; death
within 30 days

Levin et al.
2006. Annals of
Internal
Medicine

Patient
level/16,318
patients aged
40 and over

30-day hospitalization
for (1) perforation
only; 2) perforation,
bleeding, or
diverticulitis requiring
surgery; and 3) any
serious complication;
death within 30 days

Age, sex,
race/ethnicity, use
of some
medications,
biopsy or
polypectomy,
indication, trainee
participation, and
practice setting
age, sex, and the
performance of
biopsy or
polypectomy

Risk
adjustment
method
The
modified
Charlson
Index by
Romano et
al (1993)

Statistical
Technique

Major
Findings

Logistic
regression
with a
matched
cohort
design

N/A

Forward
step-wise
logistic
regression

Rates of
adverse
events
increased
with age,
polypectomy,
comorbidities,
and some
conditions
The risk of
complications
increased
with
preprocedure
warfarin use,
and
polypectomy

N/A

Bivariate
Poisson
regression
with a
generalized
estimating
equation
approach

Biopsy or
polypectomy
was
associated
with an
increased risk
for any
serious
complication.

Table 5 (continued)
Authors, Year,
Unit of
and Journal
Analysis/
Study sample
Rabeneck et al,
Patient
2008,
level/97,091
Gastroenterology patients aged
between 50 to
75 years in 4
Canadian
provinces

40

Viiala et al,
2003, Internal
Medicine
Journal

Patient
level/23,508
patients aged
between 13 to
102

Quality measures and
definitions

Independent
variables

30-day hospitalization
for bleeding or
perforation; death
within 30 days

age, sex,
comorbidity,
polypectomy,
endoscopist’s
specialty and
experience, and
location of care.

30-day hospitalization
for bleeding,
perforation, and other
complications; death
within 30 days

Provider’s
experience and the
type of procedure

Risk
adjustment
method
The
modified
Charlson
Index by
Deyo et al.
(1992)

Statistical
Technique

Major
Findings

Generalized
estimating
equations
model

N/A

Descriptive
analysis

Older age,
male sex,
polypectomy,
and being
treated by
low-volume
endoscopist
were more
likely to have
bleeding or
perforation.
The
complication
rates were
not higher
among
trainees
compared
with
endoscopists.

Abbreviation: N/A: not available; SEER: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results; KPNC: Kaiser Permanente of Northern California; CORI, Clinical
Outcomes Research Initiative National Endoscopic Database; CIHI: Canadian Institute for Health Information.

information from two waves of phone interviews about 7 and 30 days after patients underwent
colonoscopy, procedure reports based on medical records, and the National Death Index. The
advantage of using patient surveys is that the researchers were able to ask patients about
preprocedure use of aspirin, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory agents, warfarin, and clopidogrel to
examine the influence of these medications on complication risks. However, the study was also
limited by the survey data. With a 53% overall response rate, the estimates of complication rates
might be biased.
Compared with studies that examined multiple types of procedures, studies that focused
on outpatient colonoscopy had better defined study samples. Levin et al. (2006) only included
colonoscopies that had one of these indications: a family history of colorectal cancer or
adenomatous polyp, a follow-up to a positive screening test, for surveillance because of a
previously detected adenomatous polyp or colorectal cancer, or for primary screening. Excluded
procedures fell into one of these categories: those performed for excluded indications or for
symptoms, those with poor preparation (with a second procedure rescheduled in 90 days), those
performed less than 6 months since a previous procedure, or those performed in patients with
previous colon surgery, inpatient or outpatient visits 6 month before the procedure for abdominal
pain, lower gastrointestinal bleeding, anemia, diarrhea, or constipation. Specific rules were used
as to the inclusion/exclusion of multiple colonoscopies received by a single patient. If a
colonoscopy was incomplete and a second colonoscopy was performed within 3 months, only the
second one was included. If a second colonoscopy was performed to finish removal of a polyp,
only the first colonoscopy was included. If a patient received more than one colonoscopy during
the 7 year study period and the interval between the colonoscopies was greater than 6 months,
these colonoscopies were included in the cohort. Rabeneck et al. (2008) excluded those patients
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who had a colonoscopy, a diagnosis of colorectal cancer, a hospitalization caused by
inflammatory bowel disease, or a colonic resection in the 5 years preceding the index
colonoscopy. They also excluded patients who had an endoscopy in the 7 days prior to or on the
day of the index colonoscopy and who had the colonoscopy for endoscopic hemostasis, insertion
of a colonic stent, endoscopic colonic dilatation, or endoscopic reduction of a sigmoid volvulus.
Warren et al. (2009) excluded procedures coded by the physician as incomplete, and those done
in patients at a high risk for perforation. Specifically, persons with preexisting conditions such as
diverticulitis, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, and colorectal cancer were excluded. Patients
who received more than 2 colonoscopies during the study period or those who had 2
colonoscopies in less than 60 days were also excluded. Ko et al. (2010) excluded patients with a
history of inflammatory bowel disease or recent visible gastrointestinal bleeding. They also
restricted to the study sample to patients who received their first colonoscopy during the study
period. Excluding atypical colonoscopy procedures from the study sample improved the
homogeneity of studied cases and reduced the influence of confounding factors on the
complication rates.
Most prior studies had a pooled cross-sectional design. An exception is that Warren et al.
(2009) used a matched cohort study design to determine whether the risk for adverse events in
colonoscopy patients was higher than that in the general Medicare population. Patients
undergoing colonoscopy were matched to Medicare beneficiaries who had not undergone
colonoscopy during the same period based on birth year, procedure year, race, sex, state or
country of residence, and comorbidity score. As shown in Table 5, most studies controlled for
patient age, gender, race/ethnicity, and the type of colonoscopy technique used. Warren et al.
(2009) included the socioeconomic characteristics of patient’s neighborhood. Rabeneck et al
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(2008) and Warren et al. (2009) controlled for the severity of illness, using a modified Charlson
Index. Rabeneck et al (2008) and Ko et al. (2010) also accounted for the effects of location of
care (Ko et al., 2010; Rabeneck et al., 2008).
While Viiala et al. (2003) used mainly descriptive analyses to capture the incidence of
multiple complications and compared the complication rates among providers with different
training and among different types of procedures, other studies used both descriptive and
multivariate regression analysis methods. Levin et al. (2006) conducted bivariate Poisson
regression analyses to describe the association among complications and independent variables.
Rabeneck et al. (2008) used generalized estimating equations models to assess risk factors for
complications. Warren et al. (2009) estimated 3 separate logistic regression models for three
dependent variables: serious gastrointestinal events, other gastrointestinal events, and
cardiovascular events. In addition to demonstrating unadjusted rates for adverse events, they also
calculated the predictive 30-day marginal rate per 1000 procedures associated with an
intervention or risk factor by averaging the individual predicted rates. Ko et al. (2010) used
forward step-wise logistic regression models to study the association between the incidence of
complications and risk factors of interest. Except for age and sex, variables with global P<.1
were retained in the final model.
Overall, prior studies found that patient age and biopsy or polypectomy procedures were
reliable predictors of complications related to colonoscopy (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006;
Rabeneck et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2009). Male gender was found to be associated with higher
rates for adverse events after colonoscopy, which is consistent with the conclusion reached by
Menachemi et al. (2007). The invasiveness of the intervention patients received during
colonoscopy significantly influences the risk of complications. Prior studies indicated that
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polypectomy was associated with significantly higher risk of developing complications (Ko et al.,
2010; Rabeneck et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2009).
Prior studies examining adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy had some limitations.
First, existing studies were limited to Medicare patients (Warren et al., 2009), a few health care
facilities (Levin et al., 2006; Viiala, Zimmerman, Cullen, & Hoffman, 2003), or patient
populations with a narrow age range (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Rabeneck et al., 2008;
Warren et al., 2009). Only one of the prior studies examined complications after outpatient
colonoscopy in the general population (Viiala, Zimmerman, Cullen, & Hoffman, 2003). Two
prior studies selected patients above 40 years old, arguing that colonoscopy is used much less by
young adults (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006). Warren et al. (2009) limited the cohort to
persons aged 66 through 95 years at the time of their procedure. Rabeneck et al. (2008) restricted
the study sample to patients 50 to 75 years old who underwent screening colonoscopies. Several
studies examined large general patient population (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov,
Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, &
Brooks, 2010; Menachemi, Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2007; Menachemi,
Chukmaitov, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008) but these studies did not report specific adverse
events related to colonoscopy.
Second, the diversity of definitions and reporting of adverse events after outpatient
colonoscopy makes comparison of complication rates across studies problematic (Ko &
Dominitz, 2010). Comparison of incidence rates of adverse events other than serious
complications is even more challenging because many studies only reported aggregated
measures (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009). In addition, no study
examined a full spectrum of colonoscopy-related adverse events. For example, Warren et al
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(2009) examined serious gastrointestinal events, other gastrointestinal events, and cardiovascular
events, but they did not include sedation-related complications, as did Levin et al. (2006).
Third, prior studies did not account for market-level factors or fully control for clustering
among observations. As mentioned in the last subsection, some local health market features, such
as the level of competition between hospital-based outpatient facilities and ASCs may affect
providers’ quality production decisions. Previous studies suggested that market-level factors
such as HMO penetration and competition level affect providers’ volume, revenues, costs and
profits (Bian & Morrisey, 2007; Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2011; Courtemanche & Plotzke,
2010). Two prior studies recognized the issue of hierarchical structures in the data. Levin et al.
(2006) accounted for the nested structure of data (colonoscopies were nested within individual
colonoscopist) by using a generalized estimating equations approach. Rabeneck et al. (2008) also
used generalized estimating equations models. In a study of patients in Canada, they clustered
within province in a model that used data from four provinces, and clustered within physicians in
the model that included endoscopist information. As mentioned in the last subsection, the
method of hierarchical linear modeling is another promising approach that should be explored by
future studies. While generalized estimating equations models account for the correlation
between observations by use of empirical variance estimator, hierarchical modeling is able to
model variability at each level of the hierarchy.
This subsection reviewed the quality measures, data sources, empirical methods used, and
important factors of quality found in prior studies that specifically examined the quality of
outpatient colonoscopy. It also discussed some limitation associated with these studies. These
findings will be used to inform the design of the current study.
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Effects of Physician Ownership on Care in Ambulatory Surgery Centers
The literature review in the previous section implies that prior studies of outpatient
surgery in general as well as studies centered on outpatient colonoscopy largely overlooked the
potential effect of physician ownership. In fact, the literature on the effects of physician
ownership of ambulatory surgery centers generally followed two lines (Table 6). One line of
research focused on how physicians’ investment in ASCs affects their referral patterns. It has
been demonstrated that physicians practicing in physician-owned ASCs are more likely than
other physicians to refer Medicare and privately insured patients to their own facilities while
directing Medicaid recipients to non-physician-owned facilities (Gabel et al., 2008;
Hollingsworth et al., 2010b). Such type of patient profiling based on insurance types may create
access barriers for less resourced patients to receive ASC services (Strope, Sarma, Ye, Wei, &
Hollenbeck, 2009). Moreover, selective referral of patients to their own facilities and general
hospitals by physician owners may weaken the ability of the latter to provide safety net services
(Gabel et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2010).
The second line of research examined the effect of physician ownership on the use of
surgical procedures. Prior studies indicated that the financial incentive linked to physician
ownership of ASCs was associated with physicians’ practice patterns. Physician owners were
found to have higher use rates for 3 common orthopedic procedures compared with physician
nonowners (Mitchell, 2010). Strope et al. (2009b) found that the increase in the rates of
outpatient urological surgery with time coincided with greater utilization by new physician
owners. Furthermore, these new owners increasingly performed a larger proportion of lucrative
procedures. Hollingsworth et al. (2010) found that physician-ownership was associated with
greater use of five common outpatient procedures and the acquisition of ownership status by a
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physician was associated with significant increases in the use of four surgical procedures. One
possible interpretation of these research findings is that when physicians’ income is tied to the
profitability of the facility, they may induce demand for medical services. They may not only
increase the volume of procedures performed by themselves, but may also refer patients to other
doctors working in the physician-owned facility (Mitchell, 2005). If the financial incentive
linked to physician ownership of ASCs results in greater overall volume of surgical services (part
of which may not be medically necessary), savings due to lower payment rates in ASCs could be
offset or eliminated and total health care spending may be driven to an even higher level.
Nevertheless, a competing explanation is that high volume physicians are more likely to acquire
ownership of an ASC. With the absence of a study that appropriately addresses the potential
reverse causal relationship between physician ownership and volume, it remains unclear whether
physician ownership results in increased utilization of outpatient surgical procedures.
While empirical studies that centered on the effect of physician ownership are not
available, there is qualitative evidence from related areas that may provide some insights about
the implication of physician ownership of ASCs for the quality of care. Medical group leaders
participating in the Community Tracking Study asserted that physician-owned ASCs could
improve quality because of physician owners’ involvement in the design of the delivery system,
dedicated staff and surgical equipment, and the focus of providing a limited scope of services
(Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). If they can attract a large number of patients, physicianowned ASCs can function as focused factories which are able to control costs and improve
quality by delivering a narrow range of procedures (Herzlinger, 1997). However, if newly built
ASCs represent excess capacity in a community, the demand for outpatient surgery may not be
able to support ASCs to perform a high volume and thus achieve improved quality (Casalino,
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Devers, & Brewster, 2003; Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003). Moreover, if physician
ownership results in overutilization in physician-owned ASCs, the quality of care may be worse
in these facilities in that patients are exposed to the unnecessary risk associated with
inappropriate medical interventions (Chassin MR, Galvin RW,and the National Roundtable on
Health Care Quality, 1998; Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003). By contrast, hospital-based
facilities may benefit from hospital-wide quality improvement initiatives. Overall, there is
inconclusive qualitative evidence for the effect of physician ownership of ASCs on quality.
Two empirical studies examined the effect of physician ownership on quality of care in
physician-owned facilities. The seminal work by Mitchell and Sass (1995) examined the effect of
physician ownership of physical therapy facilities using survey data (Table 6). They found that
clinics that completely relied on physician owners’ referrals treated patients for 50% more visits
than clinics with no referrals from physician owners. They found no difference in quality of care
across ownership structures. In addition, they found that physical therapists were less likely to
work in physician-owned clinics in states that allowed them to practice independently. Overall,
the findings suggested that it was more likely that physicians invested in ancillary facilities to
induce and benefit from the demand for services than to exercise influence over the quality of
such services. O’Neill and Hartz (2012) examined outcomes for patients who underwent
percutaneous coronary interventions in 6 cardiac hospitals and 18 general hospitals in Texas.
They found that the risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality rate for patients treated at specialty
hospitals was significantly lower than the average level. However, the rate was significantly
higher when physicians who owned cardiac hospitals treated patients in general hospitals. Their
overall outcomes (mortality rate for patients treated at both cardiac and general hospitals) were
not significantly different from the average outcomes. They suggested that both lower patient
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Table 6
Empirical Studies of the Effect of Physician Ownership
Authors, Data Source/
year, and Study Period
journal

Outcome
Measures

Unit of
Analysis/
Study sample

Measurement of
physician
ownership

Control
Variables

Statistical
Technique

Major Findings

Pennsylvania
Health Care
Cost
Containment
Commission/
2003

Patient sociodemographic
characteristics
, diagnostic
group, and
referral
patterns

Facility
level/
1,008,038
outpatient
surgery
discharges in
the Pittsburg
and
Philadelphia
metropolitan
areas

Physician-owned
ASCs were
identified by
checking with
public records and
individual facilities.
Physicians who
account for the top
50% of referrals to
these ASCs are
regarded as
physician owners.

NA

Bivariate
analyses

Physician-owned
ASCs treated
less indigent,
Medicaid, and
African
American
patients.
Physicianowners tended to
refer wellinsured patients
to their facilities.

Strope et
al, 2009,
Medical
Care

Florida State
Ambulatory
Surgery
Database
(SASD)/
1998-2002

The rate of
ambulatory
surgery, the
proportion of
procedures
with
misaligned
incentives,
and the extra
cost of
changing
procedure mix

Physician
level/
543,031
patients
undergoing
procedures of
male
genitourinary
system and
female
urinary
system

Physician owners
were
operationalized as
those surgeons who
performed more
than 30% of their
ambulatory surgery
cases within a
single ASC in a
year.

Year,
ownership
status,
and the
interactio
n term of
both

Chi-square
tests,
Poisson
regression
model
with an
exposure
variable
and linear
regression
s

. This increase in
rates of
ambulatory
surgery was
associated with
the conversion
of nonowners to
owners and a
shift to lucrative
procedures
among these
new owners.
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Gabel et
al, 2008,
Health
Affairs

Table 6 (continued)
Authors, Data Source/
year, and Study Period
journal

Outcome
Measures

Unit of
Analysis/
Study sample

Measurement of
physician
ownership

Control
Variables

Statistical
Technique

Major Findings

State
documents
and claims
data from a
large private
insurer/
2003-2007

The ratio of
patients who
received the
surgical
procedure of
interest to all
patients with
same
diagnoses
treated by a
physician
in a year

Patient
level/office
visits of
patients with
diagnoses
associated
with three
orthopedic
surgical
procedures

Physician
physician
ownership status of age and
ASCs and specialty sex
hospitals and
physician owners
were identified
using data from
state records and an
insurer as well as by
contacting facilities
with incomplete
records.

Tests of
differences
between
proportion
s, logistic
regression
s

The use for each
of the orthopedic
procedures
examined was
significantly
higher for
physician
owners
compared with
physician
nonowners.

Hollings
-worth,
et al,
2010,
Health
Affairs

HCUP State
Ambulatory
Surgery
Databases of
Florida/
2003-2005

A physician's
annual
caseload (a
count of one
of the five
procedures
that a given
physician
performed
over a year)

physicianyear level/
patients who
underwent
five
procedures

A physician was
considered to be an
owner if he or she
carried out 30% or
more of his or her
ambulatory
surgeries at a given
ASC in a year.

Bivariate
analyses,
two-level
linear
mixed
models,
and linear
regression
models

Physician
owners operated
on relatively
healthier patients
and performed
more
procedures. The
use of 4
procedures rose
much more
rapidly among
physicians who
acquired
ownership.
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Mitchell,
2010,
Archives
of
Surgery

patient
characteri
stics
aggregate
d to
physician
level;
Hospital
Referral
Region,
and the
year

Table 6 (continued)
Authors, Data Source/
year, and Study Period
journal

Outcome
Measures

Unit of
Analysis/
Study sample

Measurement of
physician
ownership

Control
Variables

Statistical
Technique

Major Findings

A survey of
physical
therapy and
rehabilitation
facilities in
Florida in
1989 and a
salary survey
conducted in
1988 by PT
Forum/19881989

Consumption
(the number of
physical
therapy visits
per patient);
quality/input
mix (the
minutes of
physical
therapist labor
per visit); and
the incidence
of physician
ownership

Patient level,
encounter
level, and
physician/the
rapist
level/patients
who
underwent
physical
therapy

Physician
ownership status
was measured as
the fraction of
referrals emanating
from physician
owners

Supply
/demand
factors,
physician
characteri
stics,
induce
demand
incentives
,
existence
of some
regulation
s

Ordinary
linear
regression
and probit
regression
models

A physical
therapy clinic
that 100% relied
on referrals from
physician
owners provided
50% more visits.
No quality of
care difference
was found across
ownership
structures.

O’Neill
and
Hartz,
2012,
Health
Affairs

Inpatient,
hospital and
physician
information
from the
Texas
Department
of State
Health
Services
/2004-2007

In-hospital
mortality rate

Physician
level/ 48,460
patients who
underwent
percutaneous
coronary
interventions

The physician
ownership status of
hospitals was first
identified.
Physician owners
were defined as
those performing a
high percentage of
procedures at a
cardiac hospital

Admissio
n type,
comorbidi
ties, age,
Hispanic
ethnicity,
, hospital
and
physician
volumes

A logistic
regression
model was
used to
predict the
risk of
mortality
rate.

The outcomes
for cardiologists
who owned
specialty
hospitals were
not significantly
different from
the average.
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Mitchell
and
Sass,
1995,
Journal
of
Health
Economi
cs

acuity and higher procedural volumes may have contributed to cardiac hospitals’ nominally
lower mortality rates.
In sum, research findings from prior studies found that physician ownership of ASCs was
associated with patient “cherry-picking” and increased use of services in the outpatient surgical
settings. Qualitative studies suggested that many factors may affect the relative quality
performance of physician-owned ASCs in comparison with other non-physician-owned facilities.
Yet no empirical studies focused on the effect of physician ownership on the quality of care in
the outpatient surgical settings.
Summary
Ambulatory surgery centers are playing an increasingly important role in providing
outpatient surgical and diagnostic procedures. A review of the literature reveals that a growing
number of studies examined the quality of outpatient surgery in general and outpatient
colonoscopy in particular. But it is still unclear that how prevalent physician ownership is among
ASCs. Prior studies of physician ownership largely focused on its effects on patient selection and
services use. Only two studies outside of the outpatient surgical settings investigated the
relationship between physician ownership, services use and quality.
This review has identified a number of limitations and gaps in prior studies. First, a
method that can reliably determine physician ownership of ASCs within a large geographic area
has not been identified. Second, as with quality analysis in other settings, research on quality of
care in outpatient surgical settings needs to address the possible endogeneity of key independent
variables. Third, data used by many prior studies had hierarchical structures and special
statistical methods need to be used to deal with clustered data and render valid estimates of
standard errors. Fourth, existing studies only controlled for factors at the patient and facility
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levels. Some characteristics at the health market level, such as competition, should also be
accounted for considering that competition between hospital-based outpatient facilities and ASCs
may have quality implications. Fifth, prior studies examining adverse events after outpatient
colonoscopy used limited patient populations and complication indicators. Finally, research
findings from prior studies found that physician ownership of ASCs was associated with patient
“cherry-picking” and increased use of services in the outpatient surgical settings. Some industry
experts contend that physician ownership results in “cost-competitive, high-quality services”
(Rozich, D'Amore, & Sloan, 2000). Yet no empirical studies compared outcomes and quality in
physician-owned ASCs and other service settings.
This study aims to address these gaps in the literature. First, by examining the effect of
physician ownership of ASCs on the quality of outpatient colonoscopy, this study expands the
literature of physician ownership of ASC to outcomes beyond patient selection and service use.
Second, the study uses the consequences of a court decision in California in 2007 that changed
the licensure requirement for ASCs with physician ownership to determine the physician
ownership status of ASCs in California. Third, the introduction of market characteristics on
quality extends previous research that only examined the impact of patient, clinical, and
organizational characteristics. Multilevel analysis will be used to account for the hierarchical
structures in the data and a propensity score approach will be adopted to address the potential
endogeneity in the location of a facility. Fourth, this study examines a comprehensive list of
adverse events related to outpatient colonoscopy, using a large, all-payer, general patient
population.
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The following chapter describes the conceptual framework used in the study and
develops hypotheses on the theoretical relationships between physician ownership and quality of
care in outpatient surgical settings.
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

This study focuses on comparing the quality of care provided by physician-owned ASCs
relative to the quality of care provided by hospital-based outpatient facilities. Literature from
agency theory is drawn upon to provide conceptual guidance in this study. This chapter begins
with a discussion of potential explanations for physician investment in ASCs. The second section
examines physician ownership from the agency theory perspective. The third section discusses
under what circumstances a strengthened agency relationship between owners and physicians
can improve quality. The fourth section explains why physician ownership can also act as a
deterrent to quality under certain conditions. Formal hypotheses are developed following
theoretical discussions. The sixth section examines other factors that are potentially associated
with the ultimate quality of care and thus should be controlled for in the empirical models. The
chapter concludes with a diagrammatical depiction of the conceptual framework of the study.
Rationale for Physician Investment in ASCs
Physician investment constitutes an important contributing factor to the rapid growth of
ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). Three reasons have been given in the literature to
explain physician ownership of ASCs. First of all, physicians investing in ASCs may be
motivated by the financial gains associated with ownership (Becker & Biala, 2000; Devers,
Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003; Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, 2011; Mitchell, 2010). Physicians who perform procedures in an ASC they own
receive both professional fees and a share of facility fees. One study reported that when
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performing a cystoscopy in an ASC, a physician owner could collect $100 from the professional
fee and part of the $340 facility fee (Strope et al., 2009). In an environment with stagnating or
declining reimbursement for professional services, becoming an owner of a freestanding
specialty hospital or ASC may provide an important means for a physician to generate income
(Pham, Devers, May, & Berenson, 2004).
Second, physicians may seek ownership of a facility to assert greater control over their
work environment (Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003; Mitchell, 2010). As owners, physicians
can get have greater authority in hiring, staffing levels, scheduling, and purchasing equipment.
They are unlikely to have the same level of influence in these decisions in general hospitals.
Finally, greater efficiency may be another important reason for physicians to invest in
ASCs. The patient turnover times are shorter in ASCs than in hospital-based outpatient facilities.
An analysis of the data from the 2006 National Survey of Ambulatory Surgery found that the
average surgery time in ASCs is nearly 40% shorter than in hospital-based outpatient facilities
(Wynn, Hussey, & Ruder, 2011). Thus, physicians may be able to perform more procedures in a
day in ASCs, thereby generating more professional fees. Moreover, because ASCs usually do not
provide emergency care, disruption of scheduling for emergency cases are rare in ASCs
(Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003).
Agency Theory and Physician Ownership of ASCs
Agency theory is used to study the problems of motivating and aligning behaviors (Scott
& Davis, 2007). This theory examines the agency relationship in which one party (the principal)
contracts with another party (the agent) to perform some tasks on the principal’s behalf (Jensen
& Meckling, 1976). Two problems are focal to agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). First, there is
the problem that arises when the principal and agent have different goals and it is not feasible for
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the principal to monitor the behavior of the agent. Second, there is the problem of risk sharing,
which occurs when the principal and agent have different risk preferences. Agency theory is
based a series of assumptions about individuals, organizations, and information (Eisenhardt,
1989). For example, the theory assumes that the agent has better information about the tasks than
the principal. The primary goal of agency theory is to develop certain mechanisms so that the
objectives of the principal and agent are better aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Agency theory recognizes three mechanisms that can be used by principals for motivating
the agent to act in their interests: monitoring, bonding, and ownership (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Monitoring refers to efforts on the part of the principal to measure and control the
behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules, or
other mechanisms. In bonding, the agent guarantees the principal against loss due to the agent’s
fault. For example, a physician (agent) may promise to forgo a bonus at the end of a contract
period if certain targets agreed to with the facility (principal) are not met. Ownership allows the
agent to own a share of the asset, and thus financial returns generated by that asset.
Thus, physician ownership of ASCs can be conceptualized as an incentive by owners of a
facility (i.e., principals) to induce and reward certain behaviors by physicians providing services
at their facility (i.e., agents). Ownership is a “high-powered” incentive that tightly links
individual physicians’ financial interests to that of other facility owners. Physician owners enjoy
the profits when revenues exceed costs and share the losses when costs exceed revenues. In
addition, physician owners’ financial stake grows with the value of the organization.
The next two sections discuss how agency theory may explain the effect of physician
ownership on two different agency relationships existing within ASCs and the corresponding
quality implications. Specifically, the two agency relationships that may be affected by physician
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ownership are the agency relationship between other owners of an ASC (principals) and
physicians (agents) who perform surgical procedures in the facility and that between patients
(principals) and physicians (agents).
Physician Ownership as a Mechanism to Improve Quality
Physicians constitute a key input in the production of outpatient surgical care. Agency
theory predicts that ownership will strengthen the relationship between principals and agents, in
the case of this study, between other owners of ASCs and physicians (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Physician owners are more likely than physician non-owners to get involved in the daily
operation of the facility. For example, physician owners are listed as managing members in some
physician-owned ASCs. Under the safe harbor law, physician owners of multi-specialty ASCs
are required to perform as least one third of their surgical procedures at the ASC in which they
are investing (Office of Inspector General, 1999). Thus, they have to be actively involved with
the ASC in which they invest to remain to be owners.
In the post-managed care era, nonprice competition becomes increasingly important and
health care providers must focus on quality or related dimensions to attract business (Devers,
Brewster, & Casalino, 2003). Currently, publicly available quality information is not available
for outpatient surgeries 2. But patients may gain a sense about the quality of care at a facility
based on the personal experience of family and friends who used the facility and their health
outcomes. Assuming that consumers in the marketplace are reasonably able to assess differences
in quality across location of care and that patients value high quality care, physician owners will
be motivated to ensure that their own facility provides high quality care. This is because when
2

The Medicare Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) Quality Reporting Program will begin on October 1, 2012. For
the 2012 reporting period, ASCs will need to report on five measures and more measures are required for later
reporting periods. When these data will be made available to the public has not yet determined.
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the facility provides poor quality care, it will lead to loss of business and reputation. All
stakeholders of the facility, including physician owners will suffer financially.
There are a number of mechanisms through which physician owners may contribute to
the quality of care provided by the facility they own. Physician owners may participate in the
decision making process related to investment in organizational infrastructure. They may also
help the facility choose the optimal mix and quality of medical inputs, such as the appropriate
number and mix of qualified staff. These decisions are critical to producing quality care (Conrad
& Christianson, 2004a; Kuhn, 2003). Such a level of physician involvement in decision-making
is more difficult to achieve in non-physician-owned facilities (Schneider et al., 2008).
Physician owners may also boost the level of effort of medical and other facility staff.
The production of outpatient surgical care involves the collaboration of physicians,
anesthesiologists, nurses, medical assistants, and other support staff. Without a mechanism to
monitor or measure each team member’s efforts, the potential for shirking among team members
increases since none of them bears the full cost of shirking (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). When an
adverse event occurs, it may be difficult for the patient to determine which team member to
blame. Offering physicians equity interest (the right to claim residual profits) can prevent
shirking by either physicians or other medical team members. Physician owners have the
motivation to monitor the performance of other team members. They could be financially
penalized if poor quality of care results in lost business or malpractice suits, and conversely, they
can financially benefit if higher quality results in more business and higher profits (Alchian &
Demsetz, 1972). Therefore, physician ownership may represent a direct mechanism that ensures
the facility provides high quality care (McDowell, 1989).
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The positive effect of physician ownership on quality of care may be stronger in
competitive health care markets. As discussed above, physician owners have the expertise to
identify a series of strategies to improve the quality of care. But some strategies such as adopting
the latest medical equipment may involve sizable resources. In a less competitive health care
market, physician owners may only implement some quality improvement efforts that are less
resource-intensive (Pham, Devers, May, & Berenson, 2004). The competitive advantage
associated with physician ownership may not manifest itself. In competitive health care markets,
physician-owned ASCs may have the incentive to commit resources to more quality
improvement initiatives that are identified by physician owners. By contrast, in face of the
competition from ASCs, many hospitals strive to outperform ASCs by upgrading existing
facilities and adding new outpatient centers, which are more likely to affect amenities than
clinical quality (Devers, Brewster, & Casalino, 2003).
Physician Ownership as a Deterrent to Quality
Although patients may be able to assess the quality of care to a certain degree, as
suggested in the prior section, it may instead be the case that patients are unable to do so based
on their available knowledge and information. Without reliable comprehensive information
about the clinical quality, comparison across facilities is difficult to achieve. In practice, patients
may end up acquiescing to their physician’s recommendation when deciding whether and where
to receive medical care (Katz, 1996). Physician owners have broader concerns than physician
non-owners; they are not only concerned about the quality of services they provide, but also
about the operating expenses and profitability of the facility. The financial interest linked to
ownership may conflict with the best interest of patients. A growing body of literature indicates
that physicians’ clinical decision making process can be influenced by the financial incentives
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created by various financial arrangements and organizational structures (Casalino, 1992; Conrad
et al., 1996; Conrad & Christianson, 2004b; Matthews, 1993; McDowell, 1989; Murray,
Greenfield, Kaplan, & Yano, 1992).
First of all, physician owners may not actively implement quality improvement initiatives
even if they have the knowledge to improve the process of care. Potential physician owners of
specialty hospitals and ASCs reported that they were not motivated to invest in organized quality
improvement processes because payers did not provide corresponding financial incentives
(Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003; Pham, Devers, May, & Berenson, 2004).
Second, since third party payers set reimbursement rates for surgical procedures,
physician owners may reduce quality to bring down costs and to increase their profits. This is
likely to happen because ASCs are subject to less stringent regulation than hospital-based
outpatient facilities (American Hospital Association, 2006). In an extreme case, nurse
anesthetists were instructed by clinical staff (anecdotally physician owners) to reuse syringes to
access vials and reuse bottles of anesthesia on multiple patients (Southern Nevada Health District
Outbreak Investigation Team, 2009). When owners of an ASC underinvest in some quality
infrastructure, physician non-owners may decide to direct their patients to facilities providing
better quality of care. But physician owners may continue to refer patients to the facility even if
it has suffered a decline in the quality of care because of their equity interest (Zientek, 2003). Of
course, the extent to which physician owners can shirk on quality is limited by certification and
accreditation regulations and potential malpractice law suits. For example, the outbreak of
Hepatitis C in an physician-owned ASC in Nevada led to a half-million dollar fine and the
prosecution of the chief administrator, a physician, and employees who provided or supervised
unsafe medical procedures (Duran, 2008; Online Legal Media, 2008).
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Hypotheses
Physician ownership of ASCs could potentially lead to improved quality of outpatient
surgical care or to lower quality of care, depending on the degree to which consumers are able to
assess quality of care differences across location of care, the extent to which they value high
quality care, and physicians’ desire to pursue their financial interest.
On one hand, physician ownership can work as a mechanism to improve quality of care
by motivating physicians to actively participate in quality improvement efforts if consumers (or
referring physicians) can observe quality differences and are responsive to quality of care. The
positive effect of physician ownership on quality also relies on the degree to which physician
owners can influence facility investment, process redesign, and staff performance evaluation.
According to agency theory, physician ownership helps align the interests of physicians with
those of other owners of ASCs. If consumers can detect differences in quality of care across
different locations of care, facilities providing high quality care will gain better reputations and
will attract more business. In order to protect their own financial interests, physician owners will
be motivated to improve the quality of care provided by their own facility. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1: Assuming that patients can assess differences in quality of care across
locations of care, physician-owned ASCs will be associated with improved quality of care, all
other things being equal.
Physician ownership as a mechanism to improve quality of care may be more fully
realized in competitive health care markets. Again, assuming patients have the ability to
determine quality of care, physician-owned ASCs will have the incentive to implement quality
improvement initiatives identified by physician owners in competitive markets in order to attract
62

business from individual patients and referring physicians. By contrast, hospitals in competitive
markets may strive to outperform by upgrading existing facilities or adding new outpatient
facilities. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2: Assuming that patients have the ability to assess quality of care, the
positive effect of physician ownership on quality will be more obvious in more competitive
markets. In other words, physician-owned ASCs are expected to manifest larger quality
advantages in competitive health care markets compared to non-physician-owned facilities
(namely, hospital-based outpatient facilities).
On the other hand, physician ownership may be a deterrent to quality of care if patients
do not have the ability to assess quality of care differences and if physician owners exploit this
information void. Physician owners may reduce the quality of care to bring down operating
expenditures. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3: Assuming that patients are not able to detect quality differences across
different locations of care, physician-owned ASCs are expected to have lower quality of care in
comparison to non-physician-owned facilities (namely, hospital-based outpatient facilities).
Overall, the effect of physician ownership of ASCs is theoretically unclear, as is evident
from the hypotheses above. Empirical analysis is thus important to understand how physicianowned ASCs differ in quality of care from hospital-based outpatient facilities.
Control Variables
In addition to physician ownership, patient demographic and clinical characteristics,
facility-level factors, and characteristics of the local healthcare market may also affect patient
outcomes in the outpatient surgical settings. The following subsections motivate the relevance of
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these factors by drawing on related literature. These variables will be included in the empirical
models as control variables.
Patient characteristics.
Patient type and behavior can significantly affect health outcomes (Conrad &
Christianson, 2004b). A large body of literature indicates that many factors affect patient careseeking behavior, which in turn affects the health outcomes. Without controlling for patient
characteristics, the quality of care differences between physician-owned ASCs and hospitalbased outpatient facilities may result from the differences in patient populations across these
settings rather than being the effect of physician ownership status. According to the Behavioral
Model developed by Anderson, patient characteristics can be divided into three categories:
predisposing, enabling and need factors (Andersen, 1995). Predisposing factors relates to the
propensity that an individual uses health services. These factors include demographic
characteristics such as age, gender, social structures (e.g. education and race/ethnicity) and health
beliefs (e.g. attitudes and knowledge of health and health services). In addition, previous medical
care use may increase patients’ propensity to use medical services in the future (Anderson &
Steinberg, 1984). Therefore, this study will control for patient age group, gender, race/ethnicity,
and medical care utilization history in the multivariate analysis. Due to limitation in the data, this
study will not be able to measure and control for patients’ education level and health beliefs.
Enabling factors are related to access to health care services, including insurance and
financial resources that cover patient costs of care. Whether a patient resided in an urban or rural
location also affect his or her access to medical care. For example, rural patients often travel a
longer distance than urban patients to access the same medical care and therefore may use less
care. Need factors relate to the reasons patients seek health care services, and can comprise
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perceived need (e.g. perceived symptoms) or evaluated need (e.g. diagnosed health status).
Medical severity also can affect patients’ need for health care and provider’s ability to change
their health status. It is critical to control for patients’ severity of illness in a comparative study
of the patient outcomes in physician-owned facilities and hospital-based outpatient facilities.
Qualitative data suggested that physician owners may selectively refer relatively healthy patients
to their own facilities for treatments (Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003). If this is the case,
physician-owned ASCs may appear to have better quality of care if patient severity of illness is
not controlled for in the empirical analysis (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, &
Brooks, 2008). Therefore, this study will control for patients’ insurance status, income level,
urban/rural location, and medical severity.
Moreover, the type of the procedure that patients receive during an encounter may make
a difference in patient outcomes. For example, colonoscopy involving biopsy or polypectomy
procedures are more invasive than colonoscopy without such procedures and consequently
patients are more likely to develop complications afterwards (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006;
Rabeneck et al., 2008; Warren et al., 2009). This study therefore will control for the type of
colonoscopy involved in the encounter (Diagnostic colonoscopy, Colonoscopy and biopsy, or
Lesion removal colonoscopy).
Organizational characteristics.
The Institute of Medicine’s report Crossing the Quality Chasm posited that quality of
care is a systems problem, which can be affected by health care organizations and the larger
health care environment (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Physician-owned ASCs differ from nonphysician-owned facilities in many aspects other than the physician ownership status. For
example, physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities may have different
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volume and degree of specialization, which may also affect quality of care (Chukmaitov, Devers,
Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). Omitting these organizational characteristics from the
analysis could artificially amplify the impact of physician ownership on quality. Empirical
studies that link quality measures with organizational variables typically draw on the classic
structure-process-outcome model and specific organization theory and organizational behavior
frameworks (Mitchell & Shortell, 1997). Donabedian’s structure-process-outcome model
presumes that good organizational structure leads to good process of care, and ultimately better
health outcomes (Donabedian, 1966; Donabedian, 1978; Donabedian, 1988). Donabedian
defined structure as the attributes of the materials, human resources, and organizational
arrangements that are involved in the production of care. Process refers to the approaches used to
produce care and interactions between providers and patients as they receive care. Outcome is
the health status of patients. This study controls for structural factors such as volume and
specialization level of the facility. Due to limitations in the data, the study will not be able to
control for process of care variables. In the literature, studies in the inpatient setting also
predominantly examined the relationship between organizational structure and quality of care
(Hearld, Alexander, Fraser, & Jiang, 2008).
It is well documented in the inpatient literature that a positive relationship exists between
the volume of certain surgical procedures at a hospital and patient quality of care (Chukmaitov et
al., 2008). This relationship was also found in the outpatient surgical settings (Chukmaitov et al.,
2008; Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). It is thus necessary for this
study to control for the facility volume of the procedure of interest, namely, colonoscopy.
Additionally, ASCs tend to provide a narrow range of procedures (Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, 2004) and thus, it may be that quality of care in highly specialized ASCs is higher
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because physicians and other staff can achieve proficiency by providing a smaller set of services
often (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). Moreover, ASCs specialized in providing certain
types of procedures may do a better job in implementing evidence-based practices in a focused
area (Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). Therefore, it is also necessary
to control for the extent of organizational specialization for this study. A specialization rate, the
percentage of a certain type of procedure in a facility’s total procedures, will be used to measure
the degree of specialization. The specialization rate squared will also be included to account for
the potential diminishing returns to specialization (Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, &
Brooks, 2010).
Market characteristics.
The larger health care environment may influence quality of care by affecting patients’
access to necessary medical care and thus their health outcomes (Andersen & Davidson, 2001).
Additionally, environmental forces may encourage or impede health care providers’ efforts to
improve quality. As stated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 1), “to understand the behavior of an
organization you must understand the context of that behavior-that is, the ecology of the
organization.” Market-level factors, such as competition, managed care penetration, physician
supply, and patient demand factors, will be controlled for in this study. It is necessary to control
for market characteristics when comparing patient outcomes in different health care facilities.
This is because if physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities may locate in
different kinds of markets, and thus, not controlling for market factors will lead to biased
estimation of the effect of physician ownership.
ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities have great overlap in the types of outpatient
surgical services they provide. Evidence indicates that ASCs are meaningful competitors of
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general hospitals (Carey, Burgess, & Young, 2011). However, the theoretical relationship
between competition and quality is complex. On one hand, competition between ASCs and
hospital-owned outpatient facilities may reduce environmental munificence, namely, the
availability of critical resources needed by these facilities to operate within an environment
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 2003) and thus the available resources allocated to quality
improvement efforts. But on the other hand, some studies that examined quality of inpatient
services suggest that competition may lead to increased efficiency and thus mitigate the effect of
financial pressure on quality (Kessler & McClellan, 2000; Pope, 1989). Additionally, evidence
indicates that among patients for which organizations face regulated prices, competition for
patient business will focus on the quality and great competition will improve the quality of health
care. Whereas for markets where prices are set by providers rather than the government, both
price and quality may be influenced by competition and the relationship between quality and
competition is theoretically ambiguous (Gaynor, 2006). Therefore, the impact of competition on
quality of care is theoretically unclear. This study will control for the competition level of the
local health care market using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). As mentioned above, the
interaction term of physician ownership and HHI will also be included.
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)
penetration may also affect the quality of care. Because premiums are a key factor when
employers purchase group coverage for their employees (Legnini, Rosenberg, Perry, &
Robertson, 2000), HMOs and PPOs attach much importance to prices when they contract with
providers. Given this, health care providers may reduce the quality of care, under the pressure to
control costs. High percentage of patients enrolled in HMOs or PPOs may induce changes in the
treatment patterns and resource utilization across all patients in the area, affecting health
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outcomes of those not covered by managed care organizations (Baker, 2003). Therefore,
facilities located within the high HMO or PPO penetration markets may be expected to have
different patient outcomes than those located in the low HMO/PPO penetration markets.
In addition, the medical care resources in the community may influence health care
organizations’ investment in structural quality and ultimately affect patient outcomes (Conrad &
Christianson, 2004b). For example, physician supply in the local market may affect the cost of
human capital and thus the qualification and skills of physicians that staff health care
organizations. This study therefore will control for the number of physicians in gastroenterology,
primary care, and general surgery per 100,000 population in the county. These physicians are
included because they either are directly involved in the delivery of colonoscopy or are a source
of referrals. Furthermore, the population size, percentage of the population over age 65, and
percentage of the population below age 65 without health insurance may determine the demand
for medical care (Roggenkamp, White, & Bazzoli, 2005). These market factors will also be
controlled for in the analysis.
Conceptual Framework
As shown in Figure 3, agency theory and evidence from the literature suggests that
patient outcomes in the outpatient surgical settings can be influenced by multiple factors. This
study examines the potential effects of physician ownership on quality of care by comparing the
outcomes of patients treated at a physician-owned ASC with those achieved by patients treated
by non-physician-owned facilities (i.e., hospital-based outpatient facilities). Specifically, this
study is interested in investigating whether colonoscopy patients treated at a physician-owned
ASC were less or more likely to experience adverse events that can develop after the procedure
when compared to those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

Market Characteristics
HHI
HMO/PPO penetration
Physician supply
Population size
% of the population
above age 65
% of the population
below age 65 without
health insurance

•



Patient Outcomes
Same day ED visit or
Hospitalization
30-day adverse events
resulting in ED visit or
Hospitalization

•
•
•
•

Patient Characteristics
Age group, gender,
race/ethnicity
Previous medical care
utilization history
Insurance status,
income, urban/rural
location
Medical severity
Type of colonoscopy

Organizational Characteristics
• Physician ownership
• Physician ownership*HHI
• Facility Volume
• Specialization rate
• Specialization rate squared
Figure 3. Conceptual Framework of the Effect of Physician Ownership on the Quality of
Outpatient Colonoscopy
Note: HHI: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; HMO: health maintenance organization; PPO: preferred provider
organizations; ED: emergency department. The key independent variables appear in bold.

In order to control for other confounding factors that may affect patient outcomes, this
study accounts for patient characteristics, organizational characteristics, and health care market
characteristics in the analytical models.
Summary
This chapter drew on agency theory and the literature to develop a conceptual framework
that examines the potential effects of physician ownership on the quality of outpatient surgical
care. In theory, the relationship between physician ownership and quality of care was shown to
be unclear. Assuming that patients can distinguish the quality differences across locations of care,
physician ownership may work to improve quality. This is because physicians, as facility owners,
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can play an important role in quality improvement as it is important to their reputation and
maintaining patient business. However, if patients cannot detect differences in quality of care,
physician-owned facilities may make production decisions that lead to lower quality of care
because this may provide greater financial returns through the reduction of costs of operation.
The chapter also reviewed other factors that may affect patient outcomes in the outpatient
surgical settings and thus should be controlled for in the analysis. Figure 3 diagrammatically
presented the conceptual framework for this study. Chapter 4 covers the research methods used
in this study, including research design, data sources, sampling process, variable measurements,
and the overall analytical approach.
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Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter describes the research methods used to investigate the relationship between
physician ownership and the quality of outpatient colonoscopy. The first section describes the
research design, followed by a description of the study sample, data sources, and variable
measurements. The fifth section discusses the model specification and technical issues that need
to be addressed in the study. The chapter ends with a summary.
Research Design
This study aims to examine the effect of physician ownership of ASCs on the quality of
outpatient colonoscopy. The California appellate court decision in Capen v. Shewry (2007)
which led to the delicensing of ASCs with any physician ownership provides a unique
opportunity for this study to identify physician owned ASCs in California. This study utilizes a
pooled, cross-sectional design. This design enables the accumulation of a large number of
colonoscopy cases to identify the relatively rare complications following outpatient colonoscopy.
This study is retrospective and observational in nature. Because technological, market, and
public policy factors jointly affect physicians’ decision to invest in ASCs (Casalino, Devers, &
Brewster, 2003), a propensity score approach is used to adjust potential physician selective
investment in outpatient surgical facilities. Additionally, in sensitivity analysis, the propensity
score method will be used instead to adjust for potential selective patient referrals.
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Data Sources
The main sources of data for this study are three discharge-level databases: the State
Ambulatory Surgery Databases (SASD), State Emergency Department Databases (SEDD), and
State Inpatient Databases (SID) for the state of California from 2005 to 2007. The SASD, SEDD,
and SID are compiled by the Healthcare Cost & Utilization Project (HCUP), which is
administered by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The primary reason for
choosing California as the study site is that the Capen v. Sherwy (2007) decision makes it
possible to identify physician ownership status of ASCs. Additionally, with the absence of
national data, the state of California is a good choice for a study of ASCs. It has the largest
number of ASCs around the country and accounts for the second largest number of visits out of
all 17 participating states in HCUP SASD project. The number of records for 2005, 2006, and
2007 SASD files were 2.79 million, 2.87 million, and 3.00 million, respectively (Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2012a). In addition, California SASD tracks discharges from
freestanding ASCs and hospital-owned outpatient facilities (Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, 2012b). Finally, California does not subject medical facilities to certificate of need
requirements (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011), which allows physicians and
investors to freely respond to the changing demands for outpatient surgical care.
The SASD contain a core set of clinical and nonclinical information on all patients,
regardless of payers. Variables from the SASD include patient demographic characteristics,
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) diagnosis codes, Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT) codes, discharge status, expected payment sources, and the identifier of the
facility in which the patient received treatments. Using supplemental AHRQ files that identify
patients with multiple types of health service use (i.e., their revisit files), the outpatient surgery
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records are merged with hospital emergency department and inpatient discharge data. The SEDD
and SID contain information on all ED visits and hospital admissions in California.
The study also uses data from the annual utilization files of specialty clinics and hospitals,
which are collected by the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD). All specialty clinics and hospitals are mandated by state law to file an Annual
Utilization Report with OSHPD that contains utilization data for their licensed services. These
files include information on facility location, original license date, control type, patient
encounters, number of operating rooms, surgical volume, revenue, expenditure and other
financial data. ASCs in California are specialty clinics licensed as surgical clinics 3.
Other databases such as the Area Resource File (ARF) 2009-2010 Release (Version 2)
compiled by the Bureau of Health Professions, and the HMO and PPO enrollment data provided
by HealthLeader are also included in the study to provide information on health market
characteristics.
Study Sample
The outpatient surgery discharge records in California are used to identify a cohort of
patients who underwent outpatient colonoscopy between January 1, 2005 and November 30,
2007. Hospital emergency department and inpatient discharge records in the period from 2005 to
2007 are merged to the outpatient surgery data. There are three uses of the emergency
department and hospital data: 1) to provide additional information about patients’ medical care
use history and comorbidity conditions; 2) to identify patients transferred to emergency
department or admitted to short-term acute care hospital in the same day of the colonoscopy; and
3) to identify colonoscopy related complications resulting in emergency department or hospital
3 Personal communication with Michael B. Derrick, manager of the Licensed Services Data Unit under the OSHPD
(email received on 4/27/2009).
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use within 30 days. The study sample includes patients aged 18 and older and those covered by
all types of payers (Medicare, Medicaid, commercial insurance, or self-pay).
This study focuses on colonoscopy procedures because they are among the most common
and profitable procedures for ASCs (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2004).
Specifically, this study examines colonoscopy procedures represented by five CPT codes (Table
7). The code 45378 is used to report a diagnostic colonoscopy, in which no biopsies or excisions
are involved. CPT codes 45380, 45383, 45384, and 45385 are used to report therapeutic
colonoscopy procedures that involve biopsy, polypectomy, or excision of a lesion.
Table 7
Description of the CPT Codes Examined in the Study
CPT
code

Short
Descriptor

Description

Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure;
diagnostic, with or without collection of specimen(s)
45378
by brushing or washing, with or without colon
decompression (separate procedure)
Colonoscopy Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure;
45380
and biopsy with biopsy, single or multiple
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure;
Lesion
with ablation of tumor(s), polyp(s), or other lesion(s)
45383
removal
not amenable to removal by hot biopsy forceps,
colonoscopy
bipolar cautery or snare technique
Lesion
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure;
45384
remove
with removal of tumor(s), polyp(s), or other lesion(s)
colonoscopy by hot biopsy forceps or bipolar cautery
Lesion
Colonoscopy, flexible, proximal to splenic flexure;
45385
removal
with removal of tumor(s), polyp(s), or other lesion(s)
colonoscopy by snare technique
Diagnostic
colonoscopy

Final CY
2012
Payment
Weight

Final CY
2012
Payment

8.8699

$378.10

8.8699

$378.10

8.8699

$378.10

8.8699

$378.10

8.8699

$378.10

Note: CPT: is a registered trademark of American Medical Association. Short descriptor, payment weight and rate
information was published on the CMS website.

During the period from 2005 to 2007, 1,832,535 colonoscopy cases were performed in
California, of which 131,440 cases are not linkable to emergency department and inpatient data
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and thus excluded from the sample. The colonoscopy cases performed on patients younger than
18 are excluded (N=22,370). Following previous studies (Warren et al., 2009), colonoscopies
performed on patient with a diagnosis of diverticulitis, Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, and
colorectal cancer are excluded from the study because they are prone to experience colonic
perforation and gastrointestinal bleeding (N=116,144). If a patient had two colonoscopies less
than three months apart, only the second colonoscopy is included in the sample, considering that
the first one may be incomplete due to poor preparation (Levin et al., 2006). For those with more
than two colonoscopies that were three or more months apart during the study period, only the
first one is included. For these two reasons, 74,843 cases are removed. Cases without a facility
identifier or performed in a facility that was not licensed by California Department of Public
Health are excluded (N=68). To ensure that facilities of interest performed colonoscopy on a
regular basis, cases associated with facilities which did not perform a minimum of 30 cases in a
year are removed from the study as well (N=77,397). To ensure the completeness of a one month
follow-up after the procedure, colonoscopy cases performed in December of 2007 are excluded
(N=38,087). Missing values are found for patients’ gender (about 13%) and race/ethnicity (about
32%). The missing values for these two variables are replaced by values found on emergency
department or inpatient records during the study period. Missing values are also found in
variables including the state quartile of the median household income for the patient’s ZIP Code,
payer type, and urban/rural location. Overall, due to missing values, 68,962 cases are excluded.
Finally, cases provided by non-physician-owned ASCs (N=24,338) are also excluded due to
small numbers. The final sample contains 1,278,886 colonoscopy cases.
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Variable Measurement
Dependent variables.
This study examines all-cause ED visit and/or hospitalization in the same day of the
colonoscopy procedure and also related complications occurring within 30 days after outpatient
colonoscopy that were severe enough to require an emergency department visit or hospitalization.
A follow up period of 30 days was chosen because some serious complications such as
gastrointestinal bleeding can occur 3-4 weeks after a colonoscopy (Ko & Dominitz, 2010; Mezei
& Chung, 1999). Thirty-day hospital admissions have commonly been used as quality measures
in outpatient surgical settings (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008;
Chukmaitov, Devers, Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010; Mezei & Chung, 1999; Shnaider &
Chung, 2006; Warner, Shields, & Chute, 1993; Warren et al., 2009). Following Warren et al.
(2009), mortality is not included in the analysis because of the small number of patient deaths
after colonoscopy and the complex causes of mortality.
The first dependent variable is all-cause ED visit and/or hospitalization in the same day
of colonoscopy. Outpatient surgical patients are not expected to use emergency department or
inpatient care immediately after their procedure. Thus, this variable is an indicator of a potential
adverse event that required more intensive and immediate care (Fleisher, Pasternak, & Lyles,
2007).
The second to fourth dependent variables are related adverse events occurring within 30
days after outpatient colonoscopy that were severe enough to require an ED visit and/or
hospitalization. Specifically, the second dependent variable is the occurrence of serious
gastrointestinal events requiring ED visit and/or hospitalization within 30 days. The serious
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gastrointestinal complications included in the analysis are colonic perforation, lower
gastrointestinal bleeding, and anemia (Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009).
The third dependent variable is the occurrence of other gastrointestinal events occurring
within 30 days. Relevant complications for this variable include intestinal obstruction, abdominal
pain, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis, nausea and vomiting, and disorders of fluid (Levin et al.,
2006; Warren et al., 2009). Note that the diverticulitis and ulcerative colitis are medical
conditions developed after the patient received colonoscopy. Those with such conditions at the
time of colonoscopy have been excluded.
The fourth dependent variable is the occurrence of other non-gastrointestinal events
occurring within 30 days after outpatient colonoscopy. Relevant complications for this variable
include sedation-related cardiopulmonary complications (aspiration pneumonia, pneumonia,
organism unspecified, myocardial infarction/angina, arrhythmias, heart failure, stroke,
syncope/dizziness, hypotension, shock after procedure, respiratory and/or cardiac arrest),
infection (fever, bacteremia, and endocarditis following the procedure), and complications of
procedure (failure of sterile precautions during procedure, foreign body accidentally left during a
procedure, and postoperative infection ) (Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009).
In some cases, a patient may experience more than one type of adverse events and the
ensuing ED visit and/or hospitalization may not be attributed to one type of adverse events or
another. To avoid underestimating the incidence rate, each type of adverse event is considered to
have resulted in an ED visit and/or hospitalization in these cases. For example, if a patient had
gastrointestinal bleeding and a stroke within 30 days of the procedure and got hospitalized, two
binary variables, the occurrence of serious gastrointestinal events and the occurrence of other
non-gastrointestinal events will be coded as 1. If a patient had multiple complications that belong
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to one type of adverse events, only the corresponding dependent variable will be coded as 1. For
example, if a patient had an inpatient record with the diagnoses of abdominal pain and nausea
and vomiting, only the occurrence of other gastrointestinal events for this patient will be coded
as 1.
Key independent variable.
The primary interest of this study is examining how physician ownership status affects
patient outcomes of colonoscopy procedures. Prior to the Capen v. Shewry lawsuit and
corresponding court ruling, Section 1200, et seq. of the California Health and Safety Code
required that certain types of clinics and surgical clinics be licensed by the California
Department of Public Health (CDPH). CDPH had interpreted the Statute as excluding from
mandatory licensure clinics that were solely owned physicians. But CDPH had licensed wholly
physician-owned clinics if physicians voluntarily requested it. Most physician-owned ASCs
elected to be licensed because most third party payers, such as Medi-Cal, have included being
licensed as a condition for coverage (Fielding & Freedman, 2008).
The decision made by the Third District Court of Appeal on September 19, 2007 in the
Capen v. Shewry lawsuit altered CDPH’s licensing practices. The decision ruled that “physician
owned and operated surgical clinics are to be regulated by a division of the Medical Board, when
general anesthesia is used, and surgical clinics operated by non-physicians are to be regulated by
the Department (CDPH).”(Court of Appeal, Third District, California, 2007) CDPH interpreted
the decision as it no longer having authority to license or regulate any physician-owned ASCs,
nor to issue licenses even if physicians applied for them voluntarily. Consequently, about 450
ASCs with physician ownership stopped filing annual reports to the CDPH. These facilities also
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stopped submitting discharge data. Post the court ruling, the Medical Board of California is
solely responsible for oversight of any centers with any fraction of physician ownership.
The Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) maintains
information on all licensed health facilities in California. After the Capen v. Shewry decision,
OSHPD began to identify and delicense ASCs with any physician ownership. The delicensing
process did not happen immediately after the court ruling because many physician-owned ASCs
continued to submit utilization reports to OSHPD. By 2012, all ASCs with physician-ownership
have been delicensed. Based on the records maintained by OSHPD, this study is able to identify
ASCs with at least partial physician ownership. This study assumed that physician ownership
status remained unchanged during the study period, namely, from 2005 to 2007. Physician
information was not available in the California data. Therefore, it is not possible to identify
physicians who were practicing in physician-owned facilities or to identify which physicians
were indeed owners of these facilities.
A dummy variable physician ownership is constructed to identify outpatient surgical
facilities with physician ownership, namely, physician-owned ASCs and those without, namely,
hospital-based outpatient facilities. The first type of facility includes freestanding ASCs that
were solely or partially owned by physicians. This category also includes freestanding ASCs
organized through joint ventures between hospitals and individual physicians or between
hospitals and physician groups. The second type of facility includes hospital outpatient
departments as well as hospital-owned ASCs that are not physically attached to the main hospital
campus. Because all these hospital-owned facilities reported information at the hospital level, it
is impossible to distinguish hospital outpatient departments from hospital-owned ASCs. In this
study, hospital-based outpatient facility serves as the reference group.
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Control variables.
All regressions included the same set of control variables. These control variables can be
grouped into factors at the patient, organizational, and health care market-level as shown in
Figure 3 of Chapter 3.
Patient characteristics.
Several demographic and clinical factors that may affect patients’ likelihood of ED and
hospital inpatient care use after outpatient surgery are included in the analysis. Specifically,
patient demographic variables include: patient age group, gender, race/ethnicity, payer type,
income proxy, and urban/rural location. This study selected colonoscopy patients who were 18
years or older on the date of admission. Following Chukmaitov et al (2008a), the age group
variable is divided into five groups (18-49 [the reference group], 50-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85 and
above). Patient gender is included as a binary variable (male is the reference group).
Race/ethnicity is coded as non-Hispanic white (the reference group), non-Hispanic African
American, Hispanic, or other (non-Hispanic, including unknowns). Patient payer types are
categorized into five groups: Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance (the reference group), selfpay, or other payer.
Ideally, a patient’s income should be measured directly by the income at the patient level
or household level. However, such data are not publicly available. Instead, a quartile variable
based on the median household income for the patient’s ZIP code is used (first quartile, second
quartile, third quartile, fourth quartile [the reference group]). The quartiles are identified by
values of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating the poorest population and 4 the wealthiest population,
respectively. The cut-offs for the quartile designation is determined by ranking the ranking the
median household income for all the ZIP Codes within the state. This variable is used as a proxy
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for an individual patient’s socioeconomic status. It is worth noting that it may also be an
indicator of the community from which the outpatient surgery facility is drawing business.
Patient urban/rural location is classified as one of these categories: large metropolitan
area with at least 1 million residents (the reference group), small metropolitan area with less than
1 million residents, micropolitan area, and not metropolitan or micropolitan area (rural area).
Several clinical factors may affect patient outcomes and thus should be controlled for.
This study uses the Charlson et al. (1987) Index as a measure of medical severity of illness.
Charlson et al. (1987) defined 17 comorbidities, including myocardial infarction, congestive
heart failure, peripheral vascular disease, cerebrovascular disease, dementia, chronic pulmonary
disease, rheumatic disease, peptic ulcer disease, mild liver disease, diabetes without chronic
complication, diabetes with chronic complication, hemiplegia or paraplegia, renal disease, any
malignancy, moderate or severe liver disease, metastatic solid tumor, and HIV/AIDS. Different
comorbidities receive different weights in the construction of the Index. The first 10 conditions
(from myocardial infarction to diabetes without chronic complication) are given a weight of 1.
The eleventh to fourteenth conditions (from diabetes with chronic complication to any
malignancy) are given a weight of 2. Moderate or severe liver disease is given a weight of 3 and
metastatic solid tumor and HIV/AIDS are given a weight of 6. In this study, the Index is
constructed using diagnosis information from the outpatient surgery records as well as
emergency and inpatient records for the 6 months prior to and 6 months after the procedure,
assuming comorbid conditions remain unchanged over this period of time. The calculation is
based on the algorithms used in Quan et al (2005). Some conditions, such as acute myocardial
infarction, are excluded from the calculation of the Index if they happened within 30 days after
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the procedure because these are regarded as colonoscopy related complications. The Charlson
Index is treated as a continuous variable in the analysis.
This study also measures some other clinical factors. Following Fleisher et al (2004), the
propensity to use medical services, which is measured by the number of previous ED visits and
hospital admissions (within 6 months prior to the colonoscopy), is controlled for in this study.
The study also controls for the procedures that patients received during the colonoscopy.
Following prior studies (Ko et al., 2010; Levin et al., 2006; Warren et al., 2009), this study
controls for the type of colonoscopy performed on the patient (Diagnostic colonoscopy [the
reference group], Colonoscopy and biopsy, or Lesion removal colonoscopy).
Organizational characteristics.
Other organizational characteristics are also measured and controlled for in this study.
Facility volume is measured through a tertile variable that represents the ranking of the volume
of colonoscopies provided by a facility relative to the volume of all other facilities in a given
year (Chukmaitov et al., 2008). The total number of colonoscopies performed by each facility is
obtained by using unique facility identifiers and procedure identifiers. Following Chukmaitov et
al. (2010), this study measures procedure specialization within an outpatient surgical facility.
The variable specialization rate equals the number of colonoscopy procedures provided by the
facility divided by the total number of outpatient surgeries in that facility in a given year. The
specialization rate squared is also included to allow for the estimate of a quadratic relationship
between organizational specialization and quality of care.
Market characteristics.
The proposed study also controls for several market characteristics that may affect the
quality of outpatient surgical care, including degree of competition, HMO and PPO penetration,
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physician density, and demand-related factors. In this study, the health care market is defined as
the county due to the availability of data. Alternative methods to define health care market
include the use of the Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs) (Wennberg & Cooper, 1998) and fixed
radius. Past work suggests that different definitions of markets do not substantially change the
results (Krauchunas, 2011; McLaughlin, Normolle, Wolfe, McMahon, & Griffith, 1989).
Competition in this study is measured using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that is
based on the market share of colonoscopy for a facility, calculated with the county as the
relevant market area. Outpatient surgical facilities operated by the same health care system in a
county are treated as one organization with their market share combined to the system level. This
is the standard practice in hospital related research. Health system identifiers are obtained from
AHA annual survey. An interaction term of competition and facility type is included in the
analysis as physician-owned ASCs may behave differently in highly competitive markets. HMO
and PPO penetration rates are used to capture the financial pressure from managed care
organizations. The HMO penetration rate is defined as the proportion of the total population
enrolled in HMOs (including commercial, Medicare, and Medicaid enrollment) in a county
following the literature (Scanlon, Chernew, Swaminathan, & Lee, 2006). The PPO penetration
rate includes commercial, Medicare, and self insured enrollment and uses the total population in
the county as the denominator.
This study also includes a set of physician supply variable to reflect the medical
infrastructure in the local health care market. Specifically, the numbers of physicians practicing
gastroenterology, primary care (including family medicine, general practice, and general internal
medicine), and general surgery per 100,000 population in the county are included. Because ARF
does not provide the physician supply variables for the year 2006, averages of the values in years
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2005 and 2007 are used instead. Additionally, the study controls for several demand-related
factors, including log-transformed population size at the county level, percentage of the
population over age 65, and percentage of the population under age 65 without health insurance.
Finally, time effects are accounted for in the model. Specifically, dummy variables for each year
between 2005 and 2007 are constructed, with the reference group being 2005. Table 8
summarizes the variables included in the analysis, their definitions, and data sources.
Empirical Specification and Methodology
A descriptive analysis of colonoscopy patients’ characteristics and the prevalence of
adverse events related to outpatient colonoscopy by the ownership structure of the facility will
first be conducted. To demonstrate the prevalence of colonoscopy related adverse events, the
unadjusted rate per 1,000 persons for specific adverse events will be calculated by counting the
number of specific adverse events within 30 days of the procedure, not controlling for covariates.
Chi-square test will be used to determine whether the rate for adverse events differed
significantly across two types of facilities, namely, physician-owned ASC and hospital-based
outpatient facility.
Recognizing that a colonoscopy case is nested within an outpatient surgical facility, and
the latter is nested within a certain health care market, three-level generalized hierarchical linear
models (GHLM) will be constructed to investigate the factors associated with adverse events
after colonoscopy. Patient characteristics will be modeled at level-1, organizational factors at
level-2 and health care market characteristics at level-3. Separate models will be estimated for
each dependent variable.
In the hierarchical modeling, a patient’s log odds of experiencing an adverse event after
the index colonoscopy may vary across both facilities and health care markets. First, a patient’s
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Table 8
Variable definitions and sources
Variable
Dependent Variables
The incidence of same day ED
visit and/or hospitalization
The incidence of serious
gastrointestinal event
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The incidence of other
gastrointestinal event

The incidence of other nongastrointestinal event

Definition
All-cause ED visit and/or hospitalization in the same day of colonoscopy. This
variable is binary and equals to 1 if the patient experiences this type of adverse
events and 0 otherwise.
Serious gastrointestinal complications (colonic perforation, lower
gastrointestinal bleeding, and anemia) requiring ED visit and/or hospitalization
within 30 days following outpatient colonoscopy. This variable is binary and
equals 1 if the patient experiences any of the complications under this category
and 0 otherwise.
Other gastrointestinal complications including intestinal obstruction, abdominal
pain, diverticulitis, ulcerative colitis, nausea and vomiting, and disorders of fluid
occurring within 30 days after outpatient colonoscopy that were severe enough
to require an emergency department visit or hospitalization. This variable is
binary and equals 1 if the patient experiences any of the complications under this
category and 0 otherwise.
Other non-gastrointestinal complications including sedation-related
cardiopulmonary complications (aspiration pneumonia, pneumonia, organism
unspecified, myocardial infarction/angina, arrhythmias, heart failure, stroke,
syncope/dizziness, hypotension, shock after procedure, respiratory and/or
cardiac arrest), infection (fever, bacteremia, and endocarditis following the
procedure), and complications of procedure (failure of sterile precautions during
procedure, foreign body accidentally left during a procedure, and postoperative
infection) occurring within 30 days after outpatient colonoscopy that were
severe enough to require an emergency department visit or hospitalization. This
variable is binary and equals 1 if the patient experiences any of the
complications under this category and 0 otherwise.

Data
Sources
HCUPSEDD
and SID
HCUPSEDD
and SID

HCUPSEDD
and SID

HCUPSEDD
and SID

Table 8 (continued)
Variable

Definition

Key Independent Variable
Physician ownership

A dummy variable identifying physician-owned ASC and hospital-based
outpatient facility (the reference group)

Physician ownership interacted
with HHI

The interaction term of the dummy variable identifying physician-owned ASC
and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)

Control Variables
Patient characteristics
Age group

Dummy variables identifying these age groups: 18–49 [the reference group], 50–
64, 65–74, 75–84, 85 and above.

Gender

A dummy variable equal to 1 for male and 0 for female
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Race/ethnicity

Payer type

Income level

Urban/rural location

Dummy variables identifying white (non-Hispanic, the reference group), African
American (non-Hispanic), Hispanic, or other (including unknowns)
Dummy variables identifying Medicare (fee-for-service and managed care
Medicare), Medicaid (fee-for-service and managed care Medicaid), private
insurance (including Blue Cross, commercial carriers, and private HMOs and
PPOs, the reference group), self-pay, or other payer (Worker's Compensation,
CHAMPUS, CHAMPVA, Title V, and other government programs)
Dummy variables indicating the quartile in which the median household income
for the patient’s ZIP code falls (first quartile, second quartile, third quartile,
fourth quartile [the reference group]). The quartiles are identified by 1 to 4, with
1 indicating the poorest population and 4 the wealthiest population, respectively.
The cut-offs for the quartile designation is determined by ranking the median
household income for all ZIP Codes within the state.
A series of dummy variables identifying patient urban/rural location as one of
these: large metropolitan area with at least 1 million residents (the reference
group), small metropolitan area with less than 1 million residents, micropolitan
area, and not metropolitan or micropolitan area (nonmetro noncore area)

Data
Sources
CAOSHPD
HCUPSASD
CAOSHPD
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD

HCUPSASD

HCUPSASD

Table 8 (continued)
Variable

Definition

Charlson Comorbidity Index

A continuous variable which represents the weighted number of comorbid
conditions. It is calculated using diagnoses on the ambulatory surgery records as
well as emergency department and inpatient records for the 6 months prior to
and 6 months after the outpatient colonoscopy

# of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations

The number of ED visits and hospital admissions within 6 months prior to the
colonoscopy procedure

Colonoscopy type

Dummy variables indicating diagnostic colonoscopy (the reference group),
colonoscopy and biopsy, or lesion removal colonoscopy

Organizational Characteristics
Facility volume
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Specialization rate
Specialization rate squared
Market Characteristics
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI)
HMO and PPO penetration
Number of gastroenterologists
per 100,000 population
Number of primary care
physicians per 100,000
population

Three dummy variables representing the low-, medium-, or high-volume tertile
based on the facility volume of colonoscopy. The low tertile serves as the
reference group. These tertile variables vary from year to year with cut-offs
determined by ranking all facilities’ volumes in a given year
The percentage which equals the number of colonoscopies provided by the
facility divided by the number of outpatient surgeries for a facility in a year
A continuous variable which equals to the square of specialization rate
Sum of squares of market share of a facility’s outpatient colonoscopy cases. The
market shares for facilities that belonged to the same health systems within a
county were combined
The percentage of the population enrolled in HMOs (including commercial,
Medicare, and Medicaid) in a county and the percentage of the population in the
county enrolled in commercial PPO, Medicare PPO, or self insured PPO.
The ratio of the number of physicians in gastroenterology to 100,000 population
in the county
The ratio of the number of physicians practicing family medicine, general
medicine, and internal medicine to 100,000 population in the county

Data
Sources
HCUPSASD,
SEDD,
and SID
HCUPSEDD
and SID
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD
HCUPSASD
HealthLeader
ARF
ARF

Table 8 (continued)
Variable
Number of general surgeons per
100,000 population
Log-transformed population
size
% of the population above age
65
% of the population below age
65 without health insurance
Year dummy variables

Definition
The ratio of the number of physicians in general surgery to the total population
in the county

Data
Sources
ARF

The log-transformation of the estimated total number of population in the county

ARF

The percentage of the population above age 65

ARF

The percentage of the population under age 65 that have no health insurance

ARF

A set of dummy variables for years 2005 (the reference group), 2006, and 2007

Note: CA-OSHPD: State specialty clinic and hospital annual utilization reports from the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD);
HCUP-SASD: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State Ambulatory Surgery Databases; HCUP-SEDD: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State
Emergency Department Databases; HCUP-SID: Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project-State Inpatient Databases; ARF: Area Resource File.
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odds of having an adverse event will be modeled as a function of a facility mean and a random
error (which was assumed to have a Bernoulli distribution with a mean of zero and a constant
variance). Then, the organizational mean will be modeled as an outcome varying randomly
around a health market mean with a random error (which was assumed to have a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a certain variance). Finally, each health market mean will be
modeled as an outcome varying randomly around a grand mean with a random error (which was
also assumed to have a normal distribution).
Suppose that

is a binary variable (e.g. same day ED visit and/or hospitalization) that

equals 1 if a specific type of adverse events occurred in patient who received care from facility
which was located in health markets , the three-level logistic random-intercept model can be
expressed by the following equation:

follows

where
the Bernouli distribution,

,

is a random intercept

varying over facilities (level2),

is a random intercept varying over health

care markets (level 3).

represents the cross-level interaction

term between physician-ownership and market competition.
A common threat to the internal validity of this observational study is that physicians
may selectively invest in outpatient surgical facilities in certain type of health care market.
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Researchers have noted that technological, market, and public policy factors jointly influence
physician decisions to invest in ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003). This study will use
the propensity score approach (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984) to
identify facilities that are more likely to attract physician investment using market-level factors.
Including the propensity score in the models ensures that facilities in different categories have
similar joint distributions in observed variables related to decisions among physicians about
where to locate facilities (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1984; Rubin, 1997).
In theory, if physicians’ selection of location wholly depends on the variables used in propensity
score estimation, including propensity scores in the models can make the selection process
“ignorable” (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). But in practice, important factors that may influence
such decisions may be unobservable and thus not incorporated into the propensity score.
Little evidence exists in the current literature on physician investment decisions. One
qualitative study suggests that technological, market, and public policy factors jointly affect
physicians’ decision to invest in ASCs (Casalino, Devers, & Brewster, 2003; Pham, Devers, May,
& Berenson, 2004). For example, the presence of large single-specialty physician groups is
found to be an important contributing factor in the creation of a physician-owned ASC (Casalino,
Devers, & Brewster, 2003). In addition, physician income pressure and physician’s negotiation
power relative to that of health insurance plans and hospitals also may play a role in physicians’
decision to invest in specialty facilities (i.e., specialty hospitals or ASCs) (Pham, Devers, May, &
Berenson, 2004). In this study, all market-level factors, including competition, HMO/PPO
penetration, physician supply variables, and patient demand factors, are used in the propensity
score analysis. The propensity score is calculated using logistic regression and is included in
multilevel models as a covariate.
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In this study, data management is conducted using SAS 9.2 and STATA 12.0. Multilevel
logistic regressions are estimated using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS. This study was
reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Virginia Commonwealth
University.
Sensitivity Analyses
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine whether multivariate regression results are
robust to the change in propensity score adjustment approach. It is possible that physician
owners may selectively refer relatively healthier patients to their own facilities for treatments
(Devers, Brewster, & Ginsburg, 2003; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012). At the same time, they may direct
sicker patients and those with multiple comorbid conditions to other facilities for treatment
because these patients may require a higher level of service and cost more to be taken care of.
Thus, a separate propensity score will be constructed to account for favorable patient selection.
Because little evidence exists about what patient characteristics are used in patient selection by
physician owners, all patient-level factors will be used to construct the propensity score. Note
that patients from remote rural areas may only have access to hospital outpatient facilities
because there were no physician-owned ASCs nearby. In this case, patients’ urban/rural location
variable can be used to control for physical accessibility to physician-owned ASCs. The results
will be compared with those of primary models that include propensity score adjusting for
potential physician selective investment in outpatient surgical facilities.
An additional sensitivity analysis parallels the two series of models in the main analysis,
with an added lagged quality indicator-unadjusted adverse event rate for a facility in the previous
year. The inclusion of the lagged quality variable may be necessary for two reasons. First, lagged
quality may affect patient outcomes in the current period due to the dynamic nature of quality
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(Castle & Anderson, 2011). Second, this variable may in part pick up the influence of quality on
patients’ decisions if they are indeed able to ascertain differences in quality across different
providers. These models are run as sensitivity tests rather than the main analysis considering that
observations of year 2005 do not have lagged quality information and need to be dropped from
the analysis. This loss of sample size is significant since the outcomes are rare adverse events.
Summary
This chapter covered the research design, data sources, variable measurements, and
empirical specification and methods used in this study. This study will utilize a pooled, crosssectional design. The ambulatory surgery, emergency department, and inpatient care discharge
records from California will be linked together to identify a cohort of outpatient colonoscopy
patients and their use of emergency department and/or hospital inpatient care within 30 days
after the procedure. The Capen v Shewry decision in California in 2007 will be used to identify
the physician ownership status of outpatient surgical facilities. Using hierarchical generalized
linear modeling technique and propensity score adjustments, this study will attempt to examine
the effect of physician ownership by comparing patient outcomes in facilities with physician
ownership and in those with no physician ownership. The findings of this study are presented in
Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Results

This chapter presents the results of the empirical analyses. It is divided into four sections.
The first section provides descriptive data on patients, outpatient surgical facilities, and health
care markets for California during the 2005 to 2007 study period. The second section shows the
unadjusted rate per 1,000 procedures for adverse events of interest. The third section presents
results of multilevel models, with and without a propensity score adjusting for physician
selective investment in outpatient surgical facilities. The fourth section reports the results of
sensitivity analyses, in which a different propensity score is constructed to adjust for patient
selection and lagged quality indicators are included in the empirical model. These results are
compared with those obtained in the main analysis. The fifth and final section concludes the
chapter with a brief summary.
Results of Descriptive Analysis
Numbers of colonoscopy patients, facilities, and markets.
During the study period (2005-2007), 1,832,535 colonoscopies were performed in
California, of which 1,278,886 colonoscopies were performed on patients aged 18 or above and
were included in the study. Physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities
provided 645,481 (50.5%) and 633,405 (49.5%) colonoscopies, respectively. There were 1,324
facility-years included in this study, with 494 physician-owned ASC-years and 830 hospitalbased outpatient facility-years. On average, in each study year, there were 165 physician-owned
ASCs and 277 hospital-based outpatient facilities with an annual facility volume of no less than
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30 colonoscopies. Those outpatient surgical facilities were located in 58 counties. The counties
of Alpine and Sierra did not have any health care facility that provided outpatient surgeries
during the study period. In Modoc County, the only licensed health care facility, Modoc Medical
Center, reported 7 outpatient surgeries (no colonoscopy) in 2005 and none in 2006 and 2007.
Thus, Alpine, Sierra, and Modoc counties were excluded from the study. These three counties
are the three least populated in California. Thus, the health care markets in 55 counties were
examined in the study.
Characteristics of patients examined.
As reported in Table 9, a majority of colonoscopy patients (71.7%) were between age 50
and 74, which is consistent with the recommendation that colonoscopy be conducted for polyps
and cancer screening in an average risk person, aged between 50 and 75 (U.S. Preventive
Services Task Force, 2008). The distribution of patient age was similar at physician-owned
ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities.
Outpatient colonoscopy patients were more likely to be female. Although a higher
percentage of patients treated at a physician-owned ASC were male than patients treated at a
hospital-based outpatient facility (45.7% versus 45.1%, p<0.0001), the magnitude of the
difference may not have practical implications.
Extra caution needs to be exercised when interpreting the racial/ethnic composition of patients in
different types of facilities. More patients at a physician-owned ASC had unknown race/ethnicity.
In this situation, the racial-ethnic composition is calculated on the basis of patients with known
race/ethnicity. Overall, non-Hispanic white, African American, and Hispanic patients accounted
for 81.4%, 4.0%, and 14.6% of all patients with known race/ethnicity, respectively. In physician-
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics for Patient-level Characteristics by Facility Type from 2005 to 2007
Physician-owned
ASC
# of cases (%)
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Patient age
18-49 (reference)
50-64
65-74
75-84
85 or greater
Patient gender
Male (reference)
Female
Patient race/ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Other
Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance (reference)
Self-pay
Other payer
Median household income quartile (ZIP code level)
Lowest quartile of income
Second lowest quartile of income

86,918
323,124
144,779
79,831
10,829

(13.5)
(50.1)
(22.4)
(12.4)
(1.7)

Hospital-owned
Outpatient Facility
# of cases (%)
95,244
317,479
131,783
76,348
12,551

(15.0)
(50.1)
(20.8)
(12.1)
(2.0)

Total
# of cases (%)
182,162
640,603
276,562
156,179
23,380

(14.2)
(50.1)
(21.6)
(12.2)
(1.8)

294,799 (45.7)
350,682 (54.3)

285,914 (45.1)
347,491 (54.9)

580,713 (45.4)
698,173 (54.6)

381,806
19,832
61,020
182,823

(59.2)
(3.1)
(9.5)
(28.3)

416,925
19,963
82,110
114,407

(65.8)
(3.2)
(13.0)
(18.1)

798,731
39,795
143,130
297,230

(62.5)
(3.1)
(11.2)
(23.2)

222,200
10,808
374,037
7,890
30,546

(34.4)
(1.7)
(57.9)
(1.2)
(4.7)

205,126
37,121
355,123
9,674
26,361

(32.4)
(5.9)
(56.1)
(1.5)
(4.2)

427,326
47,929
729,160
17,564
56,907

(33.4)
(3.7)
(57.0)
(1.4)
(4.4)

105,618 (16.4)
125,518 (19.4)

117,653 (18.6)
151,213 (23.9)

223,271 (17.5)
276,731 (21.6)

Table 9 (continued)
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Second highest quartile of income
Highest quartile of income (reference)
Urban/rural location
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million residents,
reference)
Metropolitan areas (<1 million residents)
Micropolitan areas
Non-urban areas
Charlson Comorbidity Indexa
Propensity to use medical servicesa
Colonoscopy type
Diagnostic colonoscopy (reference)
Colonoscopy and biopsy
Lesion removal colonoscopy
Total

Physician-owned
ASC
# of cases (%)
176,949 (27.4)
237,396 (36.8)

Hospital-owned
Outpatient Facility
# of cases (%)
172,924 (27.3)
191,615 (30.3)

466,053
170,060
4,870
4,498
0.17
0.15

(72.2)
(26.3)
(0.8)
(0.7)
(0.80)
(0.55)

448,594
148,319
26,074
10,418
0.35
0.23

(70.8)
(23.4)
(4.1)
(1.6)
(1.02)
(0.74)

337,922
141,383
166,176
645,481

(52.4)
(21.9)
(25.7)
(100.0)

334,998
138,331
160,076
633,405

(52.9)
(21.8)
(25.3)
(100.0)

Total
# of cases (%)
349,873 (27.4)
429,011 (33.5)
914,647
318,379
30,944
14,916
0.26
0.19
672,920
279,714
326,252
1,278,886

(71.5)
(24.9)
(2.4)
(1.2)
(0.92)
(0.65)
(52.6)
(21.9)
(25.5)
(100.0)

Note: Chi-square test was used to test the association between the row variables and facility type variables. a For Charlson Comorbidity Index and
propensity to use medical services, mean and standard deviation are reported and t test was used to test the differences across facility types. All differences
across the two types of facilities are significant at the p<0.01 level.

owned ASCs, the three percentages were 82.5%, 4.3%, and 13.2%, respectively while in
hospital-based outpatient facilities, the three percentages were 80.3%, 3.8%, and 15.8%. Taking
African American and Hispanic patients together, physician-owned ASCs served a relatively
smaller percentage of patients from racial-ethnic minority groups (17.5%) than hospital-based
outpatient facilities (19.7%).
The patients tended to be covered by private insurance or Medicare. Medicare patients
and private insured patients accounted for a significantly larger percentage in physician-owned
ASCs (92.3%) than in hospital-based outpatient facilities (88.5%). By contrast, Medicaid
patients accounted for a significantly smaller percentage in physician-owned ASCs (1.7%) than
in hospital-based outpatient facilities (5.9%).
Using the median household income quartile for the patient’s ZIP code as a proxy for a
patients’ income, physician-owned ASCs had a significantly higher percentage of patients from
the wealthiest quartile (36.8%) and a significantly lower percentage of patients from the poorest
quartile (16.4%) than hospital-based outpatient facilities (30.3% and 18.6%, respectively).
A majority of colonoscopy patients came from metropolitan areas (96.4%). Physicianowned ASCs had significantly smaller percentages of patients from micropolitan and non-urban
areas (0.8% and 0.7%, respectively) than hospital-based outpatient facilities (4.1% and 1.6%,
respectively).
Outpatient colonoscopy patients were largely healthy. The average Charlson Comorbidity
Index was 0.26 and the average number of the ED visits and hospitalizations in the six months
prior to the colonoscopy was 0.19 per person. Physician-owned ASCs served significantly
healthier patients. The mean Charlson Comorbidity Index for patients treated at a physicianowned ASC was 0.17 while the number was 0.35 for patients treated at a hospital-based
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outpatient facility. Patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had a significantly lower
propensity to use medical services. The average number of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations was 0.15 for patients treated at a physician-owned ASC while that number for
patients treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility was 0.23.
More than half of outpatient colonoscopies were diagnostic colonoscopies. About one
fifth were colonoscopy with biopsy and about one fourth were lesion removal colonoscopies.
The composition of different colonoscopy procedures was similar across the two types of
facilities. Overall, 52.6% of colonoscopy patients received diagnostic colonoscopy without
biopsy or polypectomy, while 21.9% received colonoscopy and biopsy and 25.5% received
lesion removal colonoscopy.
In sum, a majority of outpatient colonoscopy patients were above age 50. They were
more likely to be female and non-Hispanic white. Private insurance and Medicare were two
largest payers for this type of medical care. Patients from the wealthier two quartiles accounted
for more than 60% of all the patients. Most patients lived in metropolitan areas. Outpatient
colonoscopy patients were largely healthy. A little more than half of patients received diagnostic
colonoscopy. There were significant differences among patients receiving the procedure at a
physician-owned ASC and those treated by a hospital outpatient facility. Patients receiving the
procedure at a physician-owned ASC were more likely to be non-Hispanic white, have private
insurance or Medicare, live in wealthier zip codes and metropolitan areas, and have better health
status.
Characteristics of outpatient surgical facilities.
As reported in Table 10, on average an outpatient surgical facility provided 1284
colonoscopies in a given year. On average 30% of all the surgeries in an outpatient facility were
99

Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Facility-level Characteristics by Facility Type from 2005 to 2007
Physician-owned
ASC
Mean (Standard
deviation)

Facility colonoscopy
volume
1811.67 (1711.98)
Facility colonoscopy
volume groupa
30-430 cases per year
(reference)
113 (22.9)
431-1333 cases per year
124 (25.1)
>= 1334 cases per year
257 (52.0)
Specialization rate
0.48 (0.27)
Facility-years
494 (100.0)

Hospital-owned
Outpatient Facility
Mean (Standard
deviation)

Mean (Standard
deviation)

970.69 (1088.72)

1284.47 (1414.36)

314
323
193
0.20
830

(37.8)
(38.9)
(23.3)
(0.12)
(100.0)

Total

427
447
450
0.31
1,324

(32.3)
(33.8)
(34.0)
(0.23)
(100.0)

Note: Means are reported and standard deviations are in brackets. t test was used to check on the equality of means
of row variables of different facility types. a For the Facility colonoscopy volume group variables, frequencies and
column percentages are reported and chi-square test is used to test the association between row variables and facility
type variables. All differences across the two types of facilities are significant at the p<0.01 level.

colonoscopy procedures. Physician-owned ASCs on average had a significantly higher
colonoscopy volume (1,812 cases per year) than hospital-based outpatient facilities (971 cases
per year). Correspondingly, 52.0% of physician-owned ASC-years fell into the highest volume
group while 23.3% of hospital-based outpatient facilities belonged to that group. Physicianowned ASCs had a significantly higher level of specialization than hospital-based outpatient
facilities. Among physician-owned ASCs, on average 48% of all outpatient surgeries were
colonoscopy cases. In hospital-based outpatient facilities, only 20% of all outpatient surgeries
were colonoscopies on average.
Characteristics of health care markets.
As mentioned before, counties are used to define health care markets in this study. The
distribution of outpatient surgical facilities that performed outpatient colonoscopy varied greatly
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across counties. Among the 55 counties with at least one outpatient surgical facility that provided
30 or more outpatient colonoscopies in a given year, only 38 counties had both physician-owned
ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities. The other 17 counties only had hospital-based
outpatient facilities.
Table 11 depicts the characteristics of the health care markets based on the percentage of
outpatient surgical center observations for the three year study period in a county that were
physician-owned ASC observations rather than hospital-based outpatient facility observations.
Twenty-five counties had low percentages of physician-owned ASC observations (0-29.9%), 17
counties belonged to the group of markets with moderate percentages (30.0-49.9%), and 10
belonged to the group of markets with high percentages of physician-owned ASC observations
(above 50.0%). Markets with low percentages of physician-owned ASC observations had a much
lower level of competition (HHI 0.6814) compared with markets with moderate or high
percentages of physician-owned ASC observations (HHI 0.2820 and 0.3549, respectively).
Markets with low percentages of physician-owned ASC observations also had a relatively lower
HMO penetration rate, lower gastroenterologists per 100,000 population, higher primary care
physicians per 100,000 population, higher general surgeon per 100,000 population, a smaller
population size, and a higher percent of the population aged 65 or above. Little difference in the
rate of individuals who are uninsured was found across the three market types.
Unadjusted rates for adverse events by facility type.
Table 12 presents the unadjusted rates for specific adverse events that developed within
30 days of outpatient colonoscopy and resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization by facility type.
Here the rate is calculated by summing up all the complications across facilities of a particular
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for Market-level Characteristics by Percentages of Outpatient Surgical Center Observations that were for
Physician-owned ACSsa
% of Observations that
were for Physicianowned ASC

# of
# of GS
Log
PCP
per
population
per
100,000
100,000
64.05
9.29
11.28

13.8%

% of
the
uninsu
red
19.7%

13.34

11.1%

19.7%

8.27

12.30

12.3%

19.8%

9.08

12.22

12.6%

19.7%

HHI

HMO
penetration

PPO
penetr
ation

# of GI
per
100,000

Low (0-29.9%)

0.6814

27.0%

32.1%

1.61

Medium (30.0-49.9%)

0.2820

39.0%

29.5%

2.99

59.64

9.22

High (>=50.0%)

0.3549

29.7%

37.2%

2.62

62.31

Overall

0.4768

31.9%

32.1%

2.30

62.13

% of
populatio
n age 65+
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Note: HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; GI: gastroenterologists; PCP: primary care physicians; GS: general surgeons. aThe percentage was calculated
by dividing the number of study observations for physician-owned ASCs during the three-year study period within a county by the total number of
outpatient surgical center observations (i.e., physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities) in that county.

Table 12
Unadjusted Rates per 1,000 procedures for Specific Adverse Events within 30 Days of Colonoscopy by Facility Type from
2005 to 2007

Adverse event

Physician-owned
ASCs (n=645,481)

Hospital-based
outpatient facilities
(n=633,405)
Events, n
Rate
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Events, n

Rate

Same day transfer to ED or Hospital

1,131

1.8

2,283

Serious GI events resulting in an ED
visit or hospitalization within 30 days

638

1.0

Other GI events resulting in an ED visit
or hospitalization within 30 days

3,028

Other non-GI events resulting in an ED
visit or hospitalization within 30 days

7,683

Note: ED: emergency department; GI=gastrointestinal.

Total
(n=1,278,886)

P value

Events, n

Rate

3.6

3,414

2.7

<0.001

636

1.0

1,274

1.0

0.779

4.7

3,451

5.4

6,479

5.1

<0.001

11.9

9,951

15.7

17,634

13.8

<0.001

ownership type and then dividing this by the total number of procedures (measured in 1000s) for
that facility ownership type. The rate for same day transfer to ED or short-term acute care
hospital was 2.7 per 1,000 procedures. Rate for same day transfer to ED or short-term acute care
hospital was significantly lower for patients treated at a physician-owned ASC (1.8 per 1,000
procedures) than those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility (3.6 per 1,000procedures) .
The incidence of serious gastrointestinal events (colonic perforation or lower gastrointestinal
bleeding) that resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization was 1.0 per 1,000 procedures. The rate
for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events was not significantly different among patients treated at
the two types of facilities.
The rate for other gastrointestinal adverse events (e.g. intestinal obstruction) that resulted
in ED visit or hospitalization was 5.1 per 1,000 procedures. Rate for other gastrointestinal events
was significantly lower among patients receiving colonoscopy at a physician-owned ASC (4.7
per 1,000 procedures) than those treated in a hospital-based outpatient facility (5.4 per 1,000
procedures). In addition, the incidence of non-gastrointestinal adverse events (cardiopulmonary
events and complications associated with the procedure) was 13.8 per 1,000 procedures. Rate for
non-gastrointestinal events was significantly lower among patients treated at a physician-owned
ASC (11.9 per 1,000 procedures) than among those receiving procedures at a hospital-based
outpatient facility (15.7 per 1,000 procedures).
In sum, a comparison of the unadjusted rates for adverse events after outpatient
colonoscopy across the two types of facilities indicates that before controlling for other
confounding factors, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had relatively lower rates for
developing complications that resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization than those receiving
treatments in a hospital-based outpatient facility. Except for serious gastrointestinal events,
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which shows no difference across two types of facilities, patients treated at a physician-owned
ASC had significantly lower rates for same day transfer, other gastrointestinal events and other
non-gastro-intestinal events. However, these rates are unadjusted measures. The results are likely
to change after controlling for variables that may affect patient outcomes.
Results of Multivariate Analysis
This section presents the estimation results of three-level hierarchical generalized linear
models. Separate models are estimated for the incidence of four types of adverse events: same
day ED visit and/or hospitalization, serious gastrointestinal events that resulted in an ED visit or
hospitalization within 30 days, other gastrointestinal events that resulted in an ED visit or
hospitalization within 30 days, and other non-gastrointestinal events that resulted in an ED visit
or hospitalization within 30 days. For each dependent variable, basic models are first fitted. Then,
models that also include a propensity score constructed to adjust for physician selective
investment in outpatient surgical facilities are estimated.
To recap the theoretical hypotheses discussed in Chapter 3, this study expects that
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had better outcomes (lower odds for adverse events
after colonoscopy) than those receiving treatment at a hospital-based outpatient facility, with the
assumption that patients are able to assess quality of care difference across locations of care.
Additionally, the quality advantage associated with physician ownership would be stronger in
competitive health care markets. In other words, the odds ratio for the interaction term of
physician ownership and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index should be greater than one. On the other
hand, if patients do not have the ability to assess the quality differences and if physician owners
exploit this information void, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC would have higher odds
for adverse events examined in this study.
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Results for the same day ED visit and/or hospitalization measure.
Table 13 presents the results generated from the three-level hierarchical models with the
incidence of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization as the dependent variable, with and
without the propensity score adjustment for physician selective investment in outpatient surgical
facilities. The results of the model with propensity score adjustment are similar to those of the
basic model when it comes to patient factors and facility-level factors. But the results for marketlevel factors are greatly different, and a few variables that are insignificant in the basic model
become significant in the model with propensity score. Therefore, the results for the basic model
plus propensity score are reported.
For same day ED visit and/or hospitalization, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC
and those at a hospital-based outpatient facility had comparable outcomes. In the adjusted model,
the variable physician ownership yielded an odds ratio of 0.95, which is not statistically
significant. The competition level in the local health care market did not have significant
influence over patient outcomes. The estimated odds ratio of the interaction term of physician
ownership and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was 2.20 and statistically insignificant (p=0.26).
The results of the multilevel analysis show that several patient characteristics affect
patients’ odds for same day ED visit and/or hospitalization. Compared with patients aged 18
through 49, patients in age group 50-64 had a significantly lower odds for same day ED visit
and/or hospitalization (odds ratio, 0.64). But for patients aged between 75 and 84, the odds of
experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization was significantly higher than patients aged
between 18 and 49 (odds ratio, 1.35). The odds for patients in the age group of age 85 and above
was even higher (odd ratio, 2.36). The odds for a female patient to experience same day ED visit
and/or hospitalization was significantly higher than that for a male patient (odds ratio, 1.11).
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Table 13
Results of Multilevel Models for Same day ED Visit and/or Hospitalization (2005-2007)

Variable

Key Independent Variables
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Patient characteristics
Patient age
18-49 (reference)
50-64
65-74
75-84
85 or greater
Patient gender
Male (reference)
Female
Patient race/ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Other
Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance (reference)
Self-pay
Other payer
Median household income quartile
(ZIP code level)
Lowest quartile of income
Second lowest quartile of income
Second highest quartile of income
Highest quartile of income
(reference)
Urban/rural location

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

1.03 (0.72, 1.46)
1.21 (0.33, 4.49)

0.95 (0.66, 1.35)
2.20 (0.56, 8.61)

0.64 (0.57, 0.71)
0.91 (0.78, 1.05)
1.35 (1.16, 1.58)
2.36 (1.92, 2.90)

0.64 (0.57, 0.71)
0.91 (0.78, 1.05)
1.35 (1.16, 1.58)
2.36 (1.92, 2.90)

1.11 (1.03, 1.20)

1.11 (1.03, 1.20)

1.13 (0.92, 1.39)
1.00 (0.88, 1.13)
0.55 (0.49, 0.62)

1.13 (0.92, 1.39)
1.00 (0.88, 1.13)
0.55 (0.49, 0.62)

1.05 (0.93, 1.19)
1.49 (1.25, 1.78)

1.05 (0.93, 1.19)
1.50 (1.26, 1.78)

1.57 (1.18, 2.08)
0.87 (0.67, 1.12)

1.58 (1.19, 2.09)
0.86 (0.67, 1.12)

1.13 (0.98, 1.30)
0.99 (0.87, 1.12)
1.12 (1.00, 1.26)

1.14 (0.99, 1.31)
0.99 (0.87, 1.13)
1.13 (1.01, 1.26)
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Table 13 (continued)

Variable

Metropolitan areas (>=1 million,
reference)
Metropolitan areas (<1 million)
Micropolitan areas
Non-urban areas
Charlson Comorbidity Index
# of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations
Colonoscopy type
Diagnostic colonoscopy
(reference)
Colonoscopy and biopsy
Lesion removal colonoscopy
Organizational characteristics
Facility colonoscopy volume group
30-430 cases per year (reference)
431-1333 cases per year
>= 1334 cases per year
Specialization rate
Specialization rate squared
Market characteristics
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
HMO penetration rate
PPO penetration rate
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000
# of primary care physicians per
100,000
# of general surgeons per 100,000
Log-transformed population size
% of the population above age 65

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

0.78 (0.62, 0.99)
2.04 (1.31, 3.16)
0.98 (0.55, 1.75)
1.27 (1.25, 1.29)

0.81 (0.64, 1.02)
2.00 (1.29, 3.12)
1.01 (0.57, 1.79)
1.27 (1.25, 1.29)

1.20 (1.17, 1.23)

1.20 (1.17, 1.23)

1.04 (0.94, 1.15)
1.06 (0.96, 1.17)

1.04 (0.94, 1.15)
1.06 (0.96, 1.17)

0.63 (0.49, 0.81)
0.66 (0.49, 0.88)
0.62 (0.10, 4.07)
1.05 (0.14, 7.70)

0.63 (0.49, 0.81)
0.66 (0.49, 0.88)
0.53 (0.08, 3.50)
1.24 (0.17, 9.23)

0.28 (0.10, 0.79)
1.46 (0.63, 3.34)
1.80 (0.85, 3.78)
1.11 (0.95, 1.31)

35.48 (2.01, 625.17)
1.11 (0.48, 2.59)
1.01 (0.45, 2.28)
0.57 (0.39, 0.85)

1.00 (0.99, 1.01)

1.02 (1.00, 1.03)

0.98 (0.93, 1.04)
0.90 (0.75, 1.08)
0.05 (<0.001, 144.93)

1.18 (1.05, 1.33)
1.45 (1.05, 2.00)
0.06 (<0.001, 193.13)

Table 13 (continued)
108

Variable

% of the population below age 65
without health insurance
Year dummies
Year 2005 (reference)
Year 2006
Year 2007

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

0.07 (0.00, 2.47)

0.10 (0.00, 3.61)

1.16 (1.03, 1.31)
1.16 (1.02, 1.31)

1.16 (1.03, 1.31)
1.13 (0.99, 1.28)
>999.99 (42.62,
>999.99)
1,278,886
11,935,483

Propensity score
# of Observations
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood

1,278,886
11,932,011

Compared to patients covered by private health insurance, Medicaid and self-pay patients had a
significantly higher odds of experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization (odds ratios,
1.50 and 1.58, respectively). Patients with second highest quartile of income had significantly
higher odds for same day ED visit and/or hospitalization than patients with highest quartile of
income (odd ratio, 1.13). Patients from micropolitan areas had significantly higher odds of
experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization than patients from large metropolitan
areas with more than 1 million residents (odds ratio, 2.00). Increasing number of comorbid
conditions and ED visits and hospitalizations within 6 months prior to the colonoscopy
procedure were both associated with significantly higher odds for same day ED visit and/or
hospitalization (odds ratios, 1.27 and 1.20, respectively). Colonoscopy procedures with biopsy or
lesion removal were not linked to elevated odds for same day ED visit and/or hospitalization.
At the facility level, higher facility volume was associated with lower odds for same day
ED visit and/or hospitalization. Specifically, the odds of experiencing same day ED visit and/or
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hospitalization were significantly lower for patients treated at a facility with second and third
tertile colonoscopy volume (431-1333 cases per year and >=1334 cases per year) compared to
those treated at a facility with a first tertile volume (30-430 cases per year, odds ratios, 0.63 and
0.66, respectively). Both specialization rate and its squared form were not significant.
Some market characteristics were found to be associated with patients’ odds of same day
ED visit and/or hospitalization. Higher Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), i.e., lower
competition level in the market was associated with significantly higher odds of same day ED
visit and/or hospitalization. Greater number of gastroenterologists per 100,000 population was
associated with lower odds of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization while greater number of
primary care physicians per 100,000 population and greater number of general surgeons were
associated with greater odds of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization. Another market factor,
population size, was associated with an increase in the odds for same day ED visit and/or
hospitalization. The year dummy 2006 was significant in the model. This means that on average,
the odds of experiencing same day ED visit and/or hospitalization were higher in 2006 than in
2005.
Results for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or
hospitalization.
As with the same day ED visit and/or hospitalization measure, the model of 30-day serious
gastrointestinal events with propensity score adjustment results in different estimation for some
market-level factors while that for other factors is very similar to the results from the model
without propensity score adjustment (Table 14). Therefore, only results based on the model with
propensity score adjustment are reported below.
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Table 14
Results of Multilevel Models for Serious Gastrointestinal Events within 30 Days Resulting in ED
Visit or Hospitalization (2005-2007)

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for
Market Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95%
CI)

1.62 (1.33, 1.99)
0.57 (0.27, 1.19)

1.62 (1.32, 1.98)
0.59 (0.27, 1.29)

0.46 (0.39, 0.54)
0.75 (0.61, 0.92)
0.98 (0.79, 1.21)
1.30 (0.95, 1.77)

0.46 (0.39, 0.54)
0.75 (0.61, 0.92)
0.98 (0.79, 1.21)
1.30 (0.95, 1.77)

1.39 (1.24, 1.55)

1.39 (1.24, 1.55)

1.01 (0.77, 1.33)
1.22 (1.04, 1.42)
0.50 (0.42, 0.60)

1.01 (0.77, 1.33)
1.22 (1.04, 1.42)
0.50 (0.42, 0.60)

1.06 (0.90, 1.26)
1.42 (1.11, 1.81)

1.06 (0.90, 1.26)
1.42 (1.12, 1.82)

0.92 (0.54, 1.58)
1.27 (0.96, 1.67)

0.92 (0.54, 1.58)
1.26 (0.95, 1.67)

1.12 (0.93, 1.35)
1.13 (0.96, 1.33)
1.11 (0.95, 1.29)

1.12 (0.93, 1.35)
1.13 (0.96, 1.34)
1.11 (0.95, 1.29)

Variable

Key Independent Variables
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Patient characteristics
Patient age
18-49 (reference)
50-64
65-74
75-84
85 or greater
Patient gender
Male (reference)
Female
Patient race/ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Other
Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance (reference)
Self-pay
Other payer
Median household income quartile (ZIP
code level)
Lowest quartile of income
Second lowest quartile of income
Second highest quartile of income
Highest quartile of income (reference)
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Table 14 (continued)

Variable

Urban/rural location
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million,
reference)
Metropolitan areas (<1 million)
Micropolitan areas
Non-urban areas
Charlson Comorbidity Index
# of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations
Colonoscopy type
Diagnostic colonoscopy
(reference)
Colonoscopy and biopsy
Lesion removal colonoscopy
Organizational characteristics
Facility colonoscopy volume group
30-430 cases per year (reference)
431-1333 cases per year
>= 1334 cases per year
Specialization rate
Specialization rate squared
Market characteristics
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
HMO penetration rate
PPO penetration rate
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000
# of primary care physicians per
100,000
# of general surgeons per 100,000
Log-transformed population size
% of the population above age 65
% of the population below age 65
without health insurance

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

0.97 (0.80, 1.17)
1.50 (0.97, 2.31)
1.24 (0.69, 2.20)
1.37 (1.34, 1.40)

0.97 (0.80, 1.18)
1.49 (0.96, 2.31)
1.24 (0.70, 2.20)
1.37 (1.34, 1.40)

1.18 (1.14, 1.21)

1.18 (1.14, 1.21)

1.49 (1.31, 1.71)
1.44 (1.26, 1.65)

1.49 (1.31, 1.71)
1.44 (1.26, 1.65)

0.88 (0.69, 1.13)
0.74 (0.58, 0.96)
1.70 (0.45, 6.47)
0.41 (0.11, 1.48)

0.88 (0.69, 1.13)
0.74 (0.58, 0.96)
1.68 (0.44, 6.42)
0.42 (0.12, 1.50)

1.86 (0.92, 3.77)
1.49 (0.60, 3.69)
1.00 (0.40, 2.51)
1.00 (0.89, 1.12)

2.63 (0.26, 26.72)
1.47 (0.59, 3.65)
0.96 (0.37, 2.49)
0.95 (0.68, 1.33)

1.00 (0.99, 1.01)

1.00 (0.99, 1.02)

0.98 (0.94, 1.02)
1.09 (0.97, 1.23)
0.58 (0.00, 125.20)

0.99 (0.90, 1.10)
1.13 (0.88, 1.45)
0.59 (0.00, 128.10)

0.31 (0.04, 2.63)

0.32 (0.04, 2.77)
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Table 14 (continued)

Variable

Year dummies
Year 2005 (reference)
Year 2006
Year 2007
Propensity score
# of Observations
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

1.14 (0.98, 1.33)
1.05 (0.91, 1.22)

1.14 (0.98, 1.33)
1.05 (0.90, 1.22)
1.83 (0.04, 89.89)
1,278,886
12,764,218

1,278,886
12,764,267

In the adjusted model, patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had significantly higher
odds of experiencing serious gastrointestinal events within 30 days of their procedure that
resulted in an ED visit or hospitalization than patients treated at a hospital-based outpatient
facility (odds ratio, 1.61). The estimated odds ratio for the interaction term between physician
ownership and competition in the market was less than one but not statistically significant at
p<0.05 level.
Similar to the model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, female patients had higher
odds than male patients of experiencing serious gastrointestinal events within 30 days. Medicaid
patients had significantly higher odds for serious gastrointestinal events than privately insured
patients. Charlson Comorbidity Index and the number of ED visits and hospitalizations within 6
months prior to the colonoscopy procedure were associated with significantly higher odds for
serious gastrointestinal events. Among organizational factors, higher facility volume was linked
to reduced odds for serious gastrointestinal events.
Different from the model of same day ED visit and/or hospitalization, patients in age
groups 50-64 and 65-74 had significantly lower odds for serious adverse events within 30 days
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of colonoscopy than those in age group 18-49. Hispanic patients had significantly higher odds
for serious gastrointestinal events than non-Hispanic white patients. In addition, receiving
colonoscopy with biopsy or lesion removal were associated increased odds for serious
gastrointestinal events. At the market level, no factors were statistically significant.
Results for 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or
hospitalization.
As with the two prior models, the results reported here are for the model with propensity
score adjustment. The adjusted odds for other gastrointestinal events was significantly higher for
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC compared to those treated at a hospital-based
outpatient facility (Table 15). Again, the effect of physician ownership on quality of care was not
influenced by the competition level in the market.
Similar to the prior model with the measure of same day transfer to ED or hospital, older
patients aged 75 or above, being female, covered by Medicaid, being self-pay, having higher
Charlson Comorbidity Index and larger number of ED visits and hospitalizations in the 6 months
prior to the colonoscopy were associated with a higher adjusted odds for other gastrointestinal
events.
Different from the model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, Hispanic patients had
lower odds of having other gastrointestinal events compared with non-Hispanic white patients.
Being covered by Medicare or other payers was associated with elevated odds of other
gastrointestinal events compared with privately insured patients. Residing in metropolitan areas
with less than 1 million population was associated with lowered odds of other gastrointestinal
events. Certain types of procedure, including colonoscopy with biopsy and colonoscopy with
lesion removal were associated with higher odds for other gastrointestinal events. This is
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Table 15
Results of Multilevel Models for Other Gastrointestinal Events within 30 Days Resulting in ED
visit or hospitalization (2005-2007)

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

1.26 (1.14, 1.38)
1.08 (0.77, 1.50)

1.27 (1.15, 1.40)
1.00 (0.70, 1.42)

0.62 (0.57, 0.67)
0.91 (0.82, 1.00)
1.43 (1.29, 1.58)
2.49 (2.19, 2.83)

0.61 (0.57, 0.67)
0.91 (0.82, 1.00)
1.43 (1.29, 1.58)
2.49 (2.19, 2.83)

1.10 (1.05, 1.16)

1.10 (1.05, 1.16)

0.98 (0.87, 1.11)
0.90 (0.83, 0.97)
0.50 (0.46, 0.54)

0.98 (0.86, 1.11)
0.90 (0.83, 0.97)
0.50 (0.46, 0.54)

1.22 (1.13, 1.32)
1.14 (1.01, 1.30)

1.22 (1.13, 1.32)
1.14 (1.01, 1.30)

1.37 (1.11, 1.68)
1.23 (1.07, 1.40)

1.36 (1.11, 1.68)
1.23 (1.07, 1.40)

1.06 (0.97, 1.15)
0.98 (0.91, 1.06)
1.00 (0.93, 1.07)

1.06 (0.97, 1.15)
0.98 (0.91, 1.06)
0.99 (0.93, 1.06)

Variable

Key Independent Variables
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Patient characteristics
Patient age
18-49 (reference)
50-64
65-74
75-84
85 or greater
Patient gender
Male (reference)
Female
Patient race/ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Other
Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance (reference)
Self-pay
Other payer
Median household income quartile
(ZIP code level)
Lowest quartile of income
Second lowest quartile of income
Second highest quartile of income
Highest quartile of income
(reference)
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Table 15 (continued)
Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

0.92 (0.84, 1.01)
1.23 (1.00, 1.51)
0.91 (0.68, 1.20)
1.50 (1.49, 1.51)

0.91 (0.84, 1.00)
1.24 (1.01, 1.52)
0.91 (0.69, 1.20)
1.50 (1.49, 1.51)

1.24 (1.23, 1.26)

1.24 (1.23, 1.26)

1.31 (1.23, 1.39)
1.15 (1.08, 1.23)

1.31 (1.23, 1.39)
1.15 (1.08, 1.23)

0.91 (0.81, 1.03)
0.90 (0.80, 1.02)
1.37 (0.75, 2.53)
0.49 (0.27, 0.88)

0.92 (0.82, 1.03)
0.90 (0.80, 1.02)
1.40 (0.76, 2.57)
0.48 (0.27, 0.86)

1.36 (0.98, 1.89)
0.81 (0.54, 1.21)
0.79 (0.52, 1.19)
1.02 (0.97, 1.08)
1.00 (0.99, 1.00)
1.01 (0.99, 1.03)
1.04 (0.99, 1.10)
0.59 (0.05, 6.90)

0.69 (0.21, 2.31)
0.83 (0.56, 1.25)
0.84 (0.55, 1.29)
1.13 (0.95, 1.34)
0.99 (0.99, 1.00)
0.98 (0.93, 1.03)
0.97 (0.86, 1.11)
0.55 (0.05, 6.47)

0.12 (0.04, 0.30)

0.11 (0.04, 0.28)

Variable

Urban/rural location
Metropolitan areas (>=1 million,
reference)
Metropolitan areas (<1 million)
Micropolitan areas
Non-urban areas
Charlson Comorbidity Index
# of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations
Colonoscopy type
Diagnostic colonoscopy (reference)
Colonoscopy and biopsy
Lesion removal colonoscopy
Organizational characteristics
Facility colonoscopy volume group
30-430 cases per year (reference)
431-1333 cases per year
>= 1334 cases per year
Specialization rate
Specialization rate squared
Market characteristics
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
HMO penetration rate
PPO penetration rate
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000
# of primary care physicians per 100,000
# of general surgeons per 100,000
Log-transformed population size
% of the population above age 65
% of the population below age 65
without health insurance
Year dummies
Year 2005 (reference)
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Table 15 (continued)

Variable

Year 2006
Year 2007
Propensity score
# of Observations
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood

Basic Model
Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.98 (0.91, 1.05)
1.01 (0.95, 1.08)
1,278,886
10,693,596

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection
Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.98 (0.91, 1.05)
1.01 (0.95, 1.08)
0.31 (0.04, 2.30)
1,278,886
10,693,645

consistent with the model of serious gastrointestinal event. At the facility level, specialization
rate squared was significantly associated with lower odds for other gastrointestinal events. But
other facility-level variables were not significant. At the market level, the number of primary
care physicians per 100,000 population and the uninsured rate were associated with lower odds
for other gastrointestinal events.
Results for 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or
hospitalization.
As with other models, the results discussed below relate to the model with propensity
score adjustment. For the adjusted model of other non-gastrointestinal events resulting in 30-day
ED visit or hospitalization, there was no significant difference in the odds among patients treated
at a physician-owned ASC and those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility (Table 16). In
addition, the effect of physician ownership on quality of care was not influenced by the
competition level in the market.
Similar to the prior model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, at the patient level,
many factors influenced the adjusted odds for other non-gastrointestinal events. For example, the
odds of experiencing other non-gastrointestinal events among patients in age group 50-64 was
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Table 16
Results of Multilevel Models for Non-gastrointestinal Events within 30 Days Resulting in ED
visit or hospitalization (2005-2007)

Variable

Key Independent Variables
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Patient characteristics
Patient age
18-49 (reference)
50-64
65-74
75-84
85 or greater
Patient gender
Male (reference)
Female
Patient race/ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Other
Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance (reference)
Self-pay
Other payer
Median household income quartile
(ZIP code level)
Lowest quartile of income
Second lowest quartile of income
Second highest quartile of income

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

1.05 (0.99, 1.12)
0.95 (0.77, 1.17)

1.05 (0.99, 1.11)
1.00 (0.80, 1.24)

0.92 (0.87, 0.97)
1.51 (1.41, 1.61)
2.41 (2.25, 2.57)
3.89 (3.58, 4.23)

0.92 (0.87, 0.97)
1.51 (1.41, 1.61)
2.41 (2.25, 2.57)
3.89 (3.58, 4.24)

0.92 (0.89, 0.95)

0.92 (0.89, 0.95)

1.25 (1.16, 1.34)
0.98 (0.94, 1.03)
0.51 (0.48, 0.54)

1.25 (1.16, 1.34)
0.98 (0.94, 1.03)
0.51 (0.48, 0.54)

1.34 (1.28, 1.40)
1.58 (1.47, 1.70)

1.34 (1.28, 1.40)
1.58 (1.47, 1.70)

1.44 (1.26, 1.64)
1.32 (1.22, 1.44)

1.44 (1.26, 1.64)
1.32 (1.22, 1.44)

1.15 (1.09, 1.21)
1.13 (1.08, 1.18)
1.07 (1.03, 1.12)

1.15 (1.09, 1.21)
1.13 (1.08, 1.18)
1.07 (1.03, 1.12)

118

Table 16 (continued)

Variable

Metropolitan areas (>=1 million,
reference)
Metropolitan areas (<1 million)
Micropolitan areas
Non-urban areas
Charlson Comorbidity Index
# of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations
Colonoscopy type
Diagnostic colonoscopy
(reference)
Colonoscopy and biopsy
Lesion removal colonoscopy
Organizational characteristics
Facility colonoscopy volume group
30-430 cases per year (reference)
431-1333 cases per year
>= 1334 cases per year
Specialization rate
Specialization rate squared
Market characteristics
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
HMO penetration rate
PPO penetration rate
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000
# of primary care physicians per
100,000
# of general surgeons per 100,000
Log-transformed population size
% of the population above age 65
% of the population below age 65
without health insurance
Year dummies
Year 2005 (reference)

Basic Model

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)

1.02 (0.97, 1.08)
0.99 (0.87, 1.13)
1.08 (0.92, 1.28)
1.49 (1.48, 1.50)

1.03 (0.97, 1.08)
0.98 (0.86, 1.12)
1.08 (0.92, 1.27)
1.49 (1.48, 1.50)

1.30 (1.28, 1.31)

1.30 (1.28, 1.31)

1.16 (1.11, 1.20)
1.26 (1.21, 1.30)

1.16 (1.11, 1.20)
1.26 (1.21, 1.30)

0.86 (0.81, 0.93)
0.82 (0.77, 0.88)
1.09 (0.75, 1.58)
0.76 (0.53, 1.09)

0.86 (0.81, 0.93)
0.82 (0.76, 0.88)
1.07 (0.74, 1.56)
0.78 (0.54, 1.11)

1.42 (1.15, 1.74)
1.08 (0.84, 1.39)
1.03 (0.80, 1.34)
1.02 (0.99, 1.05)

2.29 (1.14, 4.57)
1.06 (0.82, 1.37)
0.99 (0.76, 1.29)
0.95 (0.86, 1.05)

1.00 (1.00, 1.00)

1.00 (1.00, 1.00)

1.00 (0.99, 1.01)
1.06 (1.03, 1.10)
1.34 (0.30, 6.04)

1.02 (0.99, 1.05)
1.11 (1.03, 1.20)
1.38 (0.31, 6.22)

0.46 (0.26, 0.84)

0.49 (0.27, 0.88)
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Table 16 (continued)

Variable

Year 2006
Year 2007
Propensity score
# of Observations
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood

Basic Model
Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.95 (0.91, 0.99)
0.96 (0.92, 1.00)
1,278,886
9,500,756

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection
Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.95 (0.91, 0.99)
0.96 (0.92, 1.00)
2.28 (0.73, 7.15)
1,278,886
9,500,846

significantly lower than among those in age group 18-49. Being 75 or older was associated with
elevated odds of experiencing other non-gastrointestinal events. Medicaid and self-pay patients
had higher odds of experiencing other non-gastrointestinal events compared with privately
insured patients. Patients from ZIP codes with second highest income quartile had elevated odds
for other non-gastrointestinal events compared with those from the highest income quartile.
Having higher Charlson Comorbidity Index and a larger number of ED visits and
hospitalizations in the 6 months prior to the colonoscopy were associated with higher odds for
other non-gastrointestinal event. At the facility level, higher facility volume was associated with
lower odds for other non-gastrointestinal event. At the market level, higher HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI), i.e., lower competition level in the market was associated with
significantly higher odds of other non-gastrointestinal events. The log-transformed population
size was associated with elevated odds for other non-gastrointestinal events. The year dummy
2006 was statistically significant, meaning the odds for other non-gastrointestinal events were
higher in 2006 than in 2005.
Different from the model of same day transfer to ED or hospital, the odds of having other
non-gastrointestinal events was significantly higher among patients aged 65-74 years, compared
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with patients aged 18-49. Female gender and being African-American were associated with
reduced odds for other non-gastrointestinal events. Being covered by Medicare and other payer
were associated with elevated odds of other non-gastrointestinal events. This pattern was seen in
the model of other gastrointestinal events. Patients from the lowest and second lowest income
quartiles had elevated odds of other non-gastrointestinal events. Receiving colonoscopy with
biopsy or lesion removal was associated with higher odds for other non-gastrointestinal event. At
the market level, the uninsured rate and the year dummy 2007 were associated with lower odds
of non-gastrointestinal events.
In sum, as presented in Table 17, after accounting for patient, organizational, and market
characteristics, nested data structures, and physician selective investment, the odds for same day
ED visit and/or hospitalization and other non-gastrointestinal events within 30 days of outpatient
colonoscopy were not different among patients treated at a physician-owned ASC and those
treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. However, according to the adjusted models,
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC had significantly higher odds for serious
gastrointestinal events and other gastrointestinal events within 30 days of outpatient colonoscopy,
in comparison to those treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. In all the four adjusted
models, the interaction term between physician ownership and competition level in the market
was not statistically significant.
The differences in odds for adverse events after colonoscopy are illustrated more directly
in Table 18, which presents the adjusted rate (incidence per 1,000 procedures) for different types
of adverse events, stratified by location of care. After accounting for patient-, facility-, marketlevel factors, the nested data structures, and physician selective investment, the adjusted rates for
same day transfer (2.82 per 1,000 procedures vs. 2.98 per 1,000 procedures) and the adjusted rate
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Table 17
The Effects of Physician Ownership and Its Interaction Term with HHI on Quality of Outpatient Colonoscopy
30-day Serious
30-day Other
30-day Other NonGastrointestinal
Gastrointestinal
Gastrointestinal
Same day ED visit
Variable
Events Resulting in
Events Resulting in
Events Resulting
or Hospitalization
ED Visit or
ED Visit or
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
Hospitalization
Hospitalization
Physician ownership
0.95 (0.66, 1.35)
1.62 (1.32, 1.98)***
1.27 (1.15, 1.40)***
1.05 (0.99, 1.11)
Physician ownership*HHI
2.20 (0.56, 8.61)
0.59 (0.27, 1.29)
1.00 (0.70, 1.42)
1.00 (0.80, 1.24)
Note: The results are from basic models plus propensity score adjusting for market selection. Odds ratios are reported with 95%
Confidence Intervals in brackets. ***Significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 18
Adjusted Rate per 1,000 procedures for an Adverse Event by Location of Care

Variable

Physician-owned ASC
Hospital-based
outpatient facility

Same day ED visit
or Hospitalization
Rate (95% CI)

30-Day Serious
Gastrointestinal
Event
Resulting in ED Visit
or Hospitalization
Rate (95% CI)

30-Day Other
Gastrointestinal Events
Resulting in ED Visit or
Hospitalization Rate
(95% CI)

30-Day Other NonGastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization Rate
(95% CI)

2.82 (2.07, 3.84)

1.78 (1.34, 2.36)***

5.94 (5.21, 6.77)***

16.78 (15.49, 18.18)

2.98 (2.15, 4.13)

1.10 (0.82, 1.48)

4.69 (4.09, 5.37)

16.05 (14.79, 17.42)

Note: The results are from basic models plus propensity score adjusting for market selection. Adjusted rate is reported with 95% Confidence Intervals in
brackets. ***Significant at the p<.01 level.

for other non-gastrointestinal events within 30 days (16.78 per 1,000 procedures vs. 16.05 per
1,000 procedures) are not significantly different across physician-owned ASCs and hospitalbased outpatient facilities. But for the other two outcome measures, significant differences exist
across location of care. The rate for serious gastrointestinal events was 1.78 per 1,000 procedures
if the patient received the procedure at a physician-owned ASC while the number was 1.10 per
1,000 procedures if the patient was treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility. Similarly, the
rate for other gastrointestinal events was 5.94 per 1,000 procedures if the patient received the
procedure at a physician-owned ASC and the number was 4.69 per 1,000 procedures if the
patient was treated at a hospital-based outpatient facility.
Sensitivity Analyses
Physicians’ decision to invest in an outpatient surgical facility may be influenced by the
characteristics of the market where the facility is located. Therefore, basic models plus a
propensity score adjusting for physician selective investment in outpatient surgical facilities were
presented as the main analysis in the sections above. However, referral of patients to physicianowned ASCs or hospital-based outpatient facilities may also be a nonrandom process. Physician
owners may select relatively healthier and better insured patients (those covered by private
insurance and Medicare) for ASCs in which they invest. The main analysis is thus supplemented
with a sensitivity analysis to determine whether the direction and statistical significance of the
relationships vary when a different propensity score that adjusts for patient selection is used. As
discussed in the last chapter, all patient-level factors are used to construct the propensity score.
Two series of models, one with a propensity score adjusting for physician selective
investment and another for patient selection, for the four dependent variables were compared.
For most models, the findings for the key independent variables were consistent across the two
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methods of propensity score adjustment. One exception is that the model with a propensity score
adjusting for physician selective investment did not show a significant relationship between
physician ownership and the occurrence of other non-gastrointestinal events while the model
with a propensity score adjusting for patient selection did (Table 19).
While the estimation of facility-level factors remained largely unchanged in the two
models with different propensity scores, differences were found among estimates of patient-level
factors, market-level factors, and sometimes year dummy variables (data not shown).
Substituting the propensity score adjusting for physician selective investment with the one that
adjusts for patient selection led to some market factors (such as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), the number of primary care physicians per 100,000 population, the number of general
surgeons per 100,000 population, the log-transformed population size, and the uninsured rate)
becoming insignificant. In addition, some patient factors (such as being African American, being
covered by Medicare, self-pay, or being covered by other payer, and urban/rural location
variables) gained statistical significance. The interpretation of control variables thus appears to
be sensitive to the propensity score method used.
A second sensitivity analysis focused on whether the direction and statistical significance
of key independent variables varied when a lagged quality indicator was included (Table 20).
The lagged quality indicator was operationalized as the unadjusted adverse event rate (per 1,000
procedures) for a given facility in the prior year. Because the lagged quality indictor was missing
for all colonoscopy cases performed in 2005, only 819,126 cases were included in the analysis
for the years 2006 and 2007. Table 20 presents the results of the model with a propensity score
adjusting for physician selective investment and a model with the lagged quality indicator added.
The direction and statistical significance of the odds ratios for most key independent variables
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Table 19
Sensitivity Analysis Comparing Two Models with Different Propensity Score Adjustments

Dependent Variable

Same Day ED Visit or
Hospitalization
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30-Day Serious
Gastrointestinal Events
Resulting in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
30-Day Other
Gastrointestinal Events
Resulting in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
30-Day Non-Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in ED Visit
or Hospitalization
a

Key Independent Variable

Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
-2 Res Log PseudoLikelihood
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
-2 Res Log PseudoLikelihood
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
-2 Res Log PseudoLikelihood
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
-2 Res Log PseudoLikelihood

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score Adjusting
for Market Selection

Basic Model Plus
Propensity Score Adjusting
for Patient Selectiona

Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.95 (0.66, 1.35)
2.20 (0.56, 8.61)
>999.99 (42.62, >999.99)

Odds Ratio (95% CI)
1.05 (0.74, 1.49)
1.14 (0.31, 4.23)
0.00 (<0.001, 0.01)

11,935,483
1.62 (1.32, 1.98)
0.59 (0.27, 1.29)
1.83 (0.04, 89.89)

11,957,307
1.66 (1.35, 2.03)
0.56 (0.27, 1.16)
<0.001 (<0.001, 0.00)

12,764,218
1.27 (1.15, 1.40)
1.00 (0.70, 1.42)
0.31 (0.04, 2.30)

18,831
1.29 (1.17, 1.41)
1.07 (0.77, 1.49)
<0.001 (<0.001, <0.001)

10,693,645
1.05 (0.99, 1.11)
1.00 (0.80, 1.24)
2.28 (0.73, 7.15)

10,781,797
1.08 (1.01, 1.14)
0.95 (0.77, 1.16)
<0.001 (<0.001, <0.001)

9,500,846

9,567,860

The procedure GLIMMIX did not converge for the model examining 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization.
Therefore, the procedure logistic was used instead for this outcome measure.

Table 20
Sensitivity Analysis Comparing Models With and Without the Lagged Quality Indicator

Dependent Variable

Same Day ED Visit or
Hospitalization
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30-Day Serious
Gastrointestinal Events
Resulting in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
30-Day Other
Gastrointestinal Events
Resulting in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
30-Day NonGastrointestinal Events
Resulting in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
a

Key Independent Variable

Model with Propensity
Score Adjusting for
Market Selection

Model with Propensity Score
Adjusting for Market
Selection and Lagged Qualitya

Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
Lagged quality
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
Lagged quality
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
Lagged quality
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood
Physician ownership
Physician ownership*HHI
Propensity score
Lagged quality
-2 Res Log Pseudo-Likelihood

Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.95 (0.66, 1.35)
2.20 (0.56, 8.61)
>999.99 (42.62, >999.99)
11,935,483
1.62 (1.32, 1.98)
0.59 (0.27, 1.29)
1.83 (0.04, 89.89)
12,764,218
1.27 (1.15, 1.40)
1.00 (0.70, 1.42)
0.31 (0.04, 2.30)
10,693,645
1.05 (0.99, 1.11)
1.00 (0.80, 1.24)
2.28 (0.73, 7.15)
9,500,846

Odds Ratio (95% CI)
0.92 (0.77, 1.09)
1.23 (0.60, 2.50)
31.46 (1.36, 727.98)
1.01 (1.01, 1.01)
23,959
1.55 (1.17, 2.04)
0.73 (0.25, 2.12)
1.19 (0.01, 194.23)
1.01 (0.96, 1.06)
8,124,484
1.23 (1.09, 1.39)
1.01 (0.65, 1.57)
0.20 (0.01, 2.80)
1.02 (1.01, 1.03)
6,864,247
1.08 (1.00, 1.16)
1.14 (0.88, 1.49)
5.07 (1.30, 19.67)
1.01 (1.01, 1.01)
6,106,330

The procedure GLIMMIX did not converge for the model examining same day ED visit or hospitalization. Therefore, the procedure logistic was used
instead for this outcome measure.

were similar in both models for all 4 dependent variables with one exception. The relationship
between physician ownership and the incidence of other non-gastrointestinal events became
significant after including the lagged quality indicator with individuals treated in these facilities
having higher odds of 30-day other non-GI events resulting in an ED visit or hospitalization
relative to individuals treated in hospital-owned outpatient facilities. The lagged quality indicator
had a positive and statistically significant effect in three of the models. The odds ratios ranged
from 1.01 to 1.02, which means a one unit increase in the rate of a specific type of adverse events
in the previous year increased the odds of patient having a particular adverse event by 1% to 2%.
The estimation results support the idea that quality of care is autocorrelated, i.e., the value of the
measure in the previous period can affect the value in the following period.
In sum, the results from the sensitivity analysis were generally consistent with those from
the main analysis, suggesting the findings are robust to changes in propensity score adjustment
approach and to the inclusion of a lagged quality indicator.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of descriptive and multivariate analyses. Findings of
this study indicate that physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient facilities served
different patient population, had different organizational characteristics, and were located in
health care markets with different characteristics. When examining the unadjusted occurrence of
adverse events, physician-owned ASCs had lower incidence of these events relative to hospitalbased outpatient facilities. But when controlling for variables at the patient, facility, and marketlevels, nested data structures, and potential physician selective investment in outpatient surgical
facilities, the results suggested that physician-owned ASCs had similar or worse performance
127

compared to hospital-based outpatient facilities. The main analysis suggested poorer
performance for physician owned facilities on two indicators (30-day serious gastrointestinal
events and 30-day other gastrointestinal events, both of which resulted in ED visit or
hospitalization). Sensitivity analysis found similar results for these two measures and also
suggested poorer performance for the 30-day non- gastrointestinal events that resulted in ED
visit or hospitalization among physician owned facilities. The interaction term between physician
ownership and competition level in the market was not statistically significant.
These results lend support for Hypothesis 3, but not for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
This implies that physicians may be taking advantage of information gaps faced by patients and
providing lower quality colonoscopy care in their outpatient facilities. The next chapter will
provide a more detailed summary of research findings. It will also discuss some of the
managerial, policy, and research implications of this study.
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Chapter 6: Discussion

Physicians’ investment in ASCs (along with their investment in specialty hospitals,
diagnostic imaging centers and other health care facilities) has attracted the attention of both
policy makers and researchers for a number of years. Physician-owned ASCs provide largely
identical services to hospital-based outpatient facilities. A number of studies report that
physician ownership is associated with patient “cherry picking” and overutilization of services
due to self-referral (Gabel et al., 2008; Hollingsworth et al., 2010b; Strope et al., 2009). However,
limited empirical evidence exists on the potential relationship between physician ownership and
patient quality of care. Some have argued that physician-owned ASCs provide better quality of
care and their patients should have better outcomes because physician ownership may enhance
physicians’ accountability (Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009; Office of
Inspector General, 1999). By contrast, others contend that quality of care may be compromised
at physician owned facilities because physician ownership creates financial conflicts of interest
(Mitchell & Sass, 1995; Mitchell, 2010; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012). A small number of studies have
compared patient outcomes in ASCs (combining physician-owned and non-physician-owned
facilities) to those in hospital-based outpatient facilities, but these studies have yielded mixed
results (Chukmaitov, Menachemi, Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008; Fleisher, Pasternak,
Herbert, & Anderson, 2004; Hollingsworth et al., 2012).
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This study examined the relationship between physician ownership and quality of care by
comparing patient outcomes for outpatient colonoscopy in physician-owned ASCs versus those
treated in hospital-based outpatient facilities, while controlling for factors at patient,
organizational and market levels. Using a licensing requirement change that occurred in
California due to a court decision, the study was able to identify ASCs with whole or partial
physician ownership. Procedure-related adverse events that developed after the procedure were
used to measure patient outcomes. Four categories of adverse events were examined: same day
ED visit and/or hospitalization, 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or
hospitalization. 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization, and
30-day other non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. This chapter
begins with a summary of the research findings. Then it reviews the limitation of the study,
followed by a discussion of the implications of the study for theory, policy and practice, and
future research. The last section concludes the study.
Summary
Findings of the descriptive analysis.
During the study period, physician-owned ASCs delivered slightly more than half of
outpatient colonoscopy in California. Overall, outpatient colonoscopy patients were more likely
to be age 50 or above, female, and non-Hispanic white, covered by Medicare or private insurance,
from the top two income quartiles, living in metropolitan areas, and largely healthy. The
composition of different types of outpatient colonoscopy procedures (diagnostic, with biopsy,
and with lesion removal) furnished in physician-owned ASCs and hospital-based outpatient
facilities were largely the same. However, there were significant differences among patients
treated by physician-owned ASCs and those by hospital outpatient facilities. The former were
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less likely to be racial/ethnic minorities and Medicaid recipients. This is consistent with the
finding of previous studies (Gabel et al., 2008; O’Sullivan, 2007). In addition, patients treated by
physician-owned ASCs were more likely to be covered by Medicare or private insurance and
come from more affluent neighborhood and metropolitan areas. They also had significantly
lower Charlson Comorbidity Index and lower propensity to use medical services as measured by
inpatient and emergency department service use in the six months before their colonoscopy.
At the organizational level, physician-owned ASCs on average had a significantly higher
colonoscopy volume compared with hospital outpatient facilities. In addition, they had a
significantly larger proportion of colonoscopy procedures compared with hospital-based
outpatient facility. At the market level, there was a great variation as to the representation of
physician-owned ASCs across different geographic areas. Health care markets (counties) with a
low percentage of study observations that were represented by physician-owned ASC facilities
rather than hospital-based outpatient facilities had lower levels of outpatient surgical care
competition, a lower HMO penetration rate, lower gastroenterologists per 100,000 population,
higher primary care physicians per 100,000 population, and higher general surgeons per 100,000
population. Such markets tended to have a smaller population size and higher percent of the
population aged 65 or above.
The unadjusted incidence rates for adverse events that resulted in an ED visit or
hospitalization within 30 days of outpatient colonoscopy were low. Physician-owned ASCs had
lower rates of same day ED visit or hospitalization, 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting
in ED visit or hospitalization, and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or
hospitalization than hospital-based outpatient facilities. There was no difference in the rate of 30-
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day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization across outpatient
surgery settings.
Summary of multivariate analysis.
This study drew on agency theory as a conceptual framework to examine the association
between physician ownership and quality of care. Patients treated at a physician-owned ASC
were hypothesized to have better outcomes (lower rates of adverse events after colonoscopy)
than those receiving treatment at a hospital-based outpatient facility, with the assumption that
patients are able to assess quality of care difference across outpatient surgical facilities. In
addition, the quality advantage associated with physician ownership was hypothesized to be
stronger in more competitive health care markets. Alternatively, if patients do not have the
ability to assess quality differences and if physician owners exploit this information void,
patients treated at a physician-owned ASC were hypothesized to have higher rates of adverse
events, holding other factors constant. To better isolate the relationship between physician
ownership and outcomes of care, three-level generalized hierarchical linear models (GHLM)
were used to control for confounding factors at patient, facility, and market levels.
The study found that after risk adjustment, colonoscopy patients treated at a physicianowned ASC had similar odds of experiencing same day ED visit or hospitalization and 30-day
non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization as those treated in a hospitalbased outpatient facility. But the former had significantly higher odds of experiencing 30-day
serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization and 30-day other
gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. This suggests that the odds of
experiencing certain adverse events after outpatient colonoscopy vary by site of care, with
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physician-owned ASCs having similar or worse performance when compared to hospital-based
outpatient facilities on the measures of colonoscopy quality of care examined in this study.
The study results do not support the hypotheses that physician ownership leads to better
patient outcomes and that this effect is more prominent in relatively competitive health care
markets. Instead, they lend support to the hypothesis that patients treated at physician-owned
ASCs may have higher incidence of adverse events because they may not have the ability to
assess quality differences across sites of care and physician owners may be exploiting this
information void. While this variation in surgical quality across settings was statistically
significant, it is important to note that the occurrence of these events tend to be very low,
especially for same day ED visit or hospitalization and for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events
that result in an ED visit or hospitalization.
The study also found several interesting associations between some control variables and
quality measures (Table 21). Some factors had a consistent effect on the outcome measures
examined in this study. For example, compared with being in the age group 18-49, being in the
age group 50-64 was associated with lower odds for all outcome measures. By contrast, being
aged 75 and above was associated with higher odds for three outcome measures: same day ED
visit or hospitalization, 30-day other gastrointestinal events, and 30-day non-gastrointestinal
events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Compared with privately insured patients,
Medicaid patients were associated with higher odds for all four outcome measures while self-pay
patients were associated with higher odds for the first, third and fourth quality measures. Increase
in the Charlson Index or the number of ED visits or hospitalizations in the prior six months was
associated with higher odds for all four quality measures. Receiving more invasive procedures
(Colonoscopy and biopsy or Lesion removal colonoscopy) versus diagnostic colonoscopy was
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Table 21
Summary of Significant Associations of Control Variables with Measures of Quality of Outpatient Colonoscopy

Variable

134

Patient characteristics
Patient age
18-49 (reference)
50-64
65-74
75-84
85 or greater
Patient gender
Male (reference)
Female
Patient race/ethnicity
White (reference)
Black
Hispanic
Other
Payer
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance (reference)
Self-pay
Other payer

Same day ED
visit or
Hospitalization

-

30-day Serious
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other NonGastrointestinal
Events Resulting
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization

-

+
+

+
+
+

+

+

-

+
+

+

+
-

+
+

+
-

-

-

+

+
+

+
+

+
+

+

Table 21 (continued)
Variable
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Median household income quartile
(ZIP code level)
Lowest quartile of income
Second lowest quartile of
income
Second highest quartile of
income
Highest quartile of income
(reference)
Urban/rural location
Metropolitan areas (>=1
million, reference)
Metropolitan areas (<1 million)
Micropolitan areas
Non-urban areas
Charlson Comorbidity Index
# of previous ED visits and
hospitalizations
Colonoscopy type
Diagnostic colonoscopy
(reference)
Colonoscopy and biopsy
Lesion removal colonoscopy

Same day ED
visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Serious
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other NonGastrointestinal
Events Resulting
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization

+
+
+

+

+

+
+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+
+

+
+

+
+

Table 21 (continued)
Variable
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Organizational characteristics
Facility colonoscopy volume group
30-430 cases per year (reference)
431-1333 cases per year
>= 1334 cases per year
Specialization rate
Specialization rate squared
Market characteristics
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
HMO penetration rate
PPO penetration rate
# of gastroenterologists per 100,000
# of primary care physicians per
100,000
# of general surgeons per 100,000
Log-transformed population size
% of the population above age 65
% of the population below age 65
without health insurance
Year dummies
Year 2005 (reference)

Same day ED
visit or
Hospitalization

-

30-day Serious
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other NonGastrointestinal
Events Resulting
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization

-

-

+

+

+

-

+
+

+
-

-

Table 21 (continued)
Variable
Year 2006
Year 2007

Same day ED
visit or
Hospitalization
+

30-day Serious
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other
Gastrointestinal
Events Resulting in
ED Visit or
Hospitalization

30-day Other NonGastrointestinal
Events Resulting
in ED Visit or
Hospitalization
-

Note: +: implies a significant odds ratio greater than 1.00; -: implies a significant odds ratio that is less than 1.00. All
relationships noted above were significant at the p<.05 level. The results reported here come from primary models that
included propensity score adjustment for physician market selection.
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associated with higher odds for three quality measures with same day ED visit or hospitalization
as an exception. Among organizational-level factors, having moderate or high facility
colonoscopy volume was associated with lower odds for two to three of the four quality
measures. Similar findings have been reported (Chukmaitov et al., 2008; Chukmaitov, Devers,
Harless, Menachemi, & Brooks, 2010). At the market level, higher HHI index (lower
competition level in the market) was associated with higher odds for same day ED visit or
hospitalization and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization.
The uninsured rate was associated with lower odds for 30-day other gastrointestinal events
resulting in ED visit or hospitalization and 30-day non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED
visit or hospitalization. These findings indicate that future studies of quality of care should
consider a systematic exploration of relevant factors at multiple levels.
The relationship between some control variables and outcome measures was found to be
inconsistent. For example, female gender was associated with higher odds for the first three
quality measures but lower odds for the last quality measure. This may be due to the fact that
females tend to have lower rate of cardiovascular diseases, which represented a large part of the
30-day non-gastrointestinal events. In addition, being Hispanic was found to be associated with
higher odds for 30-day serious gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization but
lower odds for 30-day other gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization.
Higher number of primary care physicians per 100,000 population was associated with higher
odds for same day ED visit or hospitalization and lower odds for 30-day other gastrointestinal
events resulting in ED visit or hospitalization. Higher log-transformed population size was
associated with higher odds for same day ED visit or hospitalization and lower odds for 30-day
other gastrointestinal events and non-gastrointestinal events resulting in ED visit or
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hospitalization. These inconsistent patterns suggest that the different types of adverse events
represented by outcome measures examined in this study have different determinants.
Some factors were not found to be significant. For example, the specialization rate (the
percentage of colonoscopy procedures to all outpatient surgeries provided by a facility) was not
significant in any models. Other examples included HMO and PPO penetration and the
percentage of the population above age 65.
Limitations of the Study
This study has several limitations that merit discussion. First, this study was based on
administrative data. Details about the surgical procedure, such as type of anesthesia, operating
room time, or monitoring were not available in the data and thus, could not be controlled. It is
also possible that physicians may choose certain locations to treat their patients based on
information not available in the administrative data. Additionally, other than facility volume and
specialization, there are other organizational characteristics that may affect quality of care that
could not be examined, such as number of operating rooms, number of support staff, number of
physicians providing care at the facility, the number of years the facility was in operation, etc.
Moreover, the accuracy of the analysis was limited to the accuracy and completeness of the
coding in the data files. There may have been coding errors in CPT codes and ICD diagnosis
codes. Finally, an existing study reported that fewer secondary diagnoses are present among
cases treated in ASCs than those in a hospital-based outpatient facility (Chukmaitov, Menachemi,
Brown, Saunders, & Brooks, 2008). This study added diagnosis information from linked
inpatient and emergency department records around the procedure date when conducting risk
adjustment. But the comorbidities of those cases without linked inpatient or emergency

139

department records may be underestimated, which may undermine the observed quality of care
provided by physician-owned ASCs.
Additionally, this study was only able to identify physician ownership at the facility level
and compared the quality of colonoscopy procedures furnished in physician-owned ASCs and
hospital-based outpatient facilities. It is possible that some physicians who perform procedures in
ASCs may not be owners. But it was not possible to identify individual physician owners. In fact,
the California data do not include physician identifiers. The study dropped colonoscopy cases
performed in non-physician-owned ASCs because there were too few observations to examine. It
is also noteworthy that hospital-based outpatient facility category included both hospital
outpatient departments as well as free-standing ASCs wholly owned by hospitals.
Third, this study dealt with selection issues (both physician investment and patient
referral) through the use of propensity matching techniques. However, these techniques only
control for observable characteristics. It could be that unobservable factors that the study could
not measure are influencing these decisions and as a result, estimated effects could be biased to
some degree by residual selection issues.
Fourth, the generalizability of the findings of this study is restricted for three reasons.
First of all, this study relied on data strictly for the State of California. The California health care
market likely differs from those of other states. In particular, California lacks certificate of need
requirements for new ASCs, its HMO penetration rate is relatively high, and it has a high
percentage of its population that is uninsured. These differences may make it hard to generalize
findings from California to other geographic areas. A second factor is that the study used
counties to define health care markets. Although prior studies suggest that changing the
definition of health care markets do not substantially affect the results (Krauchunas, 2011;
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McLaughlin, Normolle, Wolfe, McMahon, & Griffith, 1989), using counties as the boundaries of
health care market in this study may add some bias because counties are extremely wide
geographically in California. Finally, the study chose to examine the quality of care of outpatient
colonoscopy. While it enabled the study to examine procedure-specific quality measures,
focusing on one type of outpatient surgery makes it difficult to generalize the conclusions to
patients receiving other types of outpatient surgical procedures.
Implications of the Findings
Implications for theory.
This study used agency theory to conceptualize physician ownership and its potential
relationships to quality of care, examining two different agency relationships: the one between
other owners of an ASC (principals) and physicians (agents) who perform surgical procedures in
the facility and the one between patients (principals) and physicians (agents). Agency theory
does not specifically predict whether physician ownership would improve or detract from the
quality performance of an outpatient surgical facility. Depending on the extent to which
consumers are able to assess quality of care differences across settings of care, physician
ownership can function as a mechanism to improve quality or as a deterrent to quality. The study
results support the latter, namely physician ownership may be a deterrent to quality in practice.
There are several reasons why the hypothesis of physician ownership as a mechanism to
improve quality and the mediating effect of market competition were not supported. Lack of
information on clinical aspects of care quality may limit the ability of patients and their referring
physicians to make decisions about care setting for colonoscopy procedures. Additionally,
patients may be more focused on amenities and convenience when they talk to other patients
about potential sites of care. As a result, physician owners may not have the motivation to
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improve technical aspects of the quality of care, even if they have the knowledge and expertise to
do so. In a competitive health market, physician owners of ASCs may also decide to compete
with hospital-based outpatient facilities on factors such as amenities, convenience, shorter
waiting times, or other factors that patients value in health care services. Finally, given existing
reimbursement policies, physician owners may be willing to sacrifice aspects of the quality of
care to the degree that these are not noticeable to the patients so that they can lower operating
costs and enhance facility profits.
Implications for policy and management.
Quality and cost represent two important considerations in health policy decision-making.
Quality of care has drawn enormous attention after the seminal Institute of Medicine report
Crossing the Quality Chasm was published (Institute of Medicine, 2001). The Affordable Care
Act calls for the establishment of a value-based purchasing (VBP) for Medicare payments paid to
ASCs (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011). The VBP program represents an
important step for Medicare to move from rewarding volume toward rewarding better value and
outcomes. Although much of the discussion about physician ownership has been focused on
uncovering its impact on patient selection and service overutilization, this study and a few other
studies (Mitchell & Sass, 1995; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012) have directed the attention toward the
relationship between physician ownership and patient outcomes.
From a policy perspective, Medicare as well as private payers may consider more
stringent physician financial interest disclosure policies based on the findings of this study. To
qualify for safe harbor protection under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, a physician with an
ownership interest in an ASC must “fully inform” the patients of his or her ownership interest
when he or she refers patients to that facility (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS),
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HHS, 2007). While further research is needed, the findings of this study and other earlier studies
(Hollingsworth et al., 2009; Hollingsworth et al., 2010a; Mitchell, 2010; O’Neill & Hartz, 2012;
Strope et al., 2009) suggest that the disclosure of physician ownership to a larger audience may
be warranted. For example, if financial disclosure information on referring physicians becomes
available for monitoring and research purposes, the potential effects of physician investment can
be further studied and controlled. Moreover, the study may some implication for California’s
corporate practice of medicine prohibition. The prohibition precludes hospitals from directly
employing physicians with the intention of preventing unlicensed persons from interfering with
or influencing the physician’s professional judgment. Evidence from this study implies that
physician’s professional judgment may be influenced by many other factors even when they
have the ownership or control of the business. When hospitals partner with physicians to provide
outpatient colonoscopy, the quality of care is as good as or better than the quality of care
provided in physician-owned ASCs. Therefore, further studies of the ban on the corporate
practice of medicine may be needed.
Medicare and other payers should adopt strategies to collect quality of care data and
make them available to the patients to encourage evidence-based decision-making about where
to receive care. In 2012, CMS launched the ASC Quality Reporting System (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS, 2011). ASCs are required to report five quality
measures beginning October 1, 2012, for calendar year (CY) 2014 payment determination. These
five measures, in addition to two structural measures, will be used for the CY 2015 payment
determination. This study suggests that it is worthwhile to use procedure-specific quality
measures. Using only generic measures such as same day ED visit or hospitalization may miss
some meaningful quality variations across location of care.
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From a clinical or management perspective, the study provides useful information about
how to identify patient subgroups that are prone to develop certain type of adverse events after
outpatient colonoscopy. For example, senior age, female gender, being covered by Medicaid,
high Charlson Comorbidity Index, a history of using medical services six month prior to the
surgery, receiving colonoscopy procedures with biopsy or lesion removal were identified as risk
factors for developing other gastrointestinal events such as intestinal obstruction and abdominal
pain that result in ED visit or hospitalization within 30 days of the surgery. The information can
be used to focus adverse event prevention efforts. Additionally, such information should be made
available to physicians, health care facility managers, and patients to reduce the occurrence of
adverse events. In this sense, the study findings may help to improve postoperative care and the
smooth transition from the outpatient surgical settings to other settings.
Suggestions for Future Research
This study represents an initial effort to assess the effect of physician ownership of ASCs
on the quality of care. There are some suggestions for future studies given the limitations
identified above. This study operationalized the quality of outpatient colonoscopy using adverse
events developed after the surgery due to limitations of the data. However, the American Society
for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) and the American College of Gastroenterology (ACG)
proposed quality indicators for colonoscopy that encompass the preprocedure, intraprocedure,
and postprocedure periods (Rex et al., 2006). Future studies should further examine technical
indicators of quality of outpatient colonoscopy, such as colonoscopy withdrawal time, polyp
detection rate, and cecal intubation. It is also important to explore process of care measures and
patient experience measures.
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As discussed previously, the current study was only able to identify physician ownership
at the facility level. A comparison of quality of care at the physician level will be of interest.
More detailed information about physician ownership, such as an individual physician's
ownership share of an ASC should be included if the data are available.
In addition, research is needed on other types of outpatient surgical services. For example,
it is worthwhile to compare outcomes of patients who receive urological procedures in
physician-owned ASCs and those treated in hospital-based outpatient facilities. Moreover, more
studies need to be conducted in different states in different time periods to see if the findings are
robust and generalizable to other markets.
Conclusions
Physician ownership is common among ASCs. This study using a large, diverse patient
population and found that physician ownership of ASCs was not associated with better quality of
care for colonoscopy patients. Instead, patients treated by physician-owned ASCs had
significantly worse outcomes in two quality measures and similar outcomes in two other
measures when compared to colonoscopy patients treated by hospital-based outpatient facilities.
However, ASCs are believed to provide more convenient location, shorter waiting time, and
more patient-center care with a lower price (American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons,
2010; Koenig, Doherty, Dreyfus, & Xanthopoulos, 2009). Thus, it may be difficult to compare
the value of care provided by physician-owned ASCs and that by hospital-based outpatient
facilities. As more complex procedures are shifted from hospital-based outpatient facilities to
ASCs, expanded efforts to monitor and report quality of care will be worthwhile.
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